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Finance Minister Denies Fuel Sanctions Violations

AU0610084295 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 5 Oct 95

[Report by Pandeli Shehu]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In response to a request by deputy Namik Dokle, Dylber Vrioni, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, has been offering some information about the measures being taken by the government to stop smuggling. Vrioni said that, as a country that is still opening up to the world, Albania should face, in addition to other things, the problems of smuggling. For this reason, the government has made efforts to perfect legislation on the fight against the mentality of illegality. An indication of this, Vrioni said, is the Penal Code provisions, the laws on customs, the creation of the customs police, etc. This has produced results.

Vrioni denied claims that the fuel embargo against Serbia had been violated and explained that he had met and talked about this issue with those responsible on the UN Sanctions Committee.

Vrioni also spoke about the ever increasing cooperation with other countries and institutions on assistance with the necessary means and experience to fight smuggling.

The measures taken will continue to minimize this phenomenon, Vrioni concluded. [passage omitted]

Socialist Party Preelectoral Congress Set

AU0310154495 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 30 Sep 95

[Socialist Party Press Communique: "Preelectoral Socialist Party Congress To Be Held"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The General Steering Committee of the Socialist Party [PS] held its extraordinary meeting on 29 September, to analyze the present political situation.

After realistically discussing all recent events;

After analyzing the political stands of the PS presidency and parliamentary group;

After denouncing the Berisha power acts against the independence of legal entities aiming directly at PS Chairman Fatos Nano;

After stressing that the conflicting and destabilizing policy and antilegal acts of the majority against the opposition should be met with the conviction of the people in our alternatives:

The PS General Steering Committee decided:

Within the coming two weeks broad meetings and consultations should take place in all the structures and at all levels of the Party and with its supporters, and on 13 October 1995, the General Committee should gather again to decide the following:

1. To set up the Central Electoral Commission of the PS;

2. To summon the preelectoral congress of the party which will discuss and approve the electoral platform and program as well as the PS candidates for the coming elections;

3. To define the electoral map and commissions in the districts;

4. To increase the effectiveness of the work of leading structures and to improve their organization;

5. To examine the political possibilities for preelectoral and postelectoral alliances;

6. To point out and organize more effectively the international support for the PS during the electoral campaign.

a serious argument. There used to be two Germanies, and two Koreas still exist, but there are no east German or north Korean nations. Under international law, states are recognized, but not the nations that live in them. A nation cannot be created by decrees or declarations. It either exists or it does not.

If we now close our eyes and recognize the so-called Macedonian nation, this implies that we voluntarily condemn to assimilation the thousands of people in the Republic of Macedonia who possess a Bulgarian national consciousness and hope that Bulgaria will not forget them.

It is sufficient merely to follow the discussion that is now being conducted in certain Macedonian publications to realize that the process of imposing the idea of a so-called Macedonian nation is far from complete. Far from it, because increasing numbers of people are declaring their Bulgarian consciousness and this is one of the reasons why the rulers in Skopje are so insistent that we recognize the fictitious nation and language. This is also the reason for the furious campaign in the official mass media directed against Bulgaria and all the organizations and individuals in the Republic of Macedonia that insist on reassessing history and defend their Bulgarian ethnic identity.

There is a further point. If we accept the thesis of the "realists" and even only formally recognize the "Macedonian nation," tomorrow we will be faced with the next claim, namely that we should also recognize a Macedonian minority in Pirin Macedonia [part of geographical Macedonia within Bulgarian territory]. This absurd idea was carried out by the Bulgarian Communist Party as long ago as 1946 and to this very day Skopje bases its own claims on this, deafening the ears of the world with its demands.

Scholars have already had their say on whether or not a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian language exist. Not a single serious historian or linguist in the world supports the fabrications of Belgrade and Skopje.

Accordingly, it appears much more sensible to accept Minister Pirinski's thesis that the agreements between the two states should be signed in the official languages, and to leave it to Skopje, if it so desires, to specify what it understands by its own official language.

NATO Document Seen as Way To Thwart Expansion

AU0510105095 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 30 Sep-1 Oct 95 p 8

[Commentary by Georgi Apostolov: "NATO Shut Door Under East's Nose"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 28 September, NATO officially presented the "internal study on expanding the alliance," which lasted nine months, and which has been much publicized.

The study would have had the effect of a bomb had it not been softened by "leaking information" 24 hours before the meeting in Brussels between NATO General Secretary Claes and representatives of the 26 countries that participate in the Partnership for Peace initiative. The document uses 26 pages for general formulas in an attempt to cloud the only element of any importance, which occupies no more than a single page of the document. Those are the two prerequisites for membership in NATO, aimed at the East European countries; prerequisites that no East European country could meet.

NATO representatives claimed throughout the whole period of the preliminary public discussions on the "Eastward Expansion" topic that the issue of the eventual deployment of NATO nuclear weapons and troops on the territory of the newly admitted countries did not exist at all, however the document now singles out precisely this factor as a prerequisite. The bitter pill is sweetened only by the formulation that this would hardly be necessary in times of peace. Nevertheless, this is a politically unacceptable precondition for any East European country, not only because they all know that Russia would never allow nuclear weapons or foreign troops near its borders, but also because public opinion in those countries has not been prepared to accept this prerequisite. This especially applies to Bulgaria, which, even when it was Moscow's closest satellite, had no Russian nuclear weapons or troops on its territory. NATO itself would hardly dare to irritate Russia, and sources in NATO headquarters in Brussels immediately said that this prerequisite practically shuts forever NATO's door for the three Baltic states. And not only for them, this fully applies also to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, which border on the former USSR. Only the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which of all the former satellites is now the most favorably disposed toward Russia, are a bit further. Despite Germany's support, one could hardly consider the membership of Slovenia and Croatia as long as the conflict in former Yugoslavia has not been settled.

According to diplomatic sources, Bulgaria also had its opponents during the discussion, namely, Turkey and Greece. Our two southern neighbors are concerned that, if certain Central European countries are admitted to NATO, the center of the alliance's political onus will be completely shifted from Ankara and Athens, which will be isolated by the "sanitary cordon" of Bulgaria and Romania.

Indeed, it appears that precisely the internal differences on the issue of who should and when to join NATO (which was supposed to be the second stage of the internal study, which would last until the end of the year), was perhaps one of the reasons for the decision to close the "expansion" file at present.

This impression is strengthened not only by the military-political prerequisite, but also by the economic precondition cited in the study. According to that, the candidates must have made "a significant financial contribution" and have an adequate infrastructure that meets Western standards. Even the leading East European countries will not be able to meet this condition soon.

The impression that the study's purpose actually was to close the issue at present is also strengthened by the strange leaking of the text 24 hours prior to its publication by the supersecret organization. The political observers immediately linked this to the intention to give Moscow sufficient time to get in touch with Washington and Brussels and obtain the necessary clarifications in order to avoid the explosion of the political bomb. The development of events justified this analysis. Russia's ambassador in Brussels, Vitaliy Churkin, listened calmly to Willy Claes's briefing, and afterward noted with indifference that all this does not change the Russian positions. What clarifications did Russia receive from Brussels and Washington to be able to react so calmly to the prospect of having nuclear weapons deployed near its borders? There only is one answer to this question—Moscow was told that, at present, NATO deems it impossible to continue the process of integrating the East European countries and that the purpose of the prerequisites is not to blackmail Russia but to shut the door for the East European countries.

Klaus Envisages No Problems With EU Admission

AU0610082695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 23 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by "(li)": "Klaus Is Not Afraid of Complications With Our Planned Admission Into the European Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus is not afraid that differences in the economy or legal regulations would complicate admission to the European Union, to which the Czech Republic will submit an application next January. "The main thing is finding new mechanisms for the European Union in expanding the number of its members. The size of the milk subsidy is a minor issue," said the prime minister yesterday.

At the same time, he pointed to the European Union report on agriculture, which states that the agrarian sector should not be an obstacle to integration. "And, I would say that it is the most complicated sector," added the prime minister.

According to Klaus, the application should be made up of two documents—a political declaration expressing the country's desire and interest in joining the EU and a report on the state of the Republic. Klaus will hand them both to Italian Prime Minister Dini as the representative of the country that will be presiding over the European Union in January 1996.

The document still has to be approved by the government, which, according to the prime minister, will deal with it in November. The government Committee for European Integration will convene a month earlier for a final discussion on the documents. Klaus said yesterday that parliament does not have to approve the text of the documents.

The European Union has had 15 members since January, when it was joined by Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The Norwegians rejected in a referendum incorporation into the Union, which means a partial loss of state sovereignty.

As early as the beginning of this year, Klaus and Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec spoke of the European Union summit in 1996 as the most distant date for submitting the application. On the other hand, President Vaclav Havel said shortly afterwards that the Republic will submit its application before the end of this year.

Comment: Klaus Wrong To Oppose Izetbegovic Visit

AU0510182695 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Sep 95 p 12

[Commentary by Zbynek Petracek: "Prime Minister Klaus Against Czech Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The views of Vaclav Klaus on the causes of and possibilities for resolving the Balkan conflict have for some time now differed from the views of the majority of European politicians. This is no secret. It is enough to compare the reactions to the NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb army in the past year. Meanwhile, recent days have shown something else most vividly: In essence, these views of Vaclav Klaus, who to a considerable extent has earned his spurs by resurrecting Czech national interests, are at variance with Czech interests. This is apparent from the prime minister's address at the 18 September meeting with citizens, on which the Wednesday issue of MLADA FRONTA DNES carried a report. Two passages are worthy of attention.

In the first of these, the issue involves the dispute between Vaclav Klaus and Vaclav Havel over the invitation to Bosnian President Izetbegovic to visit Prague. The Czech prime minister said: Inviting just one of the presidents of the former Yugoslav republics fighting in the conflict is unfair. But who else should have been invited? Radovan Karadzic, whom no one recognizes as president of the Bosnian Serbs, but who, often dressed in khaki, represents a warring side? Or Slobodan Milosevic, perhaps, who is admittedly the rightful president of Serbia but who is also after the annulment of the embargo and, therefore, has kept quiet about Serbia's own military activities? In the three and a half years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, no instance has been recorded whereby a democratic European politician would turn down a meeting with Alija Izetbegovic. It has been rather the contrary—for instance, as absolution because it was not in the power of these statesmen to intervene in Bosnia.

Let us say that in Prague this was just a manifestation of the traditional friction between the Czech prime minister and the president. But then another of Klaus's formulations sticks out: The degree of blame for the Bosnian conflict is undecipherable and, very likely, the same on all sides. Here the issue no longer involves a mere opinion that juts out from rank-and-file opinion, even though the prime minister is absolutely convinced that he is right. Here the issue involves the fundamental stance of the Czech state toward issues of the causality of military conflicts. That this is not just an academic debate is documented by the intermittent problems concerning the expelled Germans.

Let us illustrate this graphically. We could hear the formulation "the degree of blame for Munich is undecipherable and, very likely, is the same on all sides" at any assembly of the hard core of Sudeten Germans. They suddenly found themselves in Czechoslovakia in 1918, in a configuration that they did not want—just like the majority of Bosnian Serbs in the independent Bosnia- Herzegovina three years ago. They were mostly inclined toward Henlein or, rather, Hitler—just as the Bosnian Serbs are inclined toward Karadzic or, rather, Milosevic. The view that Vaclav Klaus offers us of the Bosnian conflict is virtually the same as the view espoused by the hard core of Sudeten Germans regarding the causes of Munich.

It is unnecessary to demonize the Bosnian Serbs or Serbs in general. It is also unnecessary to demonize the Sudeten Germans and Germans in general. There is no point is concealing the fact that the Serbs, Croatians, and Bosnian Muslims have committed war crimes in Bosnia. Similarly, there is no point in concealing the crimes committed during the expulsion of the Czech Germans. But, even so, as we are aware of and, mainly, emphasize German guilt for Munich and World War II, we must not close our eyes to the guilt of the Karadzic leadership in Bosnia. As everyday policy shows, this is in the interest of the Czech state.

Article Views 'Generous' U.S. Offer of F-16's

AU0510144995 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 22 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by "(km)": "Even Despite a Discount, the F-16 Fighters Are Expensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In Prague this week, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry offered to sell modern fighter aircraft to the Czech Army at almost half their original price. This has been confirmed by several sources, independently of each other, from the Defense and Foreign Ministries.

The U.S. offer hovers around $10 million for one older F-16. The Defense Ministry has calculated that, with their general overhaul and necessary modernization, one aircraft would cost $16 million. A new F-16 fighter aircraft is about $10 million more expensive.

Experts from the defense department consider Perry's offer to be generous; however, they also agree that it will still be hard to find enough money for such a demanding contract.

If the two sides were to agree on leasing the fighters, the Army could repay the United States $1.0 million for one aircraft every year.

The costs of providing for new ground equipment and the services essential for operating the Western fighters, however, have not been included in these preliminary considerations. Without modernizing the ground navigation system, which, until now, was intended only for Russian aircraft, the U.S. aircraft could not be used in the Republic. The Defense Ministry has confirmed that it will be necessary to assign another $300 million to build the infrastructure of one air base.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan said yesterday that he is looking for ways of securing the financing for this project. At the next consultative meeting of the economy ministers, he intends to submit a proposal that certain Army projects be separated from the military budget. If the ministers in Klaus's Cabinet were to agree to this, the U.S. fighters could be paid for from the state and not the Army budget. The minister would also like to proceed in a similar fashion in the case of financing the modernization of the T-72 tank.

ODA, CMUS Disagree With MiG-21 Modernization

AU0510140295 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 23 Sep 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The Modernization of the MiG's Has Come Up Against Dissension"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague/Brno—The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] does not think it would be propitious to start modernizing the Russian MiG-21 fighter aircraft for the Czech Army. It thinks that the consideration being given to the purchase of modern U.S. fighter aircraft is better.

"Therefore, we also welcome Defense Minister Vilem Holan's decision to suspend their modernization for the time being," said ODA Press Spokesman David Rozanek yesterday. Holan suspended the project to modernize three prototypes of the outdated Russian MiG-21 fighter aircraft on 20 September. If the requests from the defense department to increase its funds from the state budget are supported by an analysis proving that, without the funds asked for, the country's defense capability will be poorer or even the same, Libor Kudlacek does not rule out the possibility that ODA will support such a request from the Army. At the same time, he pointed out that this is a matter for discussion by ODA's appropriate constitutional officials in the government and Chamber of Deputies.

In the opinion of the Bohemian-Moravian Union of the Center [CMUS], the Czech Republic needs a not too big but well equipped—where possible, with domestic hardware—army, as was the case when the democratic Czechoslovakia came into being. CMUS Deputy Milos Skocovsky said this to journalists in Brno yesterday.

According to him, the views expressed by the Defense Ministry so far indicate that most of the funds for modernization are to be devoted to the Air Force. Skocovsky considers the modernization of the MiG-21 aircraft to be an absolute waste of money, which the CMUS will not support. According to the party, the purchase of the F-16 fighters, which also require some reconstruction, would also be contentious. "None of our border is more than five minutes away from the nearest military airfield. Investing billions of korunas so that this distance is reduced to the two-minute flight of the F-16 would probably not be the most expedient thing for defense," said Deputy Skocovsky.

Deputies Respond to Statements by Bavaria's Stoiber

AU0610081595 Prague PRAVO in Czech 27 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by "ada, nig": "Payne Believes That Bavaria Reconfirmed Its Ability To Block Talks With the Czech Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—"In a 26 September PRAVO interview, Bavarian Minister President Edmund Stoiber only openly confirmed the information that they have created a double block—on the executive side and on the Bundestag side—to manage, if it were against the Bavarian interests, to stop any talks on Czech-German relations."

Parliament Foreign Committee Chairman Jiri Payne (Civic Democratic Party) told this to PRAVO on Tuesday.

He considers it a positive move that Stoiber did not use President Benes's decrees as arguments. The deputy rules out any possibility that the relations that took millennia to develop would be solved by a single gesture, a single declaration.

Stoiber considers the law that deems legal all offenses against the occupiers and their helpers from 1938 to October 1945 to be the biggest single stumbling block.

According to a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official, the office does not intend to respond to the views expressed by the Bavarian minister-president. According to him, it is Stoiber's standard opinion that does not surprise the ministry in the least. Foreign Committee Deputy Chairman Jan Krycer (Bohemian and Moravian Center Union) understands Stoiber's stand as exclusively Bavarian because the problem of Czech-German relations depends on the Governments of the Czech Republic and the FRG.

According to Foreign Committee member Vaclav Grulich (Czech Social Democratic Party), Stoiber's words show that he does not take into account what preceded the end of the war and the transfer of Germans. "It is all the more important to exert pressure so that it is, above all, the FRG Government that comments on Czech-German affairs," the deputy said.

Survey Shows Decline in Support for Trade Unions

AU0510154695 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 23 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by "(ljd)": "Trust in the Trade Unions Has Declined in the Wake of the Strike Alerts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The public's trust in the trade unions has declined significantly compared with April. This is borne out by the results of the September poll conducted by the STEM [Center for Empirical Research] Agency.

Trust in the Unions/Supporters of the Political Parties

	Percent
ODS	26
ODA	34
Association for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party	41
KDU-CSL	51
CSSD	60
KSCM	64

Compared with the 49-percent support in April, only 42 percent of the respondents expressed their support for the unions in September. According to the survey's authors, these results are interesting when confronted with the increased activity of the union centers during the summer—that is, the strike alerts called by railroad workers, doctors, and teachers. According to STEM, it is apparent that the public was obviously not absolutely convinced of the justifiability of the unions' demands or that its agreement with the unionists' course of action in these specific cases has not been projected into the overall view of the unions. According to the survey, the unions have only a small percentage of "uncritical supporters" inasmuch as only 6.0 percent of the respondents stated that they definitely trust the unions. On the other hand, 17 percent of the respondents rank themselves among the definite opponents of the unions. The unions' credibility increases with the respondents' age and declines with their education. They enjoy a surprisingly low level of trust, according to STEM, among the unemployed (just 36 percent). On the other hand, the mistrust of the unions among tradesmen and businessmen (20 percent) is apparently not too surprising. The results of the survey confirm the strong relationship between the respondents' political views and their trust in the activity of the trade unions. Among Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] supporters, 60 percent of the respondents trust the trade unions; of the supporters of the governing Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], more than half trust them. The survey's authors explain the support of KDU-CSL voters for the unions by the large number of pension-age citizens among the voters of Lux's party. The unions can expect most support from communist voters, least among supporters of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] and Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]. The distribution of support among the voters of the individual parties signals the unions' further shift toward the left of the political spectrum because, in April, the percentage of union supporters within the CSSD and Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] camps was the same.

UN High Commissioner Concerned About Intolerance

AU0610082595 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Oct 95 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Concern Over Expressions of Intolerance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Slovakia (UNHCR), which deals with the solution of the problems of refugees, emigres, and aliens, expresses serious concern over repeated expressions of intolerance and racial hatred toward some members of other nationalities in Slovakia. This is stated in a statement signed by the head of the UNHCR Liaison Office, in which the UNHCR Office wants to convey to the public its view on the incident of 29 September directed against an Asian postgraduate student of the Comenius University Medical School in Bratislava. [According to a 400-word report by "afi" in Bratislava SME in Slovak on 2 October on page 1, a group of "three or four skinheads" attacked S. CH., a 29-year-old postgraduate medical student "from one Asian state," on the "39" bus in Bratislava on 29 September and the student's "rather strongly bleeding" wounds had to be treated at a hospital. The victim is quoted as having told SME that "what surprised him most were the indifferent reactions of the passengers in the crowded bus, most of whom were university students, young people from whom he would expect help."]

'SIS Member' Claims Role in Kovac Jr. Kidnapping

AU0510165695 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "'If I Had Known That My Activity Would Be Misused, I Surely Would Not Have Had Anything To Do With It,' an Alleged Slovak Information Service Member Wrote Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The NARODNA OBRODA editorial office received a peculiar letter yesterday. It started with the words: "I am one of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] employees who testified after being brought before Major Vacok, who is investigating the kidnapping of M.K. Jr. For the sake of my protection, I was questioned as a witness without a name. I mentioned only some facts I considered necessary and that I wanted to be released as soon as possible."

The writer goes on to explain that, within the framework of SIS, he was working in the "shadowing section" [sledkovacka] and, from 28 August, was shadowing Michal Kovac Jr. on the order of his superior (whom he does not name). On the morning of 31 August, Michal Kovac left his home. "Thereupon we were ordered to follow him and to create a smoke screen when action was taken. All of our vehicles blocked the road from Jur to Bratislava to prevent other vehicles from passing through. Everything looked like an accident or a traffic jam. Before us was M.K.'s car, blocked by another group, which dragged him out of the vehicle and organized his transport. I am unable to say who was in that group. I do not even know whether they were from SIS. After this, the operation was completed," writes the alleged SIS member, according to whom neither he nor his colleagues knew what would happen and what had been planned. "If I had known that my activity would be misused, I surely would not have had anything to do with it," claims the mysterious SIS agent, adding that, when he was leaving the police to work for SIS, it never occurred to him that "SIS precisely would be used to assist in criminal activity and in the struggle for power in Slovakia." The writer feels that his life is in danger and he is therefore hiding. He follows the press and listens to the news, however, which is why he does not understand "the steps of L.I. [presumably [illegible]S Director Ivan Lexa] to cover up this act" and is c[illegible]s where it will all end up. The reason for his sending the letter to NARODNA OBRODA is probably to be found in the following appeal: "Hereby, I would like to ask my colleagues Igor M., Dusan R., Jiri N., and Peter S., who were involved in the operation along with me, to back me, to say what really happened, and not to cover up for people who are settling their power interests...." In conclusion, the unidentified writer informs us that he also wrote to investigator Vacok and that, in that letter, he supposedly provided "enough details to help uncover this case so that, at long last, no one will pull the wool over the nation's eyes any longer and hold it in fear." Then follows the signature: an SIS member who is hereby terminating his employment with SIS.

Further information: After the delivery of the above letter, we contacted all of the major dailies by telephone but learned that only PRAVDA and Czech NOVA TV had received it as well. The letter was written by hand, but it was not the original but, rather, a Xerox copy. It came in an open envelope, without a stamp but with a postmark, and gave the impression that it had been sent from some company. There is no sender on the envelope. Major Vacok did not want to comment on the matter but confirmed to fellow journalists that he had indeed received the letter heralded by the writer. According to our information, all four names mentioned in the letter are authentic and belong to SIS members who participated in the operation. We do not know why the writer waited so long with his letter, but, as he himself indicates in the letter, he is now remorseful about it. It is difficult to assess at present whether the letter is authentic or a forgery, but, at any rate, it contains information that is not known to a normal layman. The next move is now up to the investigator of the case and, above all, to the SIS director.

Fund Calls For President's Resignation

AU0610081895 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Mr. President, Step Down!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Members of the Executive Committee of the Slovak Republic National Property Fund [FNM] express unequivocal support for the decision of parliament [of 5 May] to pass a vote of no-confidence in the president of the Republic and support the statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic of 19 September calling on Mr. Michal Kovac to resign from the post of president of the Slovak Republic. By abandoning the position of impartiality, ignoring the results of democratic elections, permanently provoking conflicts on the domestic political scene, being unwilling to communicate with the government and parliament, and casting doubt on the democratic development of the country of which he is president, Mr. Michal Kovac damaged, and keeps damaging, Slovakia's good name. His destructive policies, which affect all spheres of social life, including privatization, do not guarantee Slovakia's further advancement. For the above reasons, the Slovak Republic FNM Executive Committee calls on Mr. Michal Kovac to step down from the post of president of the Slovak Republic, in the interest of stabilization of the domestic political scene, in the interest of Slovakia and its citizens.

Campaign Against Kovac Explained

LD0510155295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems that another department of the state administration, after the members of the Executive Committee of the Fund of National Property, have started to call for the president's resignation. Today's issue of the daily NARODNA OBRODA says that, allegedly, a few days ago the Slovak Ministry of Culture sent a declaration of the core departments and institutions of the state administration to all of its subordinate institutions and asked them to sign it and fax it to the president's office. The statement says, among other things, I quote:

The representatives of the core departments and institutions of the state administration, concerned about the threat to Slovakia's stability and prosperity, regret to say that they have no confidence in Mr. Michal Kovac. Michal Kovac's activity so far in the office of president of the Slovak Republic sharply contravenes the requirements stipulated by the Constitution for the performance of the head of state. This is one of the reasons all core departments and institutions of the state administration fully support the 19 September 1995 declaration of the Government of the Slovak Republic, which appealed to Mr. Michal Kovac to consider whether he should continue in office and asking him to resign, in the interest of Slovakia. End of quote.

In this connection, our colleague Magda Pospisilova phoned Marta Podhradska, spokeswoman of the Ministry of Culture.

[Begin recording] [Pospisilova] Mrs. Podhradska, can you confirm that the declaration the press published today is genuine?

[Podhradska] Yes, it is genuine and is a result of our uneasiness about the situation that resulted from the long-term activity of the president.

[Pospisilova] Who signed it and who sent it?

[Podhradska] We, the staff of the Ministry of Culture, sent it, following an agreement concluded by the representatives of the core departments and institutions. It simply resulted from the feeling that it is a duty of the core departments of the state administration to behave in such a way as to create the conditions for the advancement of a democratic system in our state and for securing the stability and prosperity of Slovakia. This duty makes us feel responsible for the state of society, and we think that the president has the same duty and responsibility. Unfortunately, his deeds and attitudes show that he is not sufficiently aware of these obligations toward the Slovak Republic. This was the only reason the core departments and institutions of the state administration decided to react to the situation by this declaration.

[Pospisilova] Do you think, Mrs. Podhradska, that it is right to involve the state administration in this way?

[Podhradska] We not only think it is right, we also think it is the state administration's right or even its duty to act in this way because this duty is a basis for the responsibility I mentioned earlier. We are slightly concerned about the campaign the press unleashed about this. I can only repeat that it is not good if somebody thinks, in this situation, that a different yardstick can be applied to different people and to assume that some people have the right to have an opinion while others do not. I think this looks like something that was typical in the past. [end recording]

We also spoke to Vladimir Stevko, the president's spokesman.

[Begin Stevko recording] After the statement issued by the Fund of National Property, which also called on the president to abdicate, we in the president's office and the president himself were looking to see who would be the next to attack him. The first one was the Ministry of Culture, which called on the core departments and institutions of the state administration to sign a letter asking the president to resign. If we ignore the fact that the letter contains many lies and deliberate falsehoods, this deed by the Ministry of Culture still looks comical and is definitely not an act that can have a real or legal effect. It is too much like similar campaigns that were organized in the 1950's and the beginning of the 1970's, when normalization started. It is a pity that campaigns like this are unleashed in a country that has decided to build democracy. [end recording]

Meciar Denies Craving Power, Explains Motivation

AU0610082095 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 3 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "dab": "Vladimir Meciar: Once We Have Built the Foundations, I Am Ready To Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—On yesterday's lunchtime "Radio Journal" program, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar "spoke publicly about himself." From the perspective of Vladimir Meciar the human being, he assessed Vladimir Meciar the politician. He said, among other things:

I do not make a distinction between the human being and the politician. I am one and the same person, and one cannot be separated from the other, even though, naturally, a politician must suppress within himself a great deal of what, in the case of a human being, would end up on an emotional note. As a person, I would be able to realize interests I am not able to realize in politics. Portraying a person is very difficult, especially someone who is active in politics at this time.

I believe that such portrayals can only be made after decades. It will then be possible to judge whether I responded to the challenges of the time correctly or wrongly.

From Totalitarianism Toward Democracy

Right now, everything is influenced by many emotions. Consider the fact that I was the coarchitect of some historic decisions, one of which was the transition from totalitarianism to democracy. I believe that I played a considerable role in that, as well as in putting Czechs and Slovaks on an equal footing and in the establishment of the independent state. After the creation of the independent state, we set ourselves the program of moving from political to economic sovereignty. Today we are setting ourselves the program of creating the model of a socially oriented society that is, at the same time, a market society. The issue is to harmonize some aspects of what we know and what is accessible today [as published], to try to create a certain idea of an internal structure of society that will be democratic but market-oriented, one that will not copy anyone but will be tailored to our needs. These are steps that transcend the limits of time and sometimes, perhaps, even the limits of one human life.

Hosannah and Crucifixion

As we were leaving Prague after the passage of the law on the division of powers [between the federation and the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1991] and many people were thanking me for it, I said how cruel life is. One day we cry "Hosannah" and the next day "Crucify him." When the political situation is the way it is, everyone ascribes this to me. This means that they acknowledge me and the fact that I play the central role, but they are unable to adapt to this central role. No one wants to be second. Everyone wants to be first, but only by pushing the others aside. But what am I supposed to do when support for me in a single constituency is bigger than the support for other political parties all over Slovakia? This is a fact from which we must proceed and stop fighting against. If the opposition parties are unable to find agreement with us, they can never blame only us for it. After all, we were so accommodating as to promise them after the elections that I would not be in the government if they joined it. It is precisely because they did not want to go into the government and did not have anyone to go into the government that I am again in it as the prime minister.

Governing Is Hard Work

Being in the government today is not good. First, it is hard work that wears down all our physical and mental strength. Second, it requires practical solutions to problems for which there are no ready recipes, and the fact-finding process is very difficult for us. Third, this is a time in which institutions, entities, and political parties are clashing in conflicts, the sources of which they always see outside themselves. Parties and party officials who are unable to build their own parties, who are unable to win the trust of the people and to win elections, want to run the state—a task that is that much more difficult. In essence, the hierarchical selection takes such a course that, precisely by the growth of tasks, you gain your position, the first or second [sentence as published]. And that is obvious today, at this time.

In December 1992, one of the deputies of the Party of the Democratic Left asked me in parliament who was responsible for Czechoslovakia's becoming extinct and for Slovakia's future failure. Find us that responsible person and we will support you. At that time, we needed three votes in Prague. At that time, I got up and said—I, Vlado Meciar, assume the responsibility. If you want to have a future victim, if you want trials, if you want to track down and prosecute the culprit some day, he is standing in front of you, but today I am asking you for those three votes. They did not give them to me. I obtained them by other means.

No Craving for Power

But the personality is sometimes of great significance. At times of building the state in particular, when there are no institutions and no other working entities, the personality plays a quite crucial role. It gives me pleasure that a number of democratic institutions are beginning to work effectively in Slovakia. And the moment may come one day when I myself will arrive at the conclusion—and this will happen much faster than others will comprehend—that it is necessary, in the interest of the functioning of institutions and the system, for me not to be prime minister any longer. And I will not be prime minister. I do not crave power. I want it now in order to prove that I will turn this country into the most progressive and the best of all of the postcommunist countries. As soon as I become convinced that this country has a firm foundation, I will be able to go, but in a way that will allow me to look everyone in the eye.

Meciar's Attitude Toward Democracy Criticized

AU0610082195 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Oct 95 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "The Prime Minister's Impromptu Remark"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Radio moderator Magda Pospisilova recently asked the Slovak prime minister how he would assess himself as a politician. The prime minister was ready to comply. The resulting impromptu remark is interesting because it reveals Vladimir Meciar's way of thinking.

While talking about himself, the prime minister also mentioned the "others" in Slovak politics: "When the political situation is the way it is, everyone ascribes this to me. This means that they acknowledge me and that I play the central role, but they are unable to adapt to this central role; no one wants to be second. Everyone wants to be first, but only by pushing the others aside." This statement throws light on what the prime minister has in mind when he demands that the opposition parties respect the results of parliamentary elections. At first glance, Meciar's appeal is illogical because the elections gave the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] a certain position and influence, whether others like it or not. His demand that they respect the election results is actually a call on those who fared worse in the elections to acknowledge the winner's central role and to adapt to it. Apparently, the Slovak prime minister regards the elections not as an act resulting in the distribution of political forces in the country but, rather, as a contest for who will be "number one." For him, elections are a competition for the winner, who then has automatic claim to leadership. The problem is, however, that elections are not a competition with one winner, in which everyone else is the loser. The fact that the HZDS received the largest number of votes does not mean that the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], the Slovak National Party [SNS], the Party of the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement, the Democratic Union, or the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement were "defeated." They merely received fewer votes. Vladimir Meciar resents the fact that "party officials who are unable to build their own parties, to win the trust of the people, and to win elections want to run the state." But is it possible to say that, if some entity received 11, 10, 7, or 5 percent of the votes, it did not win the trust of the people? Why is it reprehensible when they try to assert the will of their voters in the administration and management of the state?

The prime minister and HZDS leader suggested that, even if he wanted to, he could not give up his leader's ambitions: "But what am I supposed to do when support for me in a single constituency is greater than the support for other political parties throughout Slovakia? This is a fact from which we must proceed, and we should stop fighting against it." The real fact is that, in the last election, 1,016,433 people voted for the HZDS. The "other political parties all over Slovakia" received the votes of 1,890,983 citizens. Even when we subtract the votes belonging to the coalition parties ZRS and SNS, the nongovernmental parties were trusted by 1,520,579 voters. The election "winner" therefore cannot regard himself as the embodiment of the majority of the population, not even of the majority of voters. The claim to absolute leadership is far from being such an indisputable "fact" as Vladimir Meciar says.

At the close of his impromptu remarks, the prime minister mentioned that he does not crave power. Why does he want to have power now? "To prove that I will turn this country into the most progressive and the best of all of the postcommunist countries." The words "I will turn" suggest that, left to its own devices, Slovakia obviously would not pull this off. Of what is there more in these words: underestimation of the country or overestimation of himself?

Poll: Most Assess Coalition's Work Negatively

AU0410222295 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by "(giv)": "According to a Survey, the Assessment of the Coalition Government's First Year Is Rather Negative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Methodological-Research Committee of Slovak Radio conducted a survey from 8 to 14 September in which the 1,272 respondents replied to the following question: "In a couple of days, it will be a year since the parliamentary elections. What is your assessment of the work of the coalition government that was formed on the basis of the election results?"

Some 5.3 percent said it was very positive, 27.1 percent said rather positive, 30.7 percent said rather negative, 18.4 percent said very negative, and 18.4 percent claimed they did not know.

The government's activity was assessed positively or rather positively by 80.3 percent of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] voters, 53.8 percent of Slovak National Party [SNS] voters, 44.7 percent of Democratic Party [DS] voters, 37.9 percent of Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] voters, 31.8 percent of Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] voters, 21.7 percent of Communist Party of Slovakia [KSS] voters, 20 percent of Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] voters, 16.4 percent of Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] voters, 12.2 percent of Democratic Union [DU] voters, 10.5 percent of Hungarian Civic Party [MOS] voters, 8.0 percent of Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] voters, 5.0 percent of Slovak Green Party [SZS] voters, and 4.3 percent of Egyutteles voters.

Some 44.7 percent of the respondents were familiar with the report on the state of the Slovak Republic delivered by President M. Kovac in the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 6 September. Of these respondents, 15.8 percent identify fully with the report's assessment of the situation in the Slovak Republic; 36.3 percent think that the assessment is overwhelmingly correct, 15.9 percent think the assessment is overwhelmingly incorrect, 12.4 percent do not identify with the assessment of the situation in the Slovak Republic, and 19.6 percent do not know how to assess it.

Some 95.2 percent of MKDH voters, 92.2 percent of KDH voters, 89.3 percent of DU voters, 80 percent of Egyutteles voters, 75 percent of SDL voters, 70 percent of MOS voters, 68.8 percent of DS voters, 66.7 percent of SZS voters, 50 percent of SDSS voters, 45.5 percent of ZRS voters, 37.5 percent of KSS voters, 34.4 percent of SNS voters, and 21.9 percent of HZDS voters identified with the assessment or, rather, think the report is correct.

HZDS Denies Catholic Clergy Being Persecuted

LD0510190795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement addressed to the Club of Christian Initiative, which was passed on today to the Slovak Press Agency [TASR], the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] expressed serious concern about the activity of some of the Catholic clergy, who allowed themselves to be drawn into the political game of the opposition parties. The HZDS believes that these activities, which take the form of demagogic declarations about the alleged persecution of clergy in Slovakia, create an atmosphere of tension and confrontation. The campaign grossly distorts the reality because there is factual evidence that, compared to all other postcommunist countries, the Slovak Republic is doing the most to meet the clergy halfway, and there is absolutely no persecution of clerics in Slovakia.

New Ambassador Discusses Relations With Romania

95CH0351A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 7 Aug 95 p 7

[Interview with Ferenc Szocs, new Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, by Gabor Szego; place and date not given: "Where Do Relations With Romania Stand?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Ferenc Szocs, Hungary's new ambassador in Bucharest who is expected to assume his station there in the next few days, told our reporter that further progress in the process of Romania's democratization and modernization was in our interest as well, and that it would clearly be harmful to exclude our eastern neighbor from the course of European integration. In concluding a basic treaty with Romania, Hungarian diplomacy was regarding as its model the Hungarian-Slovak document, including the European standards for minority rights.*

[Szego] These days it is hardly possible to discuss Hungarian-Romanian relations without bringing up also the basic treaty issue, which is widely believed to be bogged down. Yet it is obvious that relations between the two countries are far more diverse. What is your assessment of the system of relations as a whole? In what areas is there a perceptible improvement, and where is progress lagging?

[Szocs] Unquestionably, the basic treaty has been discussed the most in the recent past. Which, of course, is understandable, although the scope of relations between the two countries is much broader than that. This spring, for instance, at the foreign minister and state secretary level we signed a memorandum that outlines a work schedule of sorts, for practically every area of our lives. It covers four large categories—political rights; economic relations; cultural, scientific, and educational relations; and development of consular relations—and spells out in detail the tasks and suggestions in no fewer than 55 points. The basic treaty is merely one of the 55 topics, although admittedly the first one. Hence the system of relations is very extensive, and the picture it presents is rather complex. There are quite a few examples also of favorable developments. For instance, military and defense ministry contacts are developing beneficially while exerting a favorable influence on other spheres as well. But I could mention also relations between the interior ministries or the ministries of transport and communications, and also cooperation on environmental protection. Cooperation has begun on the prevention of environmental pollution, and we will also attempt to conclude a more comprehensive treaty on environmental protection and water resources.

The Economy

[Szego] To what extent is the economy able to serve as a basis for the improvement of relations?

[Szocs] The economy, too, may be included among the favorable examples. Since 1992, trade between the two countries has been growing by about 20 percent a year. Trade during the first half of this year increased directly by 40 percent over the same period last year. Both countries' exports increased, but the Hungarian growth rate was slightly higher. If this trend continues, we will soon be able to reach the level of trade we attained in the second half of the 1980's. From its peak at that time, trade fell back practically to zero during the change of political systems; and that is from where it now had to climb back. It is gratifying that at present there are about 1600 joint Hungarian enterprises operating in Romania, and they account for a substantial proportion of the merchandise trade. Hungarian investment in Romania can be estimated at about 18 million dollars. The number of registered businesses headquartered in Hungary is much smaller, but examples abound of such businesses as well. Other opportunities also arise; for Hungary, after all, Romania is a nearby market of considerable absorptive capacity. The legislative preconditions for all this also are developing favorably. We have already concluded a treaty for the protection of investments and the avoidance of double taxation. On the whole, therefore, I would steer clear of a black-and-white assessment, with a one-sided emphasis on the difficulties; though it is obvious that cooperation in many other areas is developing less favorably. But if the program planned for this year to expand existing border-crossing points and add new ones—Battonya, Mehkerek, Nagylak, and Artand—is carried out, it would reduce tensions over a rather sore point.

[Szego] But the possible introduction of obligatory visas, as proposed in Hungary, might worsen relations. Has there been any official Romanian response to this possibility?

[Szocs] No, not so far. For the time being, this matter is still in the stage of analysis and study. Of course, the response of the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania is public knowledge, and it is clear that in the given case it would be necessary to take into consideration a reciprocity move by Bucharest.

[Szego] Permission to reopen a Hungarian consulate general in Transylvania has long been a matter in dispute.

[Szocs] Expansion of the network of consulates is undoubtedly a frequent topic of discussion, and we sorely feel the absence of a consulate general in

Kolozsvar [Cluj]. This item has been on the agenda of bilateral talks for years; most recently, also on the occasion of Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs's visit to Bucharest in July. Hungary deems it necessary to open at least one, but preferably two consulates general. In addition, the appointment might also be considered of honorary consuls, in other regions. As Romanian citizens, however, their role would have to be supplementary and limited. Transylvania as venue is an absolutely logical choice, warranted from the view point of both tourism and of administering the affairs of citizens. Consider the awkward situation at present. If some problem arises in connection with a Hungarian tourist in, say, Nagyvarad [Oradea], he has to travel not to Budapest, a distance of 250 kilometers, but to Bucharest that lies 600 kilometers from Nagyvarad. Thus Kolozsvar as the location of a consulate general is advantageous from our point of view. But if Romania has serious objections to Kolozsvar, other cities could also come into consideration.

The Basic Treaty

[Szego] That probably leads us already to the area of political gestures, because certain Romanian political forces are just as strongly opposed to a consulate general in Kolozsvar as to the conclusion of a basic treaty. Do you see any chance of concluding such a document, in the light of the failure to schedule the continuation of the talks, after Laszlo Kovacs's recent visit?

[Szocs] Hungarian diplomacy regards the Hungarian-Slovak Basic Treaty as its model for concluding a similar document also with Romania. A model not in the literal sense, of course, but in terms of the similarity of concept and content. We wish to base also our relations with Romania on European standards and accepted conventions. In any event, the search for a compromise solution must continue. To leave a series of talks unfinished, without bringing them to a conclusion, might in itself have an unfavorable effect.

[Szego] Might not the restrictive Education Law recently enacted in Romania torpedo the continuation of the talks?

[Szocs] There is no direct relationship between the two, although the law's unfavorable reception in Hungary and among Transylvania's ethnic Hungarians is common knowledge. Hence the law's enactment has hardly enhanced the continuation of the talks that had already reached a delicate phase.

[Szego] Does this apply also to the occasionally quite rude political and press campaign against the RMDSZ [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania—in Hungarian, UDMR—in Romanian]?

[Szocs] The Hungarian side is urging a continual dialog between the RMDSZ and the Romanian Government, but the RMDSZ itself is never mentioned by name in the [draft] basic treaty. Among the unsettled questions, however, we do find the legitimate right of Romania's ethnic Hungarians to found and operate a political party. Likewise still unsettled is the matter of overseeing compliance with the basic treaty that is to be concluded. What we have in mind is some sort of permanent arrangement for oversight. We would like a specific mechanism, a mixed Hungarian-Romanian commission that would monitor the implementation of the obligations undertaken in the document, and compliance with it.

The "Package"

[Szego] With what ambassadorial "package" of principles will you begin your work? How do you view the future?

[Szocs] I think it is also in Hungary's vital interest that the processes of Romania's democratization, economic development, and modernization should continue. Equally important to us is the welfare of the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, the continuation of their *embourgeoisement* [trend toward a middle class outlook]. We hope that they will prosper and find their place in the country of their birth. The success of Romania's European integration ambitions, which are similar to our own, are likewise in our interest as well. Any intention to exclude Romania would undoubtedly be harmful. It is easier even to argue when we belong to the same "club."

Bokros on Coming Talks With IMF, World Bank

AU0510144295 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 5 Oct 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Finance Minister Lajos Bokros by Sara Pogany; place and date not given: "Half of the Planned Privatization Income Might Be Received—The Finance Minister Is Optimistic Before His Washington Talks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Lajos Bokros and Gyorgy Suranyi, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank [MNB], will travel to Washington on 6 October for talks with the IMF and the World Bank. Bokros will be accompanied by Deputy State Secretary Csaba Laszlo and Department Head Agnes Vargha. Suranyi will also take a team. As the government has accepted the 1996 budget and submitted it to the National Assembly, Bokros hopes that his talks with both the IMF and the World Bank will be successful. He attaches similar hopes to the price and wage agreements to be made with the trade unions on 20 October.

[Pogany] Whom will you meet in Washington?

[Bokros] Primarily the IMF's director and the World Bank's chairman. We will continue the talks where we left them off in September. I will inform them about the current and expected situation of the budget. I believe that the 1996 budget is also acceptable to them, especially because the expected deficit can be kept below 4 percent.

[Pogany] What chance do you see for the price and wage agreements to be made with the trade unions?

[Bokros] The Finance Ministry finds the ideas of the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions to be a good negotiating basis, although the proposals do not contain their stance on the necessary reduction of real wages. It is also true that they do not reject this outright. If we manage to reduce inflation from the current level to 17.5 to 18 percent, then employees will be able to expect a perceivably smaller reduction in real wages.

[Pogany] At what point now is the debate between the Finance Ministry and the Interior Ministry on the share to be given to the local governments from the personal income taxes?

[Bokros] The debate has been suspended because we did not have time for talks. However, much progress has been made in the talks on the budget of the social insurance self-governing boards.

[Pogany] What will happen to the special state funds?

[Bokros] Five funds will be kept: the National Cultural Fund, the Road Fund, the Water Affairs Fund, the Environmental Protection Fund, and the Labor Market Fund. Apart from the National Cultural Fund, these funds get more than half their income from sources other than the budget. In essence, the other funds will also be kept but they will be listed in sections [fejezeti besorolas]. We are not planning any changes in the existing decisionmaking mechanisms.

[Pogany] Is there any progress in the work of the state administration reform committee?

[Bokros] The situation is that serious conceptual debates are conducted even within the various ministries, especially regarding the reform of the pension and health systems. However, the requirement is that many of these debates have to be closed this year, otherwise it will not be possible to start preparing the 1997 budget. In my view, it is a constitutional requirement to make an agreement on, for example, defining the retirment age because this, on one hand, will ensure the citizens' right to making a decision and it will also serve the thorough preparation of the 1997 budget. These debates have to be made more constructive because the steps to be taken in the framework of the reform of state administration are interdependent, and the establishment of the new system will even then take at least 10 to 15 years.

[Pogany] In which areas can you see a possibility for progress in 1996?

[Bokros] It is already certain that the Treasury will start to function from 1 January 1996. Initially, it will handle the expenditure estimates of the central budget institutions and the state finacial funds and the wage financing of the local budget institutions. As is known, the staff will come from the MNB's central and county directorates and the employees of the State Development Institute [AFI].

[Pogany] Does this mean that the AFI will cease to exist?

[Bokros] It will, on 31 December 1995. I can see much progress in the reform of the health system because we will introduce target-based [normativ] regulation in place of financing on the basis of previous year's costs [bazisalapu] already from 1996. We must expect that, in the course of the health system's reform, another 10,000 hospital beds will disappear in 1996.

[Pogany] But almost 10,000 hospital beds have already disappeared!

[Bokros] This is not quite true, because some 6,000 out of these 10,000 only existed on paper, but the hospitals still received financing for them. We want to stop this practice. I can also see progress in preparing the reform of education because, according to the plans, we will also switch over to target-based financing in this area from 1 August 1996. We will reduce the number of norms, but their level will be nationally identical.

I also expect to make headway in bank privatization, especially because the preparatory work is progressing well between the Finance Ministry and the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation.

[Pogany] Has a decision been made on the Budapest Bank?

[Bokros] Not yet, because we have received seriously competing offers, and I cannot say any more than this because all other information is a business secret.

[Pogany] Now, in October, what chance do you see for getting the 150 billion forint [Ft] privatization revenue?

[Bokros] If the processes preparing the privatization of the gas suppliers and the MATAV [Hungarian Telecommunications Enterprise] become accelerated, then I can see a realistic chance for getting half of the planned Ft150 billion. So far, only Ft9 billion has been paid into the central budget.

Labor Minister's Resignation Explained

LD0610104695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The labor minister [Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa] submitted her resignation in writing after the government session yesterday. Mrs. Kosa resigned because she would not accept the form of assistance for workers on sick leave which was proposed by the Finance Ministry and which had already been rejected earlier by the Constitutional Court.

There is also a dispute between the Finance and Labor Ministries over the pensionable age limit and the shortening of the period during which an unemployed person is entitled to unemployment benefit. The Finance Ministry holds that the reduction of pensionable age limit is inconceivable before the year 2003.

Mrs. Kosa is the third minister of the Horn government to resign because of measures by [Finance Minister] Lajos Bokros. The two ministers who resigned before were Pal Kovacs [minister of social welfare] and Bela Katona [minister without portfolio in charge of civilian secret services] because they disagreed with the austerity measures.

MSZP Official Views End of Coalition Dispute

AU0510182195 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 Sep 95 p 7

[Interview with Sandor Csintalan, executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Frigyes Varju; place and date not given: "No Other Coalition Alternative Exists for the SZDSZ—Sandor Csintalan on the Executive Committee's Decision, Governmental Responsibility, and the Partner's Room for Maneuver"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To our questions, Sandor Csintalan talked reservedly about the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] executive committee's 28 September decision, according to which the prime minister abandons the intention to change the government, seemingly yielding to pressure by the minor coalition party. At the same time, Csintalan did not hide his view on the need for accepting joint governmental responsibility, and on the limits of the Alliance of Free Democrats's [SZDSZ] future room for maneuver.

[Varju] The MSZP executive committee's 28 September decision exceeded all expectations. According to the first opinion of political observers, the mountains were in labor and the product was a mouse.

[Csintalan] It was also interesting for me to see how astonished the public opinion makers were at our announcement, how different a result they had expected.

[Varju] This obviously had a reason, because the MSZP's leading officials had been holding out the possibility of a split for weeks.

[Csintalan] In my view, there is more to this; namely, during the series of coalition talks, opinion forming groups close to the two parties often said that this conflict was unmanageable and a split could be the only outcome. In spite of this, I am convinced that the Socialist leadership made a good decision at the prime minister's initiative. Perceiving the weight of one-man responsibility, the prime minister decided that he would remove this coalition debate, which is laden with conflicts, from this level to enable us to concentrate on issues that truly and seriously affect the country. In addition, when, on the occasion of 23 October, the extreme right is inciting the public with calls for civic war, in my view, the coalition has to put aside the differences of opinions.

[Varju] Recognizing the moral and political reasoning behind the executive committee's decision, I suppose you also admit that you managed to create a real surprise? It was also clear from your statement that the prime minister had made several proposals on improving governmental work and none of them were accepted by the coalition partner. After all this, it is indeed strange and controversial for precisely the offended prime minister to initiate the ending of the debate.

[Csintalan] A series of contradictions can be found not only in the statement but in the whole political situation, and these will still have to be processed both by the MSZP and the SZDSZ. I am also certain that this story will teach many lessons to all of us, and we will get to the point where we are able to show efficient governmental work. To achieve this, both parties will have to assesses the events, in order to create an atmosphere of confidence in which the prime minister can keep his ability to act. The prime minister has only one tool to improve the level of governmental work: If he sees problems or he wants to create new priorities, then he can establish new institutions, change the government's structure, or assign new tasks to new people. However, this definitely requires an atmosphere of confidence.

[Varju] Do you feel that this decision will restore confidence between the coalition parties? I would find this strange because none of the prime minister's proposals on structural changes have been accepted by the partners so far, in fact, before this withdrawal, the bigger government party was forced to make many compromises. Where is the atmosphere of confidence here?!

[Csintalan] In this casting of roles, in which a small and a much bigger party are governing together, the bigger side has to initiate the building of the bridge of confidence. However, I very much trust that the SZDSZ's leadership will handle this gesture properly and befittingly.

[Varju] Did the 28 September decision simply sweep the former coalition problems under the carpet? After all, the prime minister had previously made many—unsuccessful—proposals on improving the organizational and personnel work of the government, but this time, contradicting the past, the MSZP's executive committee pointed out that no government restructuring was to take place. Is it now necessary to improve the governmental work or not?

[Csintalan] We must choose a much more difficult road than we previously planned, considering that our coalition partner has turned stubborn. Other ways also exist to reach our planned governmental goals. This means that, working from the bottom up, we will try to establish the background institutions in accordance with the prime minister's intentions, and, through these, we can get to our most important goal. In addition to organizational and personnel changes in the government, other methods are also needed for this. For example, establishing the institutional background and managing projects, and the work of the economic cabinet also has to be strengthened to remove some burdens from the government. For us, it continues to be an issue of principle that the government should mainly try to solve the problems of the economy.

[Varju] You spoke about establishing background institutions. Do I understand it correctly that this might mean expanding the apparatus and setting up new positions?

[Csintalan] Not necessarily; it is much more a case of regrouping the tasks. As a matter of fact, in the past period, the government abolished some 7,000 positions through reducing the staffing of the ministries. Therefore, it is visible that major changes are in progress, and in these we have to find the means that also affect the government's work through, for example, a more-coordinated preparation of decisions.

[Varju] I'm sorry that I am still on the 28 September decision, but the question cannot be avoided: Why does a party with a big social support constantly have to withdraw because of a much smaller partner?

[Csintalan] It is obvious, also on the basis of the previous parliamentary cycle's experience, that at least 50 percent of the Parliament is replaced at each election, there is big mobility among the deputies, and many political laymen are coming in. From this, it follows that stable government cannot be feasible with a coalition that has less than 60 percent of Parliament seats. We knew this when we began our work, and know it now, too. It is also clear for all political forces in the country that the political situation has not become as consolidated here as it is in the West, therefore, governing with a small majority is impossible. This would also require a stable party structure, which again we do not have.

[Varju] However, what is the guarantee that the MSZP's seemingly stable parliamentary basis will not dwindle after this withdrawal? A number of platforms are being organized in the parliamentary group, and fractures or even splits can happen along these.

[Csintalan] The MSZP leadership's and parliamentary group's sense of responsibility is the guarantee that this will not happen. I cannot see any conflicts, either, that would result in resignations or splits. I add that one of the lessons we learned from the past four years is that leaving a parliamentary group always leads to becoming politically insignificant.

[Varju] How does the party leadership wish to approach the membership at the approaching congress where the background to this step will have to be explained?

[Csintalan] We have been holding continuous dialogue with the party's organizations at various levels, therefore, the executive committee's decision could not have had the effect of cold water on anyone. In fact, the many weeks of political coordination played a decisive role in forming the final decision.

[Varju] Does this mean that the executive committee and the prime minister enjoyed full political support?

[Csintalan] This decision had significant support within the party, this is precisely what it means.

[Varju] Could the cautious decision have been motivated by the fact that, at the approaching congress, convening an extraordinary party conference at which personnel issues would be on the agenda might be suggested? One can already hear about many self-appointed candidates.

[Csintalan] Power and prestige factors must never receive priority in a governmental party's decisions. Therefore, I can say with a clear conscience that nothing like this influenced the prime minister's and the executive committee's decision, the prime minister is mainly responsible for the country's affairs. Naturally, one can have surprises at a party congress and, in some situations, measures of historic importance can have negative short-term counterblows. Even then, however, these decisions have to be made because one is primarily responsible to the country's citizens and to history.

[Varju] How will the coalition continue to work together?

[Csintalan] It will be necessary for the two parties to have contact on more points and strengthened by personal links in order to assess the coalition disagreements without bias. For me, one of the major lessons learned from the past weeks is that the apparently monolithic SZDSZ has a much more complicated structure and system of interests than it seems from the outside. As I have come into closer contact with many SZDSZ politicians in the meantime, I am convinced that we will be able to resolve the conflicts, which are necessarily emerging as a result of the difficult tasks we are facing, in a much less hysterical way.

[Varju] In the past weeks, the need to end the coalition has occurred to many members of the MSZP's executive committee, in fact the idea of early elections was also raised at the sessions. How many of the executive committee's 17 members supported the 28 September decision?

[Csintalan] We made the decision with one vote against and one abstention, and one person did not participate in the voting. Therefore, the executive committee has a definite political support. As to the former contemplations of the executive committee's members, many versions of solving the coalition crisis emerged in the past weeks.

[Varju] What was the SZDSZ leadership's first reaction to the statement?

[Csintalan] When, late that night, I left the television building to which I had been invited for an interview, dozens of messages were waiting for me at the porter's lodge from SZDSZ politicians. Some of them were congratulatory, very much moved by the political wisdom displayed by the prime minister and the executive committee. On the basis of this, I very much trust that, just as the bigger government party managed to show self-restraint, the SZDSZ will also realize where the limit of the smaller coalition party's possibilities and room for maneuver lies. I very much hope that joint coalition responsibility will permeate the Free Democrats in governmental work, in the coalition cooperation, and before the public. I also trust that they will understand that the success or failure of this government will also decide the SZDSZ's political future, and that it will at last also dawn on them that they do not have an alternative to this coalition, either. Consequently, having a prime minister who is able to act is in their vital interest. It also has to be stated firmly that the economic policy has a single center, namely the government, and that the interests of the SZDSZ and its voters cannot enjoy priority over the country's interests. I believe that it is now clear for everyone that dual power cannot exist in a government.

[Varju] And what if these do not happen?

[Csintalan] Then we will follow the road we promised at the elections in 1994, and we will fulfill the will of our voters. At any cost.

New Mission, Strategies of Armed Forces

95CH0342B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
10 Aug 95 pp 17-18

[Article by Peter Deak: "Armed Forces' Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There have been revolutionary changes in the military situation everywhere in the world—new generations of weaponry have eliminated conventional large-scale wars. The new weapons systems require radically new, more effective organization. Warfare has practically arrived in the world of science fiction. At the same time, it has also displaced the primitive, terroristic forms of combat. Furthermore, the budgeting of less funds for defense is also typical worldwide.

The task of the armed forces has changed particularly in our area: in the developing rule-of-law state their mission and role have been limited to defense against external enemies.

And last but not least, our country's geostrategic environment—including also the nature and intensity of the security challenges—has changed drastically. To wit, the possibility of military conflict, especially of total conflict, has declined to minimal, while the probability of other dangers—partly the danger of armed attack, and partly social and ecological dangers—has increased.

From all this it follows that recognition of the imperative requirements, rather than the political will, was what placed the military establishment's reform on the agenda.

It was evident already in 1990 that reform of the military was an integral part of the change of political systems, and of modernization. It cannot be said that, during the past five years, there had been no mention of the modernization of defense. Indeed, the situation-assessment phase of the preliminaries to a decision is over: the sources of danger that the armed forces might have to confront were clearly identified. On that basis it was possible to draw up what the armed forces would need to be able to fulfill their intended function.

However, the reform's actual elaboration proceeded hesitantly. More emphasis was placed on the symbolism of aspectual elements that had some ideological content, than on the elaboration of strategy versions. Nobody analyzed and said openly what political conditions he was setting, and how much money he was earmarking for their realization.

As a substitute for action, new organizational units were created that could not fit into the conceptual plan, satisfied only sham requirements, and were therefore doomed to failure from the very outset. Brigades were aborted, while intermediate commands sought their niche and formulated tasks for themselves. With their requests for retroactive funding, moreover, these new "small structures" always confronted the state budget with accomplished facts.

It would hardly have been possible to avoid acceptance of the donated weapons or procurement in partial settlement of the foreign debt owed Hungary. At the same time, these weapons did not fit into the established system. Moreover, they merely appeared to be free: adapting them to fit into the system, as well as their operation, diverted funds from other expenditures.

The absence of clear requirements and the procrastination have created a situation that by now is critical, and have shifted decisionmaking onto a forced trajectory.

It was announced that less funding would be available in the long run, because those who were in power could not let the nonmilitary (administrative, social welfare, etc.) aspects of security suffer and thereby cause destabilization. Thus it became a basic principle that the military was the very last in the queue for funding.

The structural and doctrinal heritage of the Hungarian Armed Forces is in a crisis. Every item of hardware is obsolete and continues to deteriorate. The prestige of the Armed Forces is plummeting, and not just because of the absence of any perceptible threat. Insecurity about their jobs is detectable among the officers, NCO's and civilian employees: well-trained leaders are leaving the Armed Forces, while the elder generation wants to stay. There are too many levels of command, and responsibility is being shifted between them.

At the same time, the situation regarding military policy is quite clear. The risks and dangers have been identified, but the forces are not suited to cope with them operationally or to carry out international tasks. This was the situation in which the government acted, forcing parliament to adopt—in relative general agreement, despite all the spectacular rows and votes against—a policy decision that contains also an investment program.

Thus the cabinet provided important, though not sufficiently decisive, answers as to what kind of military establishment it wanted in terms of its intended purpose, capabilities, basic structure and size; how it proposed to change over from the old system to the new one; and according to what specific schedule it intended to implement the individual stages of the changeover.

But the combat-materiel aspect remained obscure. No forecast was prepared of the consequences of the reorganization. And the specific numbers were left out that would have determined how much funding the government intended to obtain for all this.

Let us examine from among which versions of the basic principles of military organization the adopted conceptual plan for reforming the Armed Forces was chosen; and what were the points of departure in making the decision, while it was taken as given that budgetary uncertainties would be the key issue in the reorganization. In the sense of security policy, the decision was clearly alliance-oriented. This might have expenditure-sharing characteristics, beyond the costs of catching up with the alliance.

From among military establishments based on professional soldiers, universal conscription and a citizen-soldier system, respectively, the decisionmakers chose a peculiar combination of all three, while reinforcing the principle of voluntary enlistment. As a result of its gradualism, this combination moderates the sudden costs of a changeover to a professional military establishment. It can also make for greater efficiency in training (the period of training absorbs 62 percent of a conscript's term of service, but only between 12 and 15 percent in the case of a professional soldier), while postponing for later the creation of an unquestionably more expensive military establishment based on voluntary enlistment.

Starting out from the premise that the reorganization would be taking place when there was no particular military tension (in other words, when there was time), the decisionmakers chose—in addition to the first, relatively quick measures consisting mostly of cuts—the method of evolutive modernization. When even the amounts of funding that will be available each year are uncertain, this method permits the temporary suspension or curtailment of investment expenditures, or their acceleration under favorable conditions, and in the initial period it makes possible the concentration of the infrastructure and weapons in best working order, and of the best trained personnel.

This solution, unlike the traditional principles of military organization, does not convert to its reduced peacetime strength a massive military establishment that had been planned for the worst case. Rather, it does the exact opposite: it puts in place a peacetime structure tailored to the most likely situation of its deployment, but provides a way of enlarging that structure to satisfy wartime requirements when necessary. In peacetime it maintains a much smaller military establishment in terms of effective strength, military equipment, levels of command, and the number of garrisons in particular. Thus it eliminates excessive stocks of supplies, together with the costs of their storage and maintenance; and reduces the mass infrastructure of garrisons and barracks. On the other hand, the activation and beefing-up of existing organizations will require considerable outlays.

The adopted version is modeled on NATO's military organization and thereby combines the costs of possible accession and the costs of domestic modernization.

While retaining the conventional organization of military units, as well as territorial formations and mobile troops, the adopted version gives preference to mobile units. That will make redeployment unnecessary, should the security-policy climate change. But rapid reaction will require more expensive combat materiel.

From the present stock of regulation combat materiel, the adopted version will enable the combat-ready but fewer units to use the most modern combat materiel that is in the best state of repair, thereby deferring procurement. Of course, postponement of the introduction of new weaponry could steadily increase the maintenance cost of the existing combat materiel.

Naturally, these are merely basic principles of organization. Here, as always, much will depend on the consistent elaboration of the details, only the outlines of which are known for the time being. Clashes can be expected between advocates of different views, lobbies of the branches and services, political groups, ministries, military social strata, and generations. Still, which are the proposed organizational stakes that cannot be moved?

Fewer levels of command enhance the military's ability to react rapidly, make for faster communication, and for better-informed and more independent staffs. In this respect one can still find organizations that are not functioning properly: especially in the rear services there are offices and directorates that could be merged and abolished; the General Staff is too big and appears to be duplicating the Defense Ministry.

The smaller, 60,000 strong, military establishment is in accord with the balance of power in the area. The question is, how much of this total strength will be the so-called combat strength? (According to present plans, the rank and file will account for about 50 percent; the rest will be civilian employees, officers and NCO's.) Organizational follies are still to be found. Symbolic structures exist that are wasteful and incompatible with the military's basic mission. To remove them from the order of battle, it will be necessary to overcome the opposition of certain groups.

Well-organized battalions, the core of the troops, are equally able to operate within larger units, independently, or split up into subunits—if their formation remains operational; if the leadership firmly opposes the always occurring ideas about providing additional replacements; if units that are truly combat-ready and kept at strength are not assigned "peace missions"; and if the battalions are relieved of training, for which special establishments are maintained.

While increasing the effectiveness of the ground troops, we must also bear in mind that today Hungary is threatened basically from the air. Therefore, the Air Force, which includes also Air Defense, must be given priority in investment. It will be expedient to concentrate here, and also on reconnaissance, the funds available for investment and procurement.

In procurement, while supporting the domestic military industry's considerations, we must seek partners who offer coproduction and innovation, and are also able to provide markets. After all, a highly developed state of our national industry is a guarantee of our defense, and it is also in our economic interest.

Armed Forces' Restructuring Resolution Criticized

95CH0351B Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 11 Aug 95 p 12

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Tibor Havas, Mate Zalka Military Academy, Department of Combat Materiel: "Reform the Armed Forces, but Do So Sensibly"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 June 1995, the National Assembly adopted its resolution entitled "On the Directions of the Hungarian Armed Forces' Long- and Medium-Term Restructuring and Their Strength." For those whom the resolution affects directly, the absence of a consensus on its passage among the parliamentary political parties is not very reassuring. Indeed, the opposition parties did not even attend the sitting of the full House. As the resolution's implementation will be spread over several parliamentary terms, the military could rest more assured if the reform's concept were based on a broad consensus.

In view of the fact that I have done, and am still doing, research into the feasibility of streamlining the system of advancement for regular officers assigned to combat materiel in the services, I have studied also the proportions of commissioned and noncommissioned officers, respectively, in the Hungarian Armed Forces. Furthermore, I have analyzed more than ten European armies from this point of view. Among other things, the recommendations I made in my university doctoral dissertation stemmed from the results of these investigations. On the basis of my research work I am able to say that the resolution's recommended targets for the composition and strength of the Hungarian Armed Forces are flawed. They perpetuate the blurring of the division of duties between commissioned officers and senior NCO's, which is a source of tension even at present; and they do not resolve the commissioned-officer centricity of the Hungarian Armed Forces. It is wasteful, and also continuous undermining of the commissioned personnel's prestige, when commissioned officers are forced to assume duties normally carried out by senior NCO's officers. Within a military establishment whose combined strength of all categories of personnel is 60,000, the optimal proportion of commissioned officers is 10 percent, which means 6,000 commissioned officers. If we take into consideration also the organizational changes in the bodies exercising command and control, a commissioned personnel of this size will be able to achieve predictable, calculable professional and military careers (advancement), without becoming stalled. Along a streamlined career ladder, of course, competing on the basis of merit rather than seniority.

It will be expedient to set the proportion of senior NCO's and warrant officers jointly at 20 percent, which would mean a strength of 12,000. And it will be desirable to build up the proportion of the rank and file to 55 percent. As long as compulsory military service is retained, the ideal proportion of contract soldiers will be between 15 and 25 percent within the above 55 percent. The peacetime proportion of civilian employees supplementing the military personnel could be 15 percent, or about 9,000 civilians.

It was gratifying to read Colonel General Deak's opinion that Belgium's military reform had provided numerous lessons for Hungary as well.

As of 1994, the Belgians are changing over to voluntary enlistment, in the course of which the effective strength of their armed forces is being reduced to 40,000, to which 5,000 civilian employees are being added. The composition and strength of the armed forces has been determined as follows: 5,000 commissioned officers (12.5 percent), 15,000 senior NCO's (37.5 percent), and 20,000 rank and file (50 percent).

A similar restructuring, with similar composition and strength targets, has begun also in the Netherlands.

I am convinced that also in Hungary the commissioned personnel will understand that a smaller military establishment will require fewer commissioned officers. It is not necessary to keep repeating that "we do not want to discharge professionals," while the officials concerned with manpower policy consider solutions under which commissioned officers would be offered the duties of senior NCO's. It is most disillusioning when newly commissioned officers are offered the prospect of serving essentially as senior NCO's. The military establishment does not want to discharge them, but sets conditions for them such that they prefer to leave voluntarily. Could that be the real objective?

In my opinion, the commissioned personnel, which is about 12,300 strong at present, can be reduced to half that strength by 31 December 1998—decently, humanely, and with dignity—but at the cost of suitable financial outlays.

The maintenance of 12,000 senior NCO's and about 7,000 contract soldiers will require, in addition to funding, also a new approach to personnel work.

Restructuring the military establishment will cost a lot of money. Obviously, those who voted for the resolution in the National Assembly were also aware of this.

Aircraft Strength 'Increasingly Less Adequate'

95CH0342C Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
10 Aug 95 pp 18-19

[Article by Emilia Sebok: "The Air Force on a Glide Path"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Just as the airspace over its territory is an integral part of the country, the aviation units and formations—generally referred to as the Air Force—are an essential part of the Armed Forces defending the country. The tasks of the Air Force are: air defense, and air support of ground troops in combat; in connection with the preceding, aerial reconnaissance and destruction of attacking planes; and also air transport. Overall, the Hungarian Air Force's strength of warplanes and attack helicopters is more or less adequate for the mission defined in this manner. But if we consider the future condition of the aircraft, based on projections of the present situation of both the Air Force and the state budget, then the aircraft strength is becoming (increasingly) less adequate. That is how we may summarize the information we received from Major General Nandor Hollosi, chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces Main Directorate of Supply and Materiel.

According to the Vienna Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty, Hungary is allowed to have 180 warplanes and 108 attack helicopters. However, the actual numbers are lower, especially in the case of helicopters. (See Table 1.) Moreover, the data in the international registry embellish considerably the actual situation: at this moment there are only 157 warplanes on the country's territory, but merely 84 of them could be sent into combat immediately and without restrictions. (See Table 2.) Namely, the combat rating of the trainer versions is only a fraction of the combat versions' rating; 23 MiG-21's were grounded already at the beginning of the 1990's; of the remaining 56 fighters of this type, only 42 are actually operational, and only 12 [of the 18] trainer versions of this type. The attack helicopter strength, which is far below the ceiling, is expected to increase in the near future: in a form of intergovernmental aid, the Hungarian Armed Forces will receive from Germany 14 Mi-24 D and six Mi-24 P helicopters that have been "demobilized" from the former East German Army. But because these helicopters have not been flown for years, and the Hungarian Armed Forces are unlikely to have funds to cover the costs of placing them in operation, they will only be adding to the number of helicopters of record, but not to the combat strength of the Air Force.

Of our warplanes, only the MiG-29 interceptor-fighters that arrived at the end of 1993 may be regarded as modern. All the other types are tactically obsolete, although to varying degrees. This is true particularly of the MiG-21 fighters that are unsuitable, for instance, to attack head on a plane violating the country's airspace. Yet this is the type of which the air regiments [groups] have the most. It will be remembered that a debate was triggered at the beginning of 1992 by parliament's passage of a 1.1 billion-forint supplementary budget to modernize the electronic systems of the MiG-21's. That actually was a stopgap solution forced by the paucity of funds. Namely, we were bound by international treaty to equip all our military planes so that they could identify themselves unmistakably to civilian air traffic control. Without that capability, Hungary's airspace today would not be considered safe for international air traffic. But to replace all the MiG-21's with more modern types would have cost more by orders of magnitude.

As a result of this one-billion investment, all our fighter planes remaining in the system—with the exception of the MiG-21 MF's that are to be phased out—will be equipped with NATO-compatible friend-or-foe identification systems. This is important because it is one of the basic conditions of our accession to the alliance. However, sufficient funds have not yet been available to install onboard transponders also on the attack helicopters, or to upgrade also the transport planes' identification systems so as to make them NATO-compatible. That upgrading will not even be necessary anytime soon, the soldiers are saying with a measure of black humor: if one looks at the budget plans, the nine An-26 military transports will not be flying next year (four have already been grounded), because there are not enough funds to repair them. Without air-transport capacity of our own, for instance, live rocket-firing practice will mostly cease, because it is usually conducted over distant deserts or oceans. And at least one military transport of the An-26 type is essential for that purpose.

In its present state the Hungarian Air Force, whose strength had already been scaled down to fit its defensive mission, clearly reflects that Hungary today is a "weak position" within the area. This holds true even if we assume: (1) that the signatories of the Vienna Treaty would not be able to send into combat immediately all the aircraft within their total strength, which exceeds their respective ceilings; and (2) that the quality of the other former socialist countries' air forces is no better than ours. Under these conditions, Gen. Hollosi believes, it is not absolutely essential that we build up our strength to the established ceilings, nor would such a buildup give us offensive power. But at least the existing combat aircraft should be kept in good repair and operating condition, through maintenance and major repairs, so as to enable the Air Force to fulfill its assigned tasks. The only trouble is that funds for maintenance and repairs have been lacking for years; that is why more and more planes have to be grounded. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the Hungarian Air Force today is operating at the minimum acceptable level of security.

The allowable operating time of military airplanes is specified in calendar years and the number of hours flown. For instance, the allowable operating time of a MiG-21 MF is 30 years and a total of 3,000 hours flown. During the present "seven lean years" of the Hungarian Armed Forces, however, a fighter plane flies at most 100 hours a year (pilots fly substantially less than that!), because there are no funds to cover the costs of any additional flight time. But once the limit in calendar years has been reached, the plane may not take off. The manufacturer of the MiG-21's is experimenting with a general overhaul that might extend the service life of the craft. But experts of the Hungarian Air Force are of the opinion that this solution should not even be considered: keeping these increasing obsolete fighter planes in the order of battle would weaken the country's defense capabilities to an unacceptable extent. The possible appropriation for fighter planes should be used preferably to procure good ones.

Replacement of the obsolescent planes will become due in 1998-99. There is no decision as yet on the type of the between 28 and 30 fighter planes that are to be procured at the end of this millennium. But there is not too much choice, Maj. Gen. Nandor Hollosi emphasizes, if we look at what is being offered in the price range we might afford. If we add up the procurement and maintenance costs (see our boxed material), one hour of flight time in a MiG-29 is presumably more expensive than for certain Western makes in the same category. In practice, therefore, two types have been considered so far: the American F-16, and the Swedish Gripen that is being developed. In the case of the F-16, however, the planes being offered are used ones that have been stored in the desert for some time. Naturally, these fighters are not bad, but they will have to be overhauled. And they certainly are not the fighter-type of the future. The Swedes on their part are offering not just the planes but also the possibility of some coproduction. But they will not give us planes for free, either.

To give the reader some idea of the proportions of funding, here are some figures from this year's budget: The Defense Ministry's budget estimates, totaling 75.34 billion forints, contain less than 2.8 billion for the maintenance of the Air Force's combat materiel, and merely 0.9 billion for net capital formation.

For that much you cannot buy even half of an airplane.

[Box, p 19]

How Much for a MiG-29?

At the end of 1993, the Hungarian Armed Forces received 28 MiG-29's, in partial settlement of Russia's debt. The settlement price per plane cannot be determined exactly, because the $754-million package contained also ground equipment and weapons. However, it is very likely that by then the settlement price was much higher than the price at which the neighboring socialist countries had procured their planes of this type in 1987-88. But it is believed that we "bought" for less than the current free-market prices.

Some reconstruction was necessary at the Kecskemet airfield to be able to service this new type of fighter, but such expenses would have been incurred even if some other type had been added to the order of battle. And the cost of renovating the hangar, which had been postponed for many years, cannot be charged entirely to the MiG-29's either. But the need to install in these planes transponders compatible with the Western friend-or-foe interrogation system is clearly causing additional expenses.

It soon turned out that the maintenance costs of the MiG-29's are much higher than for comparable Western fighters, and foreign experience also confirms this. Therefore, the Russian manufacturer and the domestic user, the Kecskemet Tactical Air Regiment [Group], are both working frantically on the elaboration of cost-cutting procedures. But it is difficult to imagine that the maintenance costs might be cut to the same level as for the Western types. Thus we might have to support for decades from our meager budget the expensive planes that we obtained "for free."

But the Hungarian Armed Forces are now hoping that in another (perhaps $240-million) package, likewise in partial settlement of Russia's debt, they will finally get power trains and parts for the MiG-29's. Namely, the current budget does not provide any funds for this at all. Thus it could easily happen that even some of the most modern planes might have to be grounded.

Table 1. Warplanes and Attack Helicopters

Country	Warplanes		Attack Helicopters	
	Actual	Ceiling	Actual	Ceiling
Hungary	159	180	39	108
Slovakia	144	115	19	25
Ukraine	1452	1090	300	330
Romania	450	430	15	120
Yugoslavia*	313	—	80	—
Croatia*	21	—	10	—
Slovenia*	—	—	4	—

Country	Warplanes		Attack Helicopters	
Austria*	54	—	—	—

Footnote: * Not a signatory of the Vienna Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty, hence no ceiling.

Source: "Military Balance"

Table 2. Combat Aircraft in Hungary

Type	Combat Aircraft	Two-Seat Trainer	For Ground Training	To Be Scrapped
Warplanes				
MiG-29	22	6	—	—
MiG-23	9	3	—	—
MiG-21 BIS	39	18	3	2
MiG-21 MF	17		3	21
MiG-21 PF	—	—	1	—
Su-22 M3	11	2	—	—
Helicopters				
Mi-24 D	29	—	—	—
Mi-24 V	10	—	—	—

Source: Hungarian Armed Forces

Izetbegovic Discusses Cease-Fire Agreement

AU0510211495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Oct 95

[Report by Mehmetalija Sisic on news conference by Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic in Sarajevo on 5 October—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, began the news conference with the following words:

[Izetbegovic] Today, I signed on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina an agreement on a cease-fire. For the U.S. side, the agreement was signed by Mr. Holbrooke and Ambassador Menzies.

Mr. Holbrooke was in Belgrade this morning. He came to Sarajevo early this afternoon. This afternoon he left for Zagreb. This is how the final stage of negotiations on [word indistinct] Bosnia looks like.

The cease-fire comes into effect on the night of 9 and 10 October—that is, one minute after 2400, in the first minute of 10 October.

[Sisic] After Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had presented the most important information, spokesman Mirza Hajric spokesman read the text of the agreement in Bosnian and English.

[Hajric] Cease-Fire Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 1995.

The signatories below agree with the following:

Paragraph 1, starting with the day the cease-fire comes into effect [words indistinct] the two sides will [words indistinct] the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ending all military hostilities and (?observing) other provisions of this agreement.

The cease-fire will come into effect one minute after midnight, on 10 October 1995 if the supply of natural gas and power to the city of Sarajevo are fully restored by that time. If this does not happen, the cease-fire will come into effect one minute after midnight on the day (?following) the restoration of supply of these energy resources to the city.

In order to facilitate the negotiations (?and the implementation) of the peace agreement, the cease-fire will last 60 days, or until the conclusion of the direct peace negotiations and peace conference, (?whichever happens later).

According to the obligations concerning the cease-fire, on the day the cease-fire comes into effect all sides will immediately make sure that the military commanders issue [words indistinct] and orders that will prevent:

a) all offensive operations

b) patrolling and [words indistinct] (?inspection) of their positions. [passage indistinct]

Starting with the day the cease-fire comes into effect, the sides will cooperate in the activities of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] connected with the assessment of cease-fire and will immediately inform the relevant UNPROFOR organs on the violations of the agreement.

Starting with the day the cease-fire comes into effect, the sides will ensure the free moment and unhindered road access between Sarajevo to Gorazdc (?and) two primary routes, Sarajevo-Rogatica-Gorazde, and Belgrade-Gorazde, for all nonmilitary and UNPROFOR traffic.

During the cease-fire, the signatories will fully respect the obligations undertaken in the agreement on other principles of 8 September this year in Geneva, the framework agreement of 14 September this year, and other agreed principles of 26 September this year, including, but not (?restricting themselves) with general meaning of the above, the obligation to facilitate the freedom of movement to all persons and all displaced persons, as well as the right to return to their homes and take the possession of their property.

The signatories are President Izetbegovic, Ambassador Menzies and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.

[Sisic] After the text of the agreement on the cease-fire was read, President Izetbegovic insisted on two points.

[Izetbegovic] In connection with what has been read, I would like to make two remarks. We assume that [words indistinct], that is, the indirect negotiations will begin in the United States, in New York or Washington on 26 October. The peace conference will probably be held in Paris.

Moreover, you have probably noticed that Sarajevo has not been mentioned in this document. We insisted that Sarajevo be treated separately. The situation in Sarajevo is not a subject of consent or a lack of consent of the Serb side. The status of Sarajevo during this period, until the peace agreement is signed, will be solved and regulated with the unilateral acts of the United Nations, the UN resolutions, the EU decisions, and NATO's decisions.

[Sisic] After that, President Izetbegovic answered several journalists' questions. Because we are trying to finish this report before the evening newscast, we will inform you in more detail later in the Hronika Dana program.

'No Limits' Until Cease-Fire

AU0510183395 Paris AFP in English 1810 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Oct 5 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said Thursday [5 October] that there were "no limits" on Bosnia's warring parties until a ceasefire accord comes into effect in five days' time.

His remarks appeared to hint that the current clashes between the Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian Serb rebels in several parts of the country could continue up to the last minute before a conditional October 10 countrywide ceasefire clicks into place.

"The situation is the same as it is today. There are no limits in this regard. The ceasefire starts on the 10th (October) which means that it is does not start as of today," Izetbegovic told reporters following the announcements in Washington, Zagreb and Sarajevo of a ceasefire accord brokered by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke.

"The situation remains unchanged until October 9," he added.

An eight-point ceasefire agreement was reached earlier Thursday at the end of a week of frenetic shuttle diplomacy between the Balkan capitals led by Holbrooke.

The ceasefire is conditional on the restoration by rebel Serbs of gas and electricity supplies to Sarajevo, according to the accord. It will be delayed if resumption of the utilities is put off.

The eight-point agreement also requires that two roads be opened to the eastern government-held enclave Gorazde, which has been surrounded by Serb rebels for three years, according to a text of the accord distributed by the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb.

The agreement in addition also provides for the exchange of prisoners of war immediately after the ceasefire comes into effect.

Yeltsin States Support for Cease-Fire Accord

AU0510195695 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, today sent a message to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which reads as follows:

Respected Mr. President of the Presidency, the settlement of the Bosnian crisis has reached a crucial moment. As a result of a goodwill that the sides concerned have expressed and the efforts of the Contact Group, the representatives of Russia, the United States, and the EU, exceptionally important decisions have been harmonized and these offer an opportunity finally to reach a comprehensive peaceful settlement of the crisis.

A significant part of the road has been covered. To remove the remaining obstacles, speed up the progress, and find a way out of the crisis, it is necessary without delay to agree on a cease-fire throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially because the main preconditions for this already exist.

We would be prepared in practice to bring to the accord in Belgrade conditions that take into account your interests, the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo and the opening of a corridor to Gorazde. For our part, we are trying to ease the humanitarian situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and take part in the normalization of life in your long-suffering republic and the attainment of a cease-fire.

Proceeding from this, Russia is prepared to resume the delivery of natural gas. Our view is that our duty is to help the friendly peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this help should not be lost in the war hotbed. The cease-fire will facilitate a transition to practical preparations for a peace conference on the former Yugoslavia.

We take the view that it would suit the interests of all sides in the conflict if the crisis is to be brought to a conclusion [osvijestenje] at a conference in Moscow. Russia intends to continue to play an active role to ensure that the settlement of the crisis has a balanced character.

Holbrooke Leaves Sarajevo Talks Empty-Handed

AU0510142195 Paris AFP in English 1353 GMT 5 Oct 95

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Oct 5 (AFP)—US envoy Richard Holbrooke left Sarajevo citing little progress in his bid to secure an agreement on a Bosnian ceasefire during brief talks with the Bosnian government.

"We're making progress though we have nothing to announce yet. There are still a few problems to iron out. There's nothing I have to add to that," Holbrooke said after an hour-long meeting with government officials, including Bosinan President Alija Izetbegovic.

Despite a week of frenetic shuttle diplomacy across the Balkans, Holbrooke has been unable to stop fighting between government forces and the Bosnian Serbs, which has flared in recent weeks.

Holbrooke said he was heading to Zagreb to meet Croatian President Franjo Tudjman before going on to Rome where a two-day international meeting opens to debate the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia, shattered by four years of war.

The Rome session will bring together delegates from a five-nation "contact group," Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, along with Canada, Italy, Spain and Japan.

The US assistant secretary of state said the ceasefire, constitutional issues and post-war reconstruction "if there is ever a peace", would be discussed in Rome. But, he warned: "let me assure you that whatever progress we're making it's very limited against that enormous distance."

He said he would then travel to the United States to consult with President Bill Clinton and then return "to the field as soon as possible:"

On Wednesday [4 October], Holbrooke spent six hours in talks with Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade after receiving what he termed a "serious proposal" for a ceasefire from the Bosnian government the same day. [passage omitted]

Early Thursday before leaving Belgrade for the Bosnia capital, Holbrooke said that he had had: "a very long and productive session with President Milosevic (on) political, territorial and constitutional issues on the ceasefire."

Government officials in Sarajevo said their proposal centered on meeting two demands; fully lifting the siege of the capital and opening roads to the isolated Gorazde enclave in eastern Bosnia.

An earlier demand that Banja Luka, a Bosnian Serb stronghold in northern Bosnia, be "demilitarised" was dropped. "At this stage, it is not the most important thing," Mirza Hajric, a foreign ministry spokesman said. [passage omitted]

Holbrooke Reported To Arrange Cease-Fire Accord

AU0510150695 Paris AFP in English
1459 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Washington, Oct 5 (AFP)—US negotiator Richard Holbrooke has brokered an agreement concerning a ceasefire in Bosnia, a US official said Thursday [5 October].

President Bill Clinton was to make an announcement on the agreement at around 11:00 a.m. (1500 GMT) at the White House.

No other details on the accord were immediately available.

The announcement comes nine days after the warring parties agreed to a future constitutional arrangement for Bosnia.

Holbrooke was in Sarajevo and Zagreb Thursday before going on to Rome where a two-day international meeting opens to debate the reconstruction of former Yugoslavia, shattered by four years of war.

Government Official: Cease-Fire Accord Reached

AU0510152795 Paris AFP in English
1501 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Oct 5 (AFP)—An agreement has been reached on a countrywide ceasefire for Bosnia, a Bosnian Government official told AFP Thursday [5 October].

"There is an agreement on a ceasefire for the whole of Bosnia," the official said without giving further details. [passage omitted]

An aide to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic said he would give a statement at 6:00 p.m. (1700 GMT) Thursday. "All details will be available then," the official said.

'Main Points' of Cease-Fire Accord Reported

AU0510174795 Paris AFP in English
1727 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 5 (AFP)—The following are the main points of a countrywide cease-fire between Bosnia's warring factions announced Thursday [5 October]:

The cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on October 10, 1995, provided that full gas and electricity supplies have been restored to Sarajevo by that time; otherwise the cease-fire will become effective at 0001 hours on the day following such restoration.

The cease-fire will last for 60 days or until the completion of a peace conference on Bosnia, whichever is later.

Following the cease-fire, all parties will immediately ensure that all military commanders issue and compel compliance with clear orders precluding offensive operations; reconnaissance activities forward of friendly positions; all offensive weapons firing including sniper fire; the laying of mines; and the creation of additional barriers or obstacles.

After the cease-fire, all parties will ensure all civilians and prisoners are treated humanely and that all prisoners of war are exchanged.

After the cease-fire, all parties will provide free passage and unimpeded road access between Sarajevo and Gorazde along two primary routes (Sarajevo-Rogatica-Gorazde, Belgrade-Gorazde) for all non-military and UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) traffic.

Beslagic Expresses 'Reservations' About U.S. Plan

AU0410175995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Selim Beslagic, head of the Tuzla Municipality [and leader of the Union of Social Democrats of Bosnia-Herzegovina], today received a Contact Group delegation headed by Jerry Ross, which is visiting the Tuzla Municipality and the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton with a view to acquiring an insight in the implementation of the Constitution on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sead Avdic, deputy head of the Tuzla Municipality, spoke about the relationship between canton and municipality, as well as about the need to establish a unified system on the territory of the Federation, which above all means unified towns and the return of those expelled. He pointed out that the drawing up of maps can bring no peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it can survive only as a federal community of all its peoples and citizens.

Municipality leader Beslagic finally expressed his reservations about Holbrooke's proposal regarding the Serb entity, which may bring additional difficulties to the process of implementation.

Tuzla Municipality Secretary Jasmin Imamovic suggested that attention should be paid to the more active participation of opposition parties in the process of implementation and expressed his deep belief that a free Brcko and the free flow of goods would make a direct contribution to the processes of implementing the Constitution.

An appeal was sent to the international public from this meeting to make possible the opening of Tuzla airport, which would enable the region to be economically independent from parastate [word indistinct].

Bosnian-Croatian Army Generals Meet in Bihac

LD0410205895 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that military cooperation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Army on the ground is producing good results, is illustrated by the meeting between Army General Rasim Delic and Corps Gen. Zvonimir Cervenko [Croatian chief of the general staff] in Bihac. It was an opportunity for the two sides to brief each other on the military situation in the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, examine the course of cooperation so far between the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatian Armies, and set out new forms of the closest possible joint action.

Delic on Posavina Corridor, Problems With HVO

AU0510142595 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 27 Sep 95 pp 6-7

[Interview with General Rasim Delic, commander in chief of the Bosnian Army, by Dzemaludin Latic; place and date not given: "We Shall Cut Off the Corridor Only When We Are Sure That We Are Able To Keep It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Latic] General, to begin with, can you tell us what are the positions of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H Army] after the great successes of its 5th, 7th, 3d and 2d Corps?

[Delic] The B-H Army's latest big operation is a strategic operation that has come about as a result of developments on the front this year. It is being carried out by four corps: the 2d and 3d Corps on the Mount Ozren front, and the 5th and 7th Corps in central and west Bosnia. According to the information I possess and the latest information released by the B-H Army, starting with my cabinet, we have liberated some 4,000 square kilometers of territory, which is around 8 percent of the entire territory of the republic, including several cities. The territory stretches from the north-west part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, from the zone of responsibility of the 5th Corps, including the access route to Bosanski Novi, the villages of Agici, Lusci Palanka, or more precisely, the area eastward from Lusci Palanka, and descending toward Cadjavica hill overlooking Kljuc and toward Manjaca. Which means, we are positioned near Bosanski Novi and on access routes to Prijedor and Sanski Most. After that, the liberated territory links up with the territory liberated by the Croatian Army together with the Croatian Defense Council [HVO], which means that it stretches further, bypassing Varcar-Vakuf. The access to Varcar-Vakuf is held by the B-H Army on its western and north-western side, and by Croatian units on the eastern side. Varcar-Vakuf is in a sort of half-encirclement, with a way out toward Banja Luka. Furthermore, the liberated territory stretches from Jajce toward Bocac. The very access to Jajce is controlled by the B-H Army. Thus the line stretches from Jajce, near Koricanske Stijene rocks overlooking Babanovac, which means that we have freed the entire Vlasic plateau.

As for the 2d and the 3d Corps, they have freed much of Mount Ozren. The 2d Corps is controlling access roads to Bosansko Petrovo Selo, at approximately 1.5 to two kilometers from the Kraljica facility, which is situated deep in the territory of Mount Ozren, while the 3d Corps has moved away from Maglaj by freeing Bijela Ploca, and is now controlling access routes to the village of Rjecica, which means it is still in the territory of the Maglaj area, and then one actually enters the area of Doboj on the right bank of the Bosna River. There it is important that the 2d and 3d Corps continually follow each other, and that they are connected through entire Ozren, thereby maintaining the continuity of military activities. In the zones of responsibility of other corps, for the time being, there are no war activities, because in the 1st Corps zone of responsibility NATO has carried out air strikes. In the 4th Corps zone of responsibility there is some fighting, but for the time being without significant results.

[Latic] When our newspaper brought out your statement last year, that the B-H Army controls just a handful of towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, your statement caused different and severe debates. In the meantime, instead of towns, the B-H Army set out to capture heights. Now, de facto, it controls those Bosnian heights, but it has also set foot in some towns.

[Delic] Last year I said that the goal of the B-H Army was to create favorable strategic conditions in order to be able to advance. It did that last year. At the moment we are in a more favorable position when speaking of possible liberating some other towns. For instance, with Teslic it is a permanent possibility. Doboj will possibly be liberated quite soon, and some other towns as well, where military activities are already in progress, or will be launched or planned soon. All in all, favorable tactical conditions on the ground are making possible quicker breakthroughs and settlement of particular situations. I have also pointed out many times that we do not intend to enter cities directly. This attitude has shown itself to be a correct concept, because from the military-strategic point of view, it is far better to bypass a city and take facilities around it, which makes the city easy to liberate.

[Latic] Two months ago the B-H Army launched an offensive aimed at lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. Immediately thereafter the aggressor and UNPROFOR prepared the disastrous fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, while the Croatian Army launched Operation Storm, which was a brilliant success. The B-H Army General Staff, and even you yourself, were being publicly criticized for inefficiency, inadequate military strategy, impotence.... According to the critical remarks at the time, Croatia had already formed an efficient, so-called Israel-styled type of army, while our army had reportedly retained an inert concept of warfare.

[Delic] No army can be created overnight, and even if it could, we did not have capacity to create such an army and that quickly! The Croatian Army has been developing for three years now, in conditions without an arms embargo or battle lines, and it has been able to mass in certain areas, to prepare itself, plan actions, train troops.... The B-H Army has been developing in conditions of incessant fighting, limited equipment, and having an aggressor with extreme military-technical superiority. Two or three months ago, at the time of intensive war activities conducted by the B-H Army, I said on one occasion: We need to be patient and persistent. While we were conducting onslaughts around Sarajevo, we put the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor in such a position that they used up all their manpower and reserves, and they were not able to react any more. Negative pressure is being applied to the B-H Army even after it has liberated 1,100 square kilometers of territory this year and assumed the entire strategic initiative, while the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa came about more as a political case, because, as it became clear later, the B-H Army was the only one that did something for these two enclaves. Nobody else did enough to help Srebrenica and Zepa. I do not know what the reason was for such attacks on the B-H Army. I knew that the results would come about, because, as I say, we made the chetniks stretch their lines to the utmost, and it was only a matter of time before they they would burst somewhere. All those activities were carefully planned, they were part of our directive, and part of our plans that were ready for execution. And the results have come. They are no surprise to me. We planned the actions very carefully, particularly the one at Mount Ozren. There we expected a 100 percent result, and we accomplished even better, which was supposed to open up the process that is under way right now. Those who want to shift the entire burden on the back of the B-H Army should be aware of everything that the B-H Army has done for this state. When I say the B-H Army I do not refer only to its soldiers and officers, but also to all those who are with the Army, who helped establish the Army. Because, without those results the negotiating position of our state bodies would be far more unfavorable even in the conditions of two months earlier, not to mention the current conditions....

[Latic] One particular question bothers both soldiers and civilians: When will the 5th and 7th Corps link up?

[Delic] It was realistic that the units of the 5th and 7th Corps link up in Jajce. However, that linking has been accomplished through the HVO, that is, the Croatian Army, which entered Jajce. In our further plans we shall make efforts to accomplish that, because our goal is that units of the B-H Army directly link up. Whether we succeed in that, we shall see. We have realistic chances of succeeding in our objective. But there are also some political facts in the game, particularly when speaking of Banja Luka, because at the moment we are not able to link up through Jajce any more, and we have to try to accomplish that through other territories. It seems to me that both the Croatian Army and political factors want to see that the linking does not come about, and I think that in the political sense something should be done, because if that turns into a race for territory, then it is easier to squeeze oneself somewhere in between, rather than to liberate huge pieces of land. For that reason one should react politically as soon as possible, solve problems in the Federation if that is possible, or find some other way. A military solution is possible any time.

[Latic] Three days ago in Novi Travnik you met with the self-proclaimed defense minister of the Bosnian Croats and the general staff of the HVO. Was there any breakthrough in your military negotiations, or did some new problems arise?

[Delic] The problems are well-known, which is the reason for holding this and all previous meetings. In principle, it showed that by joint military efforts good results can be achieved. However, the latest operations were not joint, but simultaneous. Because, for something to be joint, one ought to make detailed plans, consult about activities, concrete tasks, and lines that are supposed to be boundaries when particular formations or units carry out their tasks. This time this was not done. On the contrary, it was just a report that we were supposed to launch an attack, to set out in one particular direction, which we did, because our goal is the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, after that something happened that we did not expect. After the liberation of Jajce it was not allowed that the status prior to its occupation be restored in the city, which means, the B-H Army was barred from entering the city. This could have caused incidents, and this meeting was aimed at preventing such incidents, which we did, but it is certain that political endeavors ought to be made very quickly, because it is difficult to hold back people who are waiting at the gates of Jajce and looking at their houses, and who have contributed to the liberation of Jajce, while somebody is denying them the right to return there. This issue ought to be politically resolved. I, as a soldier, could not discuss the issue with them. I talked to them in order to make it possible to define the current lines, so that everybody knows where the boundaries are, and actions in accordance with the Zagreb agreement, which means that, when talking about the recently liberated territory, those who have liberated it cannot claim it for themselves. The issue has to be handled according to the principles of the Washington agreement, which means, it must be made possible for all the people from those regions to return to their homes.

[Latic] You have just returned from the conference of the Contact Group of the Organization of Islamic Countries [OIC]. Those countries have publicly announced that they will not observe the arms embargo against our army, and they have promised military and training aid in order to make possible for us to survive here and save the face of the Muslims in Europe.

[Latic] In a speech I made on the first day of the conference, I said that we were saving the face of Islam and Muslims in the region, while they ought to help us to do so even better and in a more appropriate way. I also said that we had proven we were able to do that, which we had been doing for three and a half years now, and that the obligation of those who were able to help us was to do it in a more generous way. The great importance of the conference lay in the fact that for the first time there appeared the army commanders of the most influential Islamic countries, that they were able to get an insight in the real situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in our war reality first hand, on the basis of bilateral talks and at the plenum.... In the documents adopted at the conference unreserved support is expressed for our struggle, as well as their readiness to help us either within the framework of the existing conditions imposed by the international community, or outside it. It is well-known that we have friends in the Islamic world who have been aiding the struggle of the B-H Army and people in Bosnia-Herzegovina even so far. They are ready to keep on doing so with even greater enthusiasm and contribution. I think that the significance of the conference is in the fact that certain countries that have been inert until now, have woken up, and at least at the moment expressed their readiness to help us. Time will tell whether they will do that. The resolution adopted obliges the Islamic countries in a way to help us. It represents the entire Islamic world, because it is about the OIC Contact Group, about the countries that have provided troops for UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and about officials of OIC.

[Latic] General Delic, at the time of public attacks on everything that has arisen from the ashes of war there was a frequent allegation that our army is partisan, and that it must not involve itself in politics. What is the relationship between the B-H Army and official state policy?

[Delic] In the history of mankind there has never been an army detached from politics! I think those are theories that are probably a result of the former system, where a nonpartisan army was supposed to be accomplished. The army protects the current state policy and the state system that is being developed, because it is an armed force. Consequently, our army, like any other, has to serve the current state policy. Those who bring out such theories, if they were in power, would not talk about a nonpartisan army, or they would formulate it in a different way. Our army supports all actions taken by the state bodies of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency headed by President Izetbegovic. Actions taken by the state Presidency or President Izetbegovic in the domain of activities aimed at halting the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, in the case of a cease-fire, are carried out by the Army. Take the recent example of Banja Luka: If the course of an action taken by the leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina requires that Banja Luka be demilitarized in a peaceful way, and that its addition to the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina be ensured, the B-H Army, first, will not consider it necessary to enter the city, and second, it will observe all decisions made, so if the order read that all activities in the area should be suspended, we would carry it out, for the General Staff is the operational body of the Supreme Command, while the Supreme Command is the Presidency headed by President Izetbegovic. Therefore, they are the ones who who make the strategic decision on the B-H Army's deployment.

[Latic] What were the negative factors on the aggressor's side that helped the B-H Army accomplish the recent results?

[Delic] There were many such factors, and the key one is time, because in the beginning the aggressor planned to finish us off in a few days, or months. However, all this has been going on for several years now, and the B-H Army's growing defense capacity has been putting the aggressor's armada in a more and more unfavorable position. The enemy bit off more than it can chew, which needed to be defended later on, because it was a huge territory that needed to be covered by a large number of troops. In time this fact weakened the confidence about the objectives they had set themselves, and with those defeats, despite the propaganda machinery and information blockade imposed on the Serbian public, suspicion wormed its way into the people. Their morale began to dissipate a long time ago. The more results we achieved on the ground, the greater the collapse in their morale. They also had existential problems regarding supplies. In the recently liberated territories it is evident that people did not carry out farming. There are no fields sown with crops. Moreover, there was a power struggle going on in the leaderships, while some individuals were getting rich.... Furthermore, the lack of balance in weapons between us improved to a degree. The huge spoils of war that the B-H Army had captured from the enemy in the past two years brought about the situation in which we were able to mass more powerful weapons, so for the first time they felt the force of artillery or tank gunfire.... The combination of manpower and weapons has definitely improved our capacity to wage war, although, unfortunately, they still have the advantage in technical means over us.

[Latic] If they can impose an embargo on arms, they cannot impose an embargo on humanity. The just goals of our struggle and humane methods of warfare have ensured an extraordinary morale and political capital for our policy and army.

[Delic] Absolutely. We have earned ourselves great capital in this struggle, meaning that we are not waging war either against civilians, or against any particular religion or nationality. This can be seen in the territories controlled by the B-H Army. It is not a one-nation army, and even if it were, it is not struggling to accomplish a one-nation state, and it is in no way a nationalist army, as is the case with the aggressor's army. The B-H Army is fighting for such relations in Bosnia as have existed there for centuries, for such a Bosnia as has been recognized by the international community. Wherever the B-H Army is in control, free life is guaranteed to everybody regardless of his religion, nationality, or political attitude. We do not demolish either churches, or other cultural monuments, or institutions.

[Latic] Will you be shelling civilians in Banja Luka if the aggressor continues to kill civilians in territories under your control?

[Delic] No way! We have not done any such thing even so far. It is normal that in the course of some military operation civilians get killed on the opposite side, because it is difficult to create conditions where civilian facilities would be remote from military objectives. Donji Vakuf and all the recently liberated towns have shown that we have made efforts to stay out of the towns in order to prevent any mistakes or incidents possibly being caused by our soldiers. We are creating conditions to wage war solely against soldiers! The entire world knows about the humane basis and methods of our warfare, and we shall never gamble away that capital of ours. I have just visited the recently liberated territory, and everybody can plainly see that not a single Serbian orthodox church or any other house of God has been pulled down. The old Serbian orthodox church in Donji Vakuf is still there, in the same shape as it was before.

[Latic] I suppose that before and in the course of those offensives you coordinated activities with NATO or Rapid Reaction Force officers? There are theories that

NATO destroyed the aggressor's radar and communication system, which made possible the spectacular successes of the Croatian Operation Storm and our offensives?

[Delic] We certainly did coordinate activities during the NATO air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as much as was necessary to provide them with information on the aggressor's positions or the positions of heavy guns. We tried to sense the situation in order not to cause negative reactions in the case of the B-H Army's launching offensives. We assessed that there would be negative reactions if we launched offensives in the territories where the NATO air force carried out air strikes. You have seen that we did not conduct offensive actions there. The focus of NATO air strikes was in the area around Sarajevo, Mount Majevica and eastwards from Doboj. The NATO air force did damage the aggressor's radar guidance and control system, which made it difficult for the Serbs to act, but unfortunately, the NATO air force did not destroy the heavy artillery of the Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor. Not to mention that the Serbian troops' disposal on the ground has remained intact! Our latest successes ought to be ascribed to the B-H Army, which carried them out in cooperation with the Croatian Army and the HVO.

[Latic] How will the B-H Army behave towards the contingent of NATO troops that have been announced as future peacekeepers when a peace agreement is signed?

[Delic] That ought to be a political decision in the first place. It will be necessary to assess the moment of arrival and who takes part in that contingent. To me it is incomprehensible that there is insistence on deploying Russian troops in that contingent, since it is well-known what a negative role the Russian and Ukrainian UNPROFOR troops have played. Given the political attitude that Russia has shown since the beginning of the aggression, siding with the perpetrators of a genocide, having its troops within the NATO contingent will hardly be acceptable. We shall inform the state bodies of our opinion on that question. Soldiers are supposed to think about what is happening today, and until those troops arrive, the B-H Army will carry out its tasks. When the moment comes, we shall change tack.

[Latic] Are you afraid that the so-called FRY might become militarily directly involved, if the B-H Army cuts off the corridor in northern Bosnia, in whatever manner it chooses?

[Delic] We thought that the limit of tolerance beyond which the FRY Army would get involved was much bigger, but because of accumulated problems in Serbia and Montenegro that limit is much smaller. Even at this moment new units are being brought in from the FRY in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi.... Not only our cutting off the Posavina corridor [Sava River basin], which would definitely put an end to Karadzic's and Mladic's parastate, but also, speaking of Sarajevo, our nearing Banja Luka, cutting off the corridor through the Drina valley... all this, each of these things separately, can frustrate the greater Serbian plan. Milosevic's FRY is continuously involved in the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, when we plan massive operations to cut off corridors and such things, we have to take into account not only the military capacity of Karadzic's parastate, but also Milosevic's military force. We shall plan to cut the corridor in Posavina when we are sure that we are capable of keeping our positions there. That operation, if that be God's will, will mean in military terms, though not in political terms, the end of the war.

HVO Army Chief Denies Muslim-Croat Clashes

LD0510182995 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Major General Tihomir Blaskic, chief of general staff of the Croat Defense Council [HVO; Bosnian Croat army], visited Usora [in northern Bosnia] today. Ivan Katic reporting.

[Katic] The Bosnian Serb army launched fierce artillery attacks on the Usora battlefield over the past 12 hours. After a quiet night, tank and mortar shells starting hitting the Usora area early in the morning. Serbs fired more than 40 shells of various calibers at villages in Usora and defenders' positions on the northern, eastern, and western sections of the battlefield, from the direction of Stanovi and Putnik Hill above Doboj. [passage omitted]

Major General Blaskic and Brigadier Drago Dragicevic, commander of the Vitez operational area, toured the positions and command of the 110th Home Guards' Usora regiment. [passage omitted]

Blaskic also commented on Serb rumors about alleged clashes between HVO units and the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] army, which aim at increasing tension in relations between Croat and Bosniak Muslim nations and at recreating the situation from 1993. The best response to these rumors, Blaskic says, is very good cooperation between the partners in the federation, which has resulted in the liberation of large chunks of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the end of his address to the commanders of the 110th Home Guards' Usora Regiment, Blaskic commented in particular on the need to continue building HVO units as a guarantee of the Croat people's survival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The home guards' units are an important elements in this process, he said.

Dudakovic on Offensive, Banja Luka 'Liberation'

BR0210144895 Madrid ABC in Spanish 2 Oct 95 p 32

[Interview with General Atif Dudakovic, Bosnian 5th Army Corps commander, by Branimir Baron Brijevic in Bihac on 27 September: "Liberation of Banja Luka Serbian Stronghold Is Only a Matter of Time"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Zagreb—Division General Atif Dudakovic, the Bosnian Government forces' 5th Army Corps commander, used to be a young officer in the former Yugoslav army, stationed in the Zadar antiaircraft training center. At the beginning of the war against the Croatian Republic, he moved to Bosnia, to the Bihac enclave, where he gradually organized the defense and enabled the government army to control the region.*

The official name of the 5th Army Corps's latest succesful offensive is Sana, but among Didakovic's troops it is called "Operation Lightning," just like the one in western Slavonia. This is a way of emphasizing cooperation with the Croatian Army: The troops obtained all their heavy weapons, ammunition, and even their uniforms, from Croatia. "The federation and the confederation are already working within the army," Dudakovic said laughingly last Wednesday afternoon [27 September] when we met at his headquarters in Bihac, the capital of the western Bosnian province.

[Brijevic] The last few days have been rich in events. How would you describe the Sana operation?

[Dudakovic] The 5th Army Corps was entrusted with the mission of gaining access to the Japra and Sana River valleys. Our units fought in the direction of Bihac-Bosanski Petrovak-Kljuc, and Bosanska Krupa-Sanski Most. Within the first three days our units fulfilled all their objectives. We liberated all the cities we had planned to liberate. Some geographical obstacles to further penetration in the Sana valley made it difficult for us to pursue our plans further, and Sanski Most fell again to the Serbs. But, despite everything, we have recovered almost 4,000 square km of territory. When we reestablish control on the Sana valley, this will open the way to Banja Luka. In any case, most of the 5th Army Corps is already on the Sana's right bank.

[Brijevic] Is this not an amazing success, considering you are still poorly equipped?

[Dudakovic] It was a quick and resolute action, with our infantry units covering and conquering over 100 kilometers in two days, without any heavy weapons, at least without any heavy tanks, or any field guns or artillery of the kind available to the Serbs. We fight with our hearts, and that makes the difference.

[Brijevic] You have the reputation of being a chief who fights side by side with his troops.

[Dudakovic] Of course, only in this way can a commander maintain his credibility. The Yugoslav Army is organized on a different basis, hierarchy is very important. Among us, it is the objective that is important, and it is up to the noncommissioned officers to determine how the troops are to achieve this objective. As long as everything goes well, I have no reason to change my approach.

[Brijevic] You did however employ a few heavy weapons. How did this come about?

[Dudakovic] Most of such weapons were captured in hand-to-hand fighting. But the Sana operation was also supported by the Croatian Army, above all with artillery fire. This helped us a lot.

[Brijevic] Last weekend you promised a new offensive against the Banja Luka Serbian stronghold. Why did you do this, despite the success of peace negotiations in New York? Are you not afraid of missing an opportunity for peace?

[Dudakovic] We must have no illusions concerning the Serbs. Besides, in New York they are represented by Yugoslav Federation politicians because our government rightly refuses to have any dealings with war criminals like [Bosnian Serb leader] Karadzic or [General] Mladic. But this does not mean that Bosnian Serbs are prepared to accept everything. For that matter, the first thing that should be done is to hand them over to a UN Court. Then we could say that the peace process is moving forward. As long as a peace agreement is not reached and signed, we do not feel obliged to implement a cease-fire.

[Brijevic] How far is Banja Luka from your units now?

[Dudakovic] Quite far. Prijedor is not very close either. But liberation of the Banja Luka Serbian stronghold is inevitable, and it will change everything radically. We will then continue to advance toward Breko and Bijeljina. When Banja Luka falls, the way will be open. With the town of Doboj, 70 km east of Banja Luka, we now control electrical power and the main communication routes between east and west in central Bosnia.

The Bosnian governmental forces' 7th Army Corps, led by General Mehmed Alagic, wants to establish contact with us in Banja Luka. We are fighting in the vicinity of Sanski Most and we have already surrounded it. Capturing the town is only a matter of time, and the same applies to Mrkonjic Grad. We will manage, because we are used to suffering. Suffering has made us strong.

[Brijevic] Will there be a unitary state in the end?

[Dudakovic] Yes, and the "chetniks" will be expelled to Serbia. Only those who can prove that they have not committed any war crimes will be allowed to return to Bosnia.

Monitors Claim Gen Dudakovic Injured

AU0410132395 Paris AFP in English 1236 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct 4 (AFP)—A top Bosnian general was injured and seven soldiers from the Bosnian Croat and mainly Moslem Bosnian Army were killed in a gunbattle between the two allies, the United Nations said Wednesday.

A European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) reported that Bosnian Croat troops and Bosnian Army 5th Corps troops had battled near the town of Bihac, said UN spokesman Chris Gunness.

Bihac is at least 25 kilometers (15 miles) from the nearest confrontation line.

General Atif Dudakovic, who has parleyed assistance from the Croatian Army in the most successful military campaigns in Bosnia, was "slightly injured," said Gunness.

But Amir Sulic, a spokesman for the 5th Corps, said in a telephone interview from Bihac that Dudakovic had not suffered any injuries recently and that there had been no fighting between the two forces.

"It's a complete lie," said Sulic. "The best proof that Dudakovic is not injured is that he is out in the field."

Gunness said it was not clear when the reported battle took place or exactly where.

Another 5th Corps official had acknowledged one exchange of fire between the two allies in the past month but blamed it on mistaken identity, or "friendly fire."

The United Nations has said that it had received reports of the two sides jostling each other for territory, but that the military alliance that they formed to battle rebel Serbs in Bosnia was not threatened.

Wounding 'Complete Lie'

AU0410201995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] 5th Corps Spokesman Amir Sulic today denied the report on the wounding of Division General Atif Dudakovic and added that he has not been injured at all. This is a complete lie, Sulic added and explained that the best proof of this is that the general is at the front.

The 5th Corps spokesman also denied conflicts between the Croatian Army and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the Bihac region. The proof of this are the joint operations launched by the two allies' forces.

Croat Radio on Muslim-Croat Fighting Near Bihac

LD0510174095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1643 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 5 (TANJUG)—Four Croat and three Muslim soldiers were killed in fighting between Bosnian Muslim Army 5th Corps and the Bosnian Croat army around the town of Bihac in western Bosnia, Croat Radio said Thursday morning quoting E.U. monitor sources as saying.

The source said 5th Corps Commander Gen. Atif Dudakovic was slightly wounded in the fighting, the third to break out between Muslims and Croats this month.

Croat Radio quoted the source as saying that Muslim and Croat troops clashed a month ago also around the town of Bosanski Petrovac to the south and casualties were reported on both sides.

Karadzic Discusses Establishment of Cease-Fire

On Opening Sarajevo, Gorazde

LD0510162895 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the state leadership of the Bosnian Serb Republic, headed by President Radovan Karadzic, had a meeting in Bijeljina late last night with Igor Ivanov, Russian first deputy foreign minister. They discussed possibilities of establishing a cease-fire throughout former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the holding of an international peace conference at which peace in this former Yugoslav republic would be agreed. Our colleague Drago Vukovic covered the meeting.

[Vukovic] Ivanov's visit to our country, following his visits to Sarajevo, Belgrade, and Zagreb, carries not only political significance and recognition of our country but also a concrete contribution to the further progress of the peace process.

[Begin Karadzic recording] Our meeting was very useful, and it was a real pleasure to talk with His Excellency Ivanov and his assistants about what must be done to continue the peace process. We informed each other about all the important issues.

We said we were immediately ready to conclude a cease-fire agreement that would cover all lines of confrontation. We also expressed our readiness to restore all utilities to Sarajevo, because it is not in our interest that the residents of Sarajevo should suffer shortages of electricity, water, and gas. This was a result of the destructive war. We are ready to do that, just as we are ready to enable the civilians of Gorazde to travel freely on the one road whose safety we will guarantee. We also want the blue routes in Sarajevo, which are open, to function, so that Sarajevo should not be considered a closed city. Sarajevo can be opened up, and some of these roads are already being used.

Of course, we feel that a lot remains to be done. A lot of work has been done by the Geneva and New York documents, as well as with the cease-fire agreement, if it is signed. Maybe it could be signed very soon if the Muslim government accepts a halt to military operations.

What is still missing are the maps, and we do hope that we can end the war. Every war comes to an end, and so should this one. [end recording]

[Begin Ivanov recording in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] We exchanged opinions on a number of issues concerning a peaceful solution to the conflict in Bosnia. We discussed a cease-fire among other things. The Serb Republic leaders confirmed to us that they are ready for a cease-fire and are determined to solve the problem of opening up the roads around Sarajevo and a road to Gorazde. I believe that these statements are very important and go in the direction of peace and the peace process on the whole.

We discussed some other issues and concluded that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. [end recording]

[Vukovic] Let us stress at the end that the talks were also attended by Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha and Messrs (?Ivanovskiy) and (?Bosa Harcenko), senior officials in the Russian Foreign Ministry, specializing in the former Yugoslavia.

Calls For Halt of Attacks

LD0610103495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0936 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 October (SRNA)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, describes the signing of the agreement on a global cease-fire in ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina as "a great step toward the peace conference which starts on 25 October in New York, and ends in Paris."

"The Serb side is willing to meet all the obligations assumed under the agreement, provided the Muslims do not continue combat operations and sabotage the beginning of the cessation of hostilities," Karadzic cautioned in a statement for SRNA.

The president of the Serb Republic says he believes that "If the Muslims fail to honor the cease-fire, the international community will use those instruments of pressure which it has so far applied, for no reason, to the Serbs alone."

"I hope the international community will no longer tolerate one's failure to meet one's obligations," Karadzic stressed. He says he hoped that the cease-fire—if it remains in effect until the peace conference—will also mark the end of the war in ex-Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Commenting on the battlefront situation, Karadzic says that Serb armed forces consolidated their ranks and demonstrated their superiority as soon as NATO and Croatia pulled back from their joint aggression with the Muslims against the territory of the Serb Republic.

Koljevic Confirms Cease-Fire Agreement Reached

LD0510205095 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1944 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 5 Oct (SRNA)—Nikola Koljevic, deputy president of the Serb Republic [RS], has confirmed that a cease-fire agreement was reached today for the entire territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should come into effect on 10 October.

"Given that some other conditions have to be met, an agreement was reached whereby the RS is to open the road to Gorazde and Sarajevo will have daily supplies of water, electricity, and gas," said the RS deputy president and added that his deputy in the committee for cooperation with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] Maksim Stanisic would sign an agreement to this effect at Sarajevo airport tomorrow.

In Koljevic's words, "peace will be signed in 60 days' time, but if the conference lasts longer this deadline will be extended. If a peace agreement is signed at the conference then a lasting peace will be achieved."

"The visit of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov contributed to the cease-fire agreement, because the question of deployment and type of forces which will defend peace, i.e. the presence of NATO and the Russian forces, and the relationship between the commands represented an obstacle," said Koljevic.

The RS deputy president said that the Russian diplomacy "is beginning to play an increasingly important role on the world scene, and balance is being established which is important for us, an which was lacking before."

Stressing that the agreed cease-fire would accelerate the pace of the peace process, Koljevic said the time should now be used "to create a better political climate for talks."

"A meeting will start in Rome tomorrow on setting up reconstruction funds, and it would be very important that the RS and the Muslim-Croat Federation be granted the right to the equal shares of these funds, and that an end is put to the media war, which would create a better climate for talks," stressed Koljevic.

He specified that the agreement envisaged no guarantors, but that the five members of the Contact Group would no doubt be the guarantors. He also said it could not be ruled out that the regional powers, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia, become the guarantors of the agreement after settling their own problems.

"A delegation of the RS will not go to Rome, but it will go to New York where the first meeting of the peace conference will take place, which will be followed by a meeting in Paris," specified Koljevic.

Krajisnik Seen as 'Optimist' on 'Lasting Peace'

LD0510213595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2051 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 Oct (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Serb Republic People's Assembly, told SRNA this evening that the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation constitutes a big step toward establishing a lasting peace in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"I am an optimist about a lasting peace, although one can never rule out the unexpected," the speaker of the Serb Republic Assembly said, and stressed that a lot of effort has been invested in reaching a global cease-fire agreement because of the opposite side's wishes to take as much of the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible by military means.

Krajisnik stressed that the Muslims' megalomaniac demands—such as the demilitarization of Banja Luka, freedom of movement out of Sarajevo, and others—has been overcome.

The Assembly speaker added that the Serb side has met some of the demands and accepted the restoration of "nonmilitary traffic from Gorazde to Sarajevo via Rogatica, while freedom of movement in and out of Sarajevo will be discussed tomorrow at the city level."

The agreement, which comes into effect on 10 October, includes an exchange of prisoners and some humanitarian rights.

"The cease-fire was a condition for the beginning of the peace conference at which the political part of the agreement will be elaborated and a military document and maps—which are a crucial issue—will be signed," Krajisnik said.

The Serb Republic Assembly speaker gave his support to American President Bill Clinton's initiative for preliminary talks ahead of the peace conference to begin on 25 October.

Croats Taking Abdic's People to Cazin Krajina

AU0310182595 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] How firm the alliance between the Croats and Muslims [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government] is and what the agreement, which was obviously concluded without any basis, actually means is confirmed by the increasingly open conflicts on the front lines within the so-called Croat-Muslim Federation. Veljko Bosnic reports.

[Bosnic] The latest conflicts between the Croats and Muslims at [Bosanski] Petrovac, Jajce, Bugojno, and in the Cazin Krajina indicate that their alliance is breaking up in a violent way and the consequences are already evident.

More than 10 soldiers have been killed in the conflict at Petrovac, while great forces are being concentrated in the Cazin Krajina. The Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina] media have reported that the Croats are occupying parts of the Cazin Krajina, concentrating their forces and bringing Fikret Abdic's Muslims along. [passage omitted].

Article Views Serbian Defeat, Future Options

AU2409183995 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Battle for Bosnian Banja Luka"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 5th, 7th, 3d, and 2d Corps have achieved spectacular successes, and the offensive of our army [Bosnian government forces] (and the Croatian Defense Council) in western and central Bosnia is going on as we are writing this article. It is expected that three new big cities might be liberated: Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Doboj. This could confirm the thesis already published on the pages of this paper—that Karadzic's para-army, just like his state, was based on terror and that it could have existed only as long as there was enormous imbalance in weapons to the advantage of these criminals. Chetnik media (of a quality comparable to their army) published that the murderer Mladic was hospitalized and that he would be transferred to Belgrade. This will have consequences as important as the fall of chetnik lines around Bosanska Krajina up to Banja Luka, since a complete purge of the whole territory has started, which is impossible to stop now. At the moment when political seams burst, they are followed by military, and vice versa. When torture loses its scope, chaos begins. All totalitarian military and political mechanisms have so far collapsed all of a sudden, bursting at all seams. It is only natural that Mladic was removed forcefully, because of the military catastrophe and the Hague indictment, so that it is realistic to expect political and military conflicts between the leaders of the aggression and genocide and their followers. Crimes have been committed, they have also been registered, so that further pushing of the Serbs into the blood is the only way for the masters of the Serbian evil to survive. The other way is suicide.

This Serbian military catastrophe revitalizes the official Bosnian political orientation that has patiently waited for the beginning of the Serbian collapse. Two months ago, after the calvary in Srebrenica, this orientation was psychologically abandoned and it probably had the lowest rating ever. The General Staff was attacked too, that is our military doctrine and tactics. Izetbegovic's announcements of the breaking of the blockade of Sarajevo as well as his love for peace and his hesitation were publicly condemned. The results of the patient work on the achievement of peace, of military preparations and illegal armament can be seen now, though. Those who in the Assembly roared about genocide relying on military power, are now falling from their mythical elevations, since those who called for peace avoided to be accused as warmongers, working at the same time on the equalization of military imbalance.

Things are much better now in both military and diplomatic fields. Only several big impediments and dilemmas are in the way, as, for example, whether the international community will be silent if the Bosnian Army or the Croatian Defense Council crosses the imaginary border of the Muslim-Croatian federation. Are chetniks capable of organizing their crushed defense? Are they preparing a counteroffensive and the defeat of the brave 5th Corps?

The fears are unfounded. The Serbian military machinery was broken by NATO strikes, since their communications systems were destroyed. Apart from that, there is political will of the United States of America and Europe behind these strikes. That is why Karadzic is calling all Serbs and appealing to Russia for help. The hick of a foreign minister Buha sent letters to all Orthodox leaders from Russia to Ethiopia in which he accused the Western military alliance and lamented about the destiny of the Orthodox population. The time is coming when the Serbs will hurry to conferences and seek help from various commissions.

Regarding Russian help for the Serbs, it is certain that they will not get it. Both Serbia and Russia would prefer to be integrated into the developed Western world than only mutually connected. The fact that Russian communists and the ultra-right movement are unanimously lamenting and uttering threats is just ordinary rhetoric for domestic use. Russia is searching for a new foreign policy, it is afraid of losing its own borders and 25 million Russians who live outside the Russian Federation as well as of the economic collapse. The NATO strikes against the Serbs have shown Russia who is the main boss in the world.

A bigger danger is coming from the other side, from Great Britain. They have made a secret memorandum that contains political and military actions with which they want to prevent the military defeat of the Serbs! It is suspicious that they have been silent from the beginning of the NATO strikes up to now. Mr. Rifkind, the British foreign minister, (who used to be defense minister), all of a sudden announced a visit to Sarajevo?!

And the last dilemma, although no less important than others: How will our relations with the Croats develop now? One must recall several things in connection with their present policy: The Croats betrayed the agreement made with the Bosnian Army and started an attack and captured Jajce by themselves. They proclaimed it a Croatian town and invited only Croats to return (although according to the last census, their population was smaller than the largest Muslim and the second-largest Serbian). Apart from that, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] headquarters in Zagreb again (the first one was Pavelic?!) indirectly called Banja Luka a future center of a greater Croatia. It is questionable whether the Croatian Defense Council could stop the advancement of the Bosnian Army toward Banja Luka after it got stationed in Jajce. It is not clear either whether the Croatian Defense Council will go down the Vrbas River, and whether the Croatian Army will cross the Sava River toward Banja Luka, the earlier center of the court district of Bosnia.

One thing could be decisive in future relations of the Bosnian "three-legged chair:" In Kljuc and in the villages in the district of Ozren, Serbian civilians remain in their houses, responding to the calls of the Bosnian Army for them to remain there. Around Mt. Glamoc and in Varcar-Vakuf (Mrkonjic Grad), Grahovo, and Drvar, where the Serbs really had a majority, there are no such calls, since there are no Serbian civilians either. Karadzic is simulating genocide on Serbs by forcing them to flee "from Croatian and Muslim ustashas," but it still cannot be hidden who is fleeing from whom. The call to the Serbs to remain in their houses is irritating for innumerable poor Muslims whose families were killed or expelled by Serbian criminals, but it must be clear that Serbian leaders and their policies can only be destroyed by the humanitarian concept of the Bosnian battle for liberation. This is the way to destroy the "Serbian entity"—which will go on with the destruction of Bosnia- Herzegovina, thus putting the existence and the development of the Muslim population at stake—on the diplomatic level and to proceed toward a democratic Bosnian federation without chetnik and ustasha concepts. This is the quickest way that can enable us to station our units first in Banja Luka and then in Srebrenica with the smallest number of victims.

Plan Leaving One-Fourth of Land to Serbs Viewed

AU2509105395 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Bruno Lopandic and Davor Ivankovic: "The Serbs Will Get One-Fourth of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sensational map of division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, published in SLOBODNA DALMACIJA on Friday, 15 September, which was an announcement of a secret plan by which the new reality of the war would be recognized and Bosnia-Herzegovina would be divided, in a much fairer way, into two-thirds territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and one-third Serbian territory—is being confirmed. However, not only that—the map, which, it is believed, represents the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, will be even more favorable for the Federation of the Croats and the Bosniaks—less than 25 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be left to the Bosnian Serbs!

The plan, which would in fact reach a new strategic division of spheres of interest between the West and the East in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the building of a kind of "Bosnian Wall" between the strategic and other interests of two different worlds and civilizations, looks like becoming reality, as our reliable sources and the situation on the ground confirm.

It is a question of a division by which, after the four years of Greater Serbian aggression, a just peace would be established in these territories. That is, according to our sources, the largest territory possible that the Bosnian Serbs can aspire to in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the genocide carried out over the Croats and the Bosniak-Muslims.

Holbrooke's Plan Already Failed

Such a division, which obviously has some international support—would satisfy both the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia, because it would provide a friendly environment and thus remove its strategic, communications, and economic complaint—its former "soft underbelly," and Bosnian Posavina [the river Sava basin] would not be sacrificed as a Serbian corridor.

It is thought that the Bosniak-Muslim part should also agree to such a division, although it would then lose its last eastern Bosnian enclave, Gorazde, as well as access to the river Drina. However, it would get much more—compactness and defensibility of the territory, the possibility of establishing and rounding up the state and its sovereignty—that is, confirmation of the state viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina tailored that way.

The Croats' autonomy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is confirmed by the project of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—apparently through the status of constituent nation and equal partner, politically, militarily, and territorially. In such a constellation of forces and events, the project of the confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes pretty probable, and what need to be determined are the conditions and the final, or desired scope of such an agreement, which one should in any case approach extremely cautiously in future. Many think that the most realistic path to take is that of economic interests, for instance—in a form of a customs union. But those are already "soft" problems.

What else remains to be done so as to realize the map of division of Bosnia-Herzegovina based upon the principle 75.29:24.71 percent? The accounts will obviously be squared on the ground—military and political-diplomatic. That process has to develop simultaneously. That means that the military offensive of joint Croatian forces and the forces of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the allied campaign on western Bosnia and Banja Luka will not stop, and then they will continue chasing the rebels away through Posavina toward the east. At the same time there will be ongoing diplomatic negotiations that will involve, apart from the protagonists from Bosnia-Herzegovina, also Croatia and Serbia, as well as the United States and Russia (who would obviously act as surety for such a division), and with the attestation of the European Union.

Why had Holbrooke's plan (the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina 51:49) failed even before it was accepted?

One of the biggest "mistakes in procedure," of otherwise perfectly nice Richard Holbrooke, was his wrong estimation (that is, his strategic-intelligence team's wrong estimation) of the significance of Croatian Storm. A suitcase full of very different combinations for the division of Bosnia was offered by the U.S. negotiator to all sides. So many things came out of that suitcase in the last couple of weeks that even serious analysts could not make any sense of it. To put it simply, the famous Holbrooke initiative has been nothing but a series of "trail balloons" intended to test the power ratio. From the very beginning it was obvious that developments on the ground dictate the rhythm and conditions of the diplomatic process.

Appeasing Russians and Border on Drina River

So far, particularly after the collapse of the traditional cold-war division, NATO has made hundreds of plans of strategic global security, that is, plans on post cold-war division that would provide peace and stability in the longer term. Clinton's yielding and making concessions to the Russians to deploy Russian soldiers on the other side of the "Bosnian Wall" is a compromise that the United States hopes will be sufficient to appease the offended and ragged eastern empire. Without a calm Russia the planned extension of NATO cannot continue, and the last arrangement is precisely an example of such appeasement. If such a plan is realized, the Russians should be satisfied—for the first time they will physically be present in these territories. Supporting Yeltsin (any other solution would be disastrous) will remain a priority of U.S. foreign policy. On the other hand, Yeltsin needs the Americans to be the way they are now for many reasons of which the most important is the economic reason. Relations between the two giants will continue to function the same way they did in the time of the cold war, only in a somewhat softer form. Without doubt Clinton, too, once such a plan is realized, will win positive political points in internal policy. The overlapping of interests of the United States and Russia will also occur in the future, if not in these territories, then in some other European or world problems. The European partners have definitely lost pace in that race, so there is nothing for them to do but to commit themselves to either this or that option, or to play on petty malice as Italy has been doing recently.

Although from the present perspective this division seems more than favorable for the allies, the Croats and the Bosniaks and the Muslims certainly have to insist upon the following: The river Drina should remain the western border of Serbia, which means that no confederal union of the Bosnian Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro should be made possible. Otherwise, Milosevic would, it is true, lose his Greater Serbia, but he would gain a "small" Greater Serbia. Thus Serbia, although defeated in the war, would come out of it with new territorial gains, having crossed, both for the Croats, the Muslims and the Serbs, the legendary river Drina. And thus the Greater Serbian aggression would nevertheless be rewarded.

Holbrooke Informs Tudjman of Bosnia Cease-Fire

LD0510194395 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the republic Franjo Tudjman received tonight in the presidential palace U.S. peace envoy Richard Holbrooke. He was accompanied by Ambassador Peter Galbraith, General Wesley Clarke, and others. Holbrooke informed the president about a cease-fire agreement that is expected to take effect in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 10 October. The president described this agreement as an important step toward peace. They also talked about the progress of negotiations between Croatia's state authorities and representatives of Croatia's Serbs.

In this context it was stressed that the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and west Srijem into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia could not be postponed. They also talked about top level peace talks, which will be held in Washington in late October. Apart from the president, the talks were also attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs; Gordan Radin, head of the president's office; Vesna Skare-Ozbolt, aide to the head of the president's office; presidential adviser General Kresimir Kaspar; and Brigadier Ante Pivcevic, deputy head of the president's military office.

Foreign Minister Opposes Autonomous Slavonia

BR0510152295 Madrid ABC in Spanish 5 Oct 95 p 32

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Ramiro Villapadierna in Zagreb; date not given: "Belgrade Will Not Be Able To Occupy Slavonia, Not Even Through Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *For the first time Belgrade and the Slavonian Serbs have agreed on 11 basic principles for reintegration into Croatia. "For the first time the Serbs are prepared to agree to anything," reported the press yesterday. Dr. Mate Granic, Croatia's foreign minister and one of the crucial figures in the peace process in the region, commented on the situation three weeks before the elections.*

[Viliapadierna] What is the current status of the frantic negotiating activity by U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke?

[Granic] In the first place, Holbrooke is trying to obtain a cease-fire for Bosnia in the next 10 days, to then be followed by a peace conference, along with negotiations between Croatia and the Croatian Serbs. Since Croatia is really prepared to negotiate the reintegration of Baranja and Slavonia within the legal framework of Croatia. We emphasize that our negotiations must be part of the entire peace process.

[Viliapadierna] Why do you insist so much on linking the problem of Eastern Slavonia to the peace process in Bosnia?

[Granic] For two important reasons. If peace in Bosnia is conditional on the lifting of sanctions against Belgrade, then once these sanctions are lifted there will not be any negotiation on the reintegration of this territory. On the other hand, we do not want this issue to remain on the shelf in a biased way. Baranja, Eastern Slavonia, and Western Sjrem as published are integral parts of Croatia under Belgrade's occupation. We have between 80,000 and 90,000 displaced refugees who want to go home. Furthermore, this is the richest area of Croatia, both industrially and agriculturally, with factories and deposits of crude oil.

[Viliapadierna] Holbrooke does not seem to accept a military option for Slavonia, as was the case with Krajina. Is Zagreb still considering this possibility?

[Granic] We are prepared to accept a transitional period, perhaps one year under a transitional administration, and with an international presence as well as the Croatian Government, the local Serbs, and local Hungarians—all within the framework of a strong international presence.

[Viliapadierna] UN administration?

[Granic] The United Nations would be one of the parties involved in a joint administration, along with each of the municipalities. What we are hoping for is immediate disarmament, the withdrawal of artillery to Serbia, and the withdrawal of all the paramilitary forces from outside this district. After that, we should establish a civilian police force, in line with the ethnic composition at the time of the 1991 census, and we obviously hope for a future in which our borders will be controlled by our Armed Forces.

So, our model consists of peaceful reintegration within the legal framework of Croatia. We are opposed to any special kind of autonomy (Tuesday's negotiations emphasized cultural autonomy) and to a referendum because why should we hold a referendum in an area that had a clear Croatian—and especially Hungarian—majority along the border with Serbia? There is no reason and there has been no case of that in Europe. However, we are prepared to negotiate and sign an agreement on the protection of the rights of the minorities and of the community, and to monitor the provenance of people because many of these Serbs are not from here. They come from Western Slavonia. But we are not going to discuss any autonomy along our borders.

[Viliapadierna] Turning to Krajina, do you agree that a soldier who steals cars is a poorly paid soldier from a banana republic?

[Granic] Our soldiers are very well trained and disciplined. They are some of the best professional soldiers in Europe. Following Operation Oluja (Storm), there were some incidents which I personally condemned severely: theft, houses burnt down, and killings carried out by individual civilians. We will thoroughly investigate these incidents and report to the international community. However, our Army has been extraordinarily professional.

[Viliapadierna] Even the cardinal primate of Croatia has had to denounce these crimes.

[Granic] I repeat that I myself have condemned these incidents before the United Nations. I think that whoever committed these crimes is Croatia's biggest enemy. It is totally counterproductive and we condemn it. We have asked our forces to continue their actions and to protect the people, whatever their nationality. Croatia is prepared to improve the situation on the ground.

Curb Excesses

[Viliapadierna] Do you agree that these incidents will make it difficult for the Serbs to make the decision to live here and for the Slavonian Serbs to integrate?

[Granic] You have to understand that, especially in the region of Knin, 120,000 people (Croats) were expelled in 1991 by the Serbs. Now when they come back home and see all their houses destroyed and all the churches blown up, the emotional reaction by these people against the houses of their neighbors who threw them out will lead to fresh sackings, destruction, and crime. There are already 370 people in jail for that and we will continue investigating each and every case. As for the lack of confidence which this could have created among the Serbs, I am sure that the mistakes that were made in these regions are the result of the practice of ethnic cleansing of the entire region and of the tough fighting during the war. There were many victims and many homes were destroyed. The future definitely holds protection for the refugees, their return, and the protection of the rights of both minorities and the community.

General Views 'Last Attempt' at Reintegration

AU0310121795 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 1 Oct 95 p 8

[Statement by Colonel General Djuro Decak, commander of the Osijek military district, to GLAS SLAVONIJE; place and date not given: "Last Attempt at Peaceful Reintegration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is the last attempt at finding peaceful means for reintegrating occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia. I believe that the Serbs must have learned a lesson from the heretofore activities of the Croatian Army; they must be aware that there is no playing with us and that we shall not relinquish our national interests. As far as the transitional period is concerned, however, we need to stress that, according to official Croatian state policy, this means the disarmament of paramilitary formations in the occupied areas, the monitoring of borders with our neighbors by the UN or NATO forces, the establishment of a body, as yet undefined, and a sort of protectorate made up of U.S. and EU representatives and representatives of the Croatian, Hungarian, and Serb people in the region, as a type of supreme authority that would have the task of controlling the implementation of the laws pertaining to ethnic communities and minorities in the region. Such a form of organization for a limited period of time, a year or two, would be acceptable to Croatia, providing that everything I mentioned is implemented. Therefore, regardless of whether we are talking about one or two years, these are basic principles that have to be implemented before Croatia signs any such document. Therefore, the immediate return of the population to their homes. [sentence as published]

All those citizens of Croatia, irrespective of whether they have come here from western Slavonia or from former Sectors North and South, will certainly be considered full Croatian citizens. They will certainly be allowed to live in Croatia; they will first be given the choice of returning to their homes. If they do not wish to do so, we shall form centers in which these people will be accommodated. With full freedom, of course; these are not camps as Serb propaganda likes to imply. It is normal and in line with the laws of physics that a refugee cannot return to a house already occupied by a Serb who has come from another part of Croatia. As for people who have settled in the region from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, they must leave Croatian state territory as they are not citizens of the Republic of Croatia.

Ministers View Negotiations, Peace Plan

LD0510120995 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, has met with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Affairs Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic. Their talks were also attended by Ivo Sanader, deputy Croatian minister of foreign affairs, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Ambassador to Zagreb Kasim Trnka. The two ministers analyzed the situation in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the light of the U.S. peace initiative, and negotiations conducted in Geneva and New York.

Minister Granic briefed Minister Sacirbegovic about the renewal of negotiations between the Croatian Government and local Serb representatives in eastern Slavonia, laying stress on the desire of the Republic of Croatia peacefully to reintegrate eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem in the Croatian constitutional and legal system.

In the course of the talks the two sides expressed the need for coordinated actions by the Croatian and Bosnian sides regarding conditions for reaching a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, speeding up the process of implementing the Washington agreement, and strengthening the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation.

The two ministers also examined ways to speed up work on the models of admission of the two states in the European integration process. Granic and Sacirbegovic also discussed the return of refugees in the Republic of Croatia to Cazin and Velika Kladusa. The two ministers also denied reports on clashes between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council in the Cazin area.

Milanovic Comments on RSK-Croatia Talks

LD0510185995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1848 GMT 5 Oct 95

[By Djordje Vukmirovic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Oct 5 (TANJUG)—The head of the negotiating team of the Srem-baranja area, Milan Milanovic, said Thursday that he would submit to the Croatian side and officials of the international community a number of remarks to the basic principles for talks and propose concrete solutions at a meeting in Zagreb Monday.

Milanovic, who is deputy defence minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], told TANJUG that he did not wish to disclose the remarks and proposals but underscored that intensive efforts were being made on the issue by the Srem-Baranja council.

The Srem-Baranja area is part of the so-called U.N. sector east, the only territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina which has not been seized by Croatia.

Croatia launched in May and August an aggression on sectors west, north and south, all areas of the Republic of Serb Krajina. The RSK was proclaimed by the Serbs in late 1991 in response to Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Delegations of the Srem-Baranja area and Croatia met in Erdut, in the east of the Republic of Serb Krajina, on Tuesday. Despite serious divisions at the meeting, the two sides reached agreement on basic principles for direct talks.

Under the basic principles, a transition period would be proclaimed in the Srem-Baranja area. The duration of the transition period has not been decided yet. The basic principles also stipulate the formation of a transitional government for the area.

The next round of talks will decide on the proportion of officials of the international community, Serbs from the Srem-Baranja area and Croatian officials in the transitional government.

The transitional government should ensure the return of refugees to the area which should be demilitarized during the transition period.

The basic principles stipulate that the international community would guarantee for all solutions reached through talks.

Milanovic said that the Serb side maintained that an acceptance of the basic principles did not exclude the possibility of holding a referendum for the Srem-Baranja population after the transition period.

The Serb side is making preparations for the upcoming rounds of talks and drafting proposals on the transitional government.

Increased HDZ-HSLS Conflict in Osijek Seen

95BA0384A Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 11 Sep 95 pp 16-18

[Article by Milan Jelovac: "Less and Less Love on the Drava"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Reports that a special session of the City Council will be held any day now have been leaked by well informed circles, and the first item of business will be a vote of (no-)confidence in Mayor Kramaric.*

Things have been relatively calm in Osijek in recent days, if that is how one can describe the already too long vacuum state of neither war nor peace. It is true that exploding Serb shells are no longer a deafening presence in the city's squares, but nighttime gunfire is a daily occurrence here. That is why the withdrawal of Serb heavy artillery to beyond the demarcation line, which, we recall, surrounds the city on the Drava on three sides, is being interpreted here as simply a new

Serb attempt to gain time, a new attempt to cement the existing situation.

The Osijekans are certainly aware of this, and today they are completely convinced that the final solution will have to be provided by the Croatian Armed Forces; they no longer believe in negotiations.

The reintegration of the remaining occupied territory is being anticipated in the city on the Drava, and ears are pricked to the roar of the approaching typhoon more than ever before because, as they say themselves, this kind of life is unbearable. And that is certainly first and foremost among the reasons why the city on the Drava is again the focus of media attention.

The second reason, however, is the heating up of the political scene, the current divisions and skirmishes between the city and the Zupanija, and the tearing and redefining of the political and party fabric. The latest political changes at the top echelons have had repercussions on the micro level as well, and the Osijek political scene has recently been in a state of agitation. The Liberals, who hold the majority on the City Council, have been abandoned by its chairman, Branko Mihaljevic. He is still chairman, of course, but now there is another party affiliation next to his name: HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union].

Fight for Primacy in the City

Those who are better informed about Osijek political events point to the bitter clash between the HDZ and the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] in their fight for primacy in the city, or to be more precise, to the radicalization of existing antagonisms between the two strongest Croatian political parties: the ruling party, which is in the opposition in Osijek, and the opposition party, which is the ruling party in the city. The parties are personified by key people, and thus the question of whether Glavas will get the better of Kramaric or Kramaric will withstand the increasingly vocal demands for his removal lies at the very heart of the political struggle in the city, which during an ostensible lull in the fighting is being rocked by explosions of political showdowns. It is quite clear that the culmination of this is near, because the most unlikely "trumps" are being played in the regrouping of the clashing political blocs and in the discrimination against persons having differing political views.

Passionate but Short-Lived "Love Affair"

Offers of kidneys, loans, and housing are only the external manifestation of what is going on below the surface with regard to the clashes and party showdowns, the real causes of which appear to be deeper and conceptually quite different.

The "love affair" of the *zupan* [head of the district] and mayor was passionate but short-lived, wittier Osijekans will say in analyzing the causes of the conflict. The duo of Kramaric as mayor and Glavas as City Executive Council chairman quickly began to visibly part ways after the last elections, when the HDZ suffered defeat in Osijek. It appears that the HDZ was unable to reconcile itself with its electoral failure in the capital of a zupanija where the HDZ had emerged victorious. Since then, there has been no end to the open intolerance between the former duo, who are now the leaders of opposing political blocs. "Everything would work fine and the city would begin to prosper if the incompetent administration were gone," Branimir Glavas will say, adding that the current team in the city administration is very incompetent. He supports this position by arguing that the city administration has not solved any of the city's burning problems, "they are simply collecting money in an account, they are adroit financial brokers," the *zupan* will say about the municipal authorities. On the other hand, however, Kramaric sees problems in the clumsily enacted laws regulating local autonomy. "Our authorities are completely curtailed and are in conflict with the Zupanija's authorities," Kramaric responds, adding that ownership in the city should be legally regulated. The basic law on cities says that "we will not invest in things when we do not know to whom they belong; we simply must know who the titleholder is."

Who Has Built What?

Thus, the Liberals accuse the HDZ of "media control," of marginalizing the municipal authorities, and of interfering with the work of the city administration. "They just want our money," people in the city administration say. The HDZ, on the other hand, responds that all the allegations are untrue. "GLAS SLAVONIJE is open to everyone, just as Slavonian Television is," 50 percent of which has recently come under HSLS ownership. "Let them show us what they have built lately for the good of the city, and we will show you what the Zupanija has financed and built. Then you decide who is working and who is not. Who has deposited money in a private bank account, drawing from it lots of usurious interest, and who is working and investing in the Zupanija?" asks Zupan Glavas, adding, "write this: They are adroit financial brokers!"

Thus, a decisive struggle for dominance on the City Council is expected. The mayor's fate will depend on the balance of power between the opposing blocs, and at a recent press conference Branimir Glavas even announced changes at the top of the city administration. "It is an open secret that there is latent dissatisfaction in this city with the results of the work done by the Liberal authorities, primarily among the citizens, but naturally also on the part of the HDZ," the *zupan* said, his words being reported by GLAS SLAVONIJE on Friday, 1 September. "Lately a significant portion of the City Council has also been exhibiting dissatisfaction with the lack of work and inactivity of the city administration and mayor. The logical consequence of this situation is to reconsider confidence in him." According to Glavas, the Liberal policy of the city's leaders is frivolous and irresponsible, "and since we must not allow our newly created state to be led by the politically blind, the question of who will lead and represent this city is neither inconsequential nor unessential."

Kidney for Membership

But the Osijek Liberals are retaliating. Presumably aware of the situation in which they could lose primacy, they held several press conferences in only a few days, in which almost the entire party leadership took part. Budisa, Gotovac, Rados, Kramaric, and Terzic did not spare the Croatian ruling party, accusing it of "insincere interest in democracy while power, money, and might are being divided up, hidden from public view." The ruling party is endeavoring to create a model of formal democracy, as a screen toward the outside world, the Liberals in Osijek retorted.

Osijek political observers were simply scandalized when City Councilman Zeljko Kalinovic, who suffers from a serious kidney ailment, revealed that "the HDZ offered to finance a kidney transplant, but on the condition that he join their party." Time—and perhaps legal proceedings as well—will tell how much truth there is to this, but the obvious impression is that the political games have gone too far, beyond the limit of elementary ethics.

As expected, the HDZ vehemently denied the "kidney affair," and then recently issued a retort. Specifically, it made public an agreement to cancel a contract on the sale of an apartment to which Kalinovic held tenancy rights, and circles close to the HDZ conclude that this was done so that the city administration could provide and award to him an apartment in the center of the city. GLAS SLAVONIJE even asks whether "Kalinovic in fact owes a favor to the Liberals." In the latest twist, this tragedian could end up without a new kidney and without an apartment. The Kalinovic affair has become utterly politicized, and unfortunately his genuine misfortune, illness, and daily dialysis have taken a back seat. In this way, politics has transgressed the limit of what is moral.

Thus, Osijek continues to live in uncertainty. When and how will the remaining occupied areas be reintegrated, will war give way to peace, will a better life finally begin? All of these are questions that have been tormenting the citizens of Osijek in recent times. But one dilemma will be resolved very soon. Well informed sources have leaked reports that a special session of the City Council will be held any day now, and its first item of business will be a vote of (no-)confidence in Mayor Kramaric. Moreover, there is more than significant information alleging that the city's Liberals will secretly vote against their mayor. But time will soon tell whether this will actually happen.

On Defections

Kramaric: We are flabbergasted by how the whole thing is being taken to an absurd level, by how elections actually are no longer even necessary. Because if you are not satisfied with the electoral results in some location, then with a certain amount of pressure you can falsify the electoral will of the citizens. I do not equate the defections of Zoric and Mestrovic and of HDZ members to the HND [Croatian Independent Democrats]. That is not the same thing. In that case, there was an ideological disagreement.

Glavas: And what happened with the defections to the HND, when they took the HDZ to the brink, when a parliamentary crisis was brought about? In that case, they wanted to change the balance of power in the Assembly, which was legitimate in their opinion, but now, in this case, it is not. Why not? Moreover, their theory is that the people voted against us. The electorate voted for people, not for parties. And those people are still here.

On Reintegration

Glavas: We support the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories. But we will not wait forever. If it is not possible to reintegrate the occupied territories by peaceful means, our leadership clearly has the courage and will and strength to liberate the occupied territories. There is gunfire here every day, and the rebel Serbs are convinced that Milosevic will incorporate them into Serbia. That is out of the question; this is Croatian territory and it will be reintegrated. We will not permit any freezing of the status quo and of the transition period. Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Syrmia are Croatian and will remain so.

Kramaric: Some journalists from Sky Television recently asked me how it was that as an opposition party we supported "Operation Storm." Well of course, I responded: We are liberating our country, and if you want to talk about patriotism, the citizens of Osijek have demonstrated patriotism from 1991 to this very day. On the other hand, we see the end of the war as an opportunity to finally move ahead with the things that had to be substituted for and set aside because of the circumstances, to articulate these things. To finally set out on the course of general development and prosperity, but also the development of democracy.

Instead of expending our enormous energy on more courageous, constructive, and universally useful things, we are preoccupied with skirmishes, defections....And eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Syrmia are still waiting for us.

On the Kidney

Kramaric: No way, that is just horrible. This is where we must sound the alarm; in this sort of situation the greater sin is not that the Liberals are in control of Osijek, but rather that there is trafficking in human body parts going on. I have known Councilman Kalinovic going back to previous days, and I am aware of his health hardships. I must say that he never turned to me as mayor and asked for help in dealing with his great misfortune. And now I hear that his former schoolmate went to him and told him that he would be placed on a list to receive a kidney if he signed an HDZ membership application. I must note that Zeljko Kalinovic is not a member of the HSLS, but he is trying to help the city to the best of his ability.

Glavas: I can say reliably that no one from the HDZ made an offer to Kalinovic to join our party. That is low, and it is irresponsible to drag health matters into politics. The chairmen of the Zupanija and city committees of the HDZ have issued a statement regarding the HSLS attack on the HDZ. It says that Zeljko Kalinovic's lie, according to which the HDZ ostensibly promised to finance his kidney transplant if he became a member of our party, is an act that is unworthy of serious commentary, and that lacks all civil decency. But if this contemptible and unscrupulous act is considered against the backdrop of Kalinovic's active participation in the HSLS press conference, held for the purpose of defaming the HDZ, then it is not surprising, and we believe its pretext and ultimate goal is continuity in deluding and manipulating the citizens of Osijek.

Deputy Prime Minister Views Return of Serbs

LD0510150995 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1442 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Oct. 5 (TANJUG)—Croatia's Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic has said that a massive return of the Serbs who have fled from Croatia 'is not possible because Croatia and Yugoslavia have no agreement on refugees.' The number of returnees could be increased 'only for humanitarian reasons...the reunification of families,' Kostovic said in Zagreb Wednesday in a talk with head of the German Foreign Ministry division for southern Europe Gottfried Hass.

'Serbia is only provoking Croatia with the issue of the return of refugees...since the Serbs who have left Krajina are not very interested in returning to Croatia.'

Hass stressed, however, that the European Union's and Germany's aid for the reconstruction of Croatia would 'directly depend on whether Zagreb would enable all Serb refugees who want to return to Croatia.'

According to Yugoslav official figures, Croatia's aggression on the northern and southern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina in August forced about 250,000 local Serbs to flee. Several thousand Serb civilians were killed and Serb property has been plundered and burned.

Four years ago, about 320,000 people, mostly Serbs, lived in Krajina and there are hardly 4,500 there now, according to a report of a European Union's polling commission.

Issue of Refugees, Ethnic Cleansing Viewed

95BA0369A Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian
1 Sep 95 pp 11-13

[Unattributed article: "We Are All Refugees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The phrase in the title was uttered about 100 years ago by a French anthropologist who was thinking of the history of humanity and its migrations. Applied to our (whatever that means) region, the thesis is not at all erroneous, because a great resettlement of people—that is, a number of resettlements—between the fifth and eighth centuries was caused by attacks made by warlike nomad tribes of Central Asia against more peaceful farming peoples. The South Slavs and all their descendants, including today's Croats (if we exclude the theories regarding ancient Iranian origin), are refugees.

The term "refugee," then, is extremely old and very well-known, but it has been in too common use in our everyday speech. A mere glance at a historical atlas used in school could convince us of this: There have been an abundance of resettlements following the events of wars, indeed even movements of entire peoples. The campaigns against Istanbul, the flight from the Turks, the flights during World Wars I and II, the colonization of the Pannonian Depression...

There has hardly been a military conflict (and there have been a few more of them than is normal due to geostrategic location) that has not left demographers pulling their hair out and undertaking a complete analysis of the region almost from scratch. The war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is no exception in that regard. Perhaps it stands out because of the scale of the planned resettlement of people, but this has also been seen before (in Slovenia under Hitler's Germany, for example). Modern weapons, and especially the irrational ideology that underlies today's conflicts, aided by the media, which never in history have had the influence they have now, have had the result that an incredibly large number of people—both in numbers and percentages—have opted for a "change of climate to preserve their health," as the NEW YORK HERALD cynically put it at one time.

The official figure of the United Nations now stands at 3.7 million displaced persons and refugees, and we need to add to them all those who have left Croatia following the action of the Croatian Army [HV], as well as those who have come from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina due to reprisals. The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] is cautious, as always, in suppositions, and does not want to publish official figures until he gets precise data from the field, but their estimate is that more than 200,000 people have left Croatia and that another 25,000 have been driven from other areas (above all, Banja Luka). At the moment, this brings the number of displaced persons to the round figure of about 4 million. If the nearly 300,000 dead are added to that, the result is a figure that is almost equal to the inhabitants of Croatia before the war. In and of itself, however unpleasant it might appear, the number would not be a problem (there have been migrations on a larger scale in history), if there were not a strong doubt about the possibility of their returning.

The Inflow of "New Blood"

Migrations are a normal phenomenon, especially in the modern world, with the almost unlimited opportunities offered by transportation. Mixing individuals, peoples, and races is thought to be a good thing from a purely biological standpoint. It is easy to see from the example of small insular populations the danger of degeneration through intermarriage in a small group of people isolated from "new blood." In Yugoslavia, according to the 1981 Census, about 250,000 people a year changed their place of residence, and there is no reason to believe that was not the case at the beginning of the war. However, that is the normal movement of population, and not even the wave of guest workers in the seventies seriously disrupted the demographic patterns. The problem today, which lies in the large-scale ethnic cleansing of all nationalities, has deep roots in events of about 50 years ago, in the deportation of Serbs from Vojvodina, in the large-scale massacres in Bosnia, in Bleiburg....The collective guilt was never rationalized and resolved, only well covered up. It is no wonder, then, that in 1991 ideas emerged, not only about "ethnically pure areas," a double-edged sword, and about "all Serbs in one state" and "Croatia for the Croats, and whoever doesn't like it can leave," but also about "humane resettlement" on the principle of "this is better for everyone." Some of those stories grew old very quickly—people with the least optimism, but the most realistic people from today's vantage point, managed to exchange their property and move to areas where their nationality was in the majority, and, if they were lucky, even to another state. By the time of the first conflicts in March 1991 in Pakrac, about 20,000 Serbs had moved to Vojvodina, and approximately half as many Croats had moved from Krajina and from Kordun. When the war began, so did the large-scale exoduses. Fear for their lives "sent" almost the entire Croatian population out of Baranja, and after the fall of Ilok, Vukovar, and other towns, few remained in those devastated places. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina began a new chapter in resettlement, above all because the population in that state was highly mixed.

"Humane" and Other Cleansings

According to UNHCR figures, there were about two-and-a-half million refugees in mid-1992. Nearly 15 percent of the population of Croatia (not including Krajina) had the status of displaced person or refugee, and about 20 percent of the Serbs had left Croatia. Almost the entire Hungarian population had left Baranja: some 50,000 people. The fall of Jajce was the reason why 25,000 people moved to Travnik, and about 70,000 people were driven from Sandzak into Bosnia. Unfortunately, these are only some examples of "humane" cleansing, in which, following the military activities proper, there were no large-scale atrocities, and they were on a "voluntary" basis. In 1992, large-scale arrests, threats, and terrorization of the population began for the first time, for the purpose of creating ethnically pure areas. So that all this would have a sound economic basis, people began to be forced to officially sign a "request for departure" and leave behind all their property—there are a large number of documented cases from Bihac. Prisoner of war camps also proved to be a good means of cleansing areas. The families had to leave the area if they ever wanted to see the prisoners. There is still no firm opinion on the question of the function performed by the large-scale rapes, which are fairly rare in the history of warfare. A large number of experts believe they should contribute to ethnic cleansing, but there is also the opposite opinion, that is, these were "only" camps for the soldiers to have a good time.

Large-scale flights became ever larger and more frequent as the war dragged on. Kilometer-long columns from central Bosnia, then western Slavonia, Srebrenica, and Zepa, and finally the recently liberated Krajina are horrible evidence of plans which obviously were devised long ago and which made ethnically homogeneous states the objective of all the conflicts. The departure of 200,000 Serbs from Croatia is not merely the fruit of fear (real) of the behavior of the Croatian Army and later the Croatian Government, there was also manipulation of their destinies and lives to suit the purpose of certain "higher national interests." A brief digression concerning their number. Brave mathematicians in various ministries have calculated that the maximum number of Serbs in refugee convoys was about 130,000, because that was their number in the last population census. However, according to the last population census, Zagreb had slightly more than 900,000 inhabitants, and about 10,000 people came to it with official refugee status, while it is calculated that about 100,000 are visiting or have made a permanent move. It should be emphasized that there was also primary migration to Krajina. The Serbs from the part of western Herzegovina and northern Bosnia where they were in the minority decided to cross the border, so that the number, still unofficial, is probably accurate. Not long after their departure it was announced that the empty space would be ceded to Croats who, for revenge or as part of a broader plan, were driven out of the region of Banja Luka and from Vojvodina. This is understandable in economic terms, because there is no money to build new camps, but the monstrous assumption is that a majority of these people will never return. And if they do return and see that there is no longer room for them, they will leave forever. The contours of present-day policy could be glimpsed when something similar took place in eastern Slavonia after Operation "Flash." Officially, the people who fled from Croatia can return, but the question is where? After all, if the settlement with Croats actually takes place, where, in purely physical terms, will the Serbs return? Jure Radic has wished the Vojvodina Croats a welcome, and they are to come forever, but there is no desire on the part of the authorities for them to return. "They are needed here" in order to settle the areas abandoned by the Serbs. About 35,000 refugees from Germany must return to Croatia by the end of the year and they will be offered accommodations in Krajina, and Croats from within the country and abroad are being attracted to Knin with many privileges. The proposal for doing away with the special status of the areas where the Serbs were in the majority also suggests that "they are not expected for dinner."

Continuation of the Resettlements

But in Serbia, which until recently was negatively disposed toward refugees from Krajina and Bosnia and even sent them back posthaste, views are also changing. A large number of the refugees will settle on the "abandoned" farms of Vojvodina and Baranja, and some will be transported to Kosovo. Calculations regarding the number of the latter vary and range from 500 to 10,000. About 40 percent of the muslim population has left Sandzak, but according to certain estimates no less than 50 percent of the Croats in Vojvodina will seek a safer future outside the province by the end of the year. According to reports from the Hungarian authorities, no extensive resettlement of their people from Vojvodina has been noted (about 3 to 5 percent of the population), and the figures for other minorities are similar.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is more complicated, above all because three nationalities are involved and in most of the opcinas they were fairly intermixed. Border areas such as western Herzegovina or a portion of the northern Drina Valley have long been so homogeneous that even France might envy them, and something similar is being attempted even in the traditionally multinational communities. The area from which there have been the most displaced persons in the recent past—Banja Luka and Prijedor—was the most heterogeneous according to the last population census; that is where the highest number of declared Yugoslavs, all of 15 percent, was recorded. According to the same source, 17 percent of the marriages in Bosnia and Herzegovina were mixed, and this was the republic with the highest growth in the number of individuals who declared themselves to be ethnically uncommitted or declared Yugoslavs. The ethnic confusion that prevailed in Bosnia over the last 50 years nevertheless seems to be slowly coming to an end. Just as croatization of Krajina is ongoing in Croatia and serbization of Baranja and part of eastern Slavonia is ongoing, while in Serbia Kosovo and Sandzak are being settled with Serbs once again, so in Bosnia and Herzegovina the future ethnic borders of all three nationalities are also being painted. If we compare the number of refugees and displaced persons to the size of the population, we get a marvelously clean map in most of the areas, something similar to Montenegro or Slovenia, in which the percentage of minorities is reduced to single digits.

Humane resettlements, or ethnic cleansings, are obviously aimed at the ultimate goal of changing borders. Probably not immediately, but after the end of single "operations," a consensus will be established on the federation and every nationality will be granted the right, in this case to an ethnically homogeneous region, to confederation, and it is only a step further to officially annex those areas to one of the states. The idea is neither unfeasible nor new, and to a certain extent it is understandable and explainable in terms of the paranoia of small peoples which see only enemies around them. However, the consequences of artificial resettlements of population have always been bad in the end: The best example of this is Northern Ireland, which has never ceased to be a hotbed of crisis. Resettlements of caucasian peoples are the cause of today's conflicts, and the Near East is also the victim of sins from the past. It is probably true that never up to now has any resettlement been carried out with such a large percentage of the population—in most cases, the number is greater than 95—but the question still remains of whether this will resolve interethnic friction. Will the minorities who may remain move out completely, or will they be assimilated, or, because of the world public, will a small number of the minority nationalities be allowed to remain? The latter version is more likely, but it runs a great danger: Unless there is economic stability, and unless the usages of a highly democratic society with individual freedoms are established, there will be dissatisfaction, rebellion, smothering of rebellion, assistance from outside to help the related nationality, and we will be back where we started.

Agreement Between Abdic, Rijeka Officals Examined

LD0510190395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1544 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 5 Oct (SRNA)—Fikret Abdic, president of the former Republic of Western Bosnia, signed an agreement with representatives of Croatian authorities in Rijeka in late September. The agreement provides for the setting up of Glina county with a seat in Velika Kladusa.

The Croatian newspapers, all of which carried the news, specify that Abdic requested help from Zagreb in his attempt to neutralize Izetbegovic's 5th Corps. They announced that Glina county would be controlled by tripartite police force, consisting of the police forces from Croatia, Turkey and the Croat-Muslim federation.

According to the Rijeka agreement, Bozidar Sicel has been put forward as a candidate for the prefect of Glina county, while Abdic will probably be the county's prime minister and the man who will relaunch production in Agrokomerc [food processing factory], together with Italian investors who have already been contacted.

Croatian newspapers say that Abdic has not missed the opportunity to stress excellent economic cooperation between Croatia and western Bosnia, stressing that only he "can reconcile the Bosnian Muslims and direct them toward a happier future."

Croatian newspapers stress Abdic's warning that there is no future for the Bosnian Muslims if they try to build it through Tehran, as well as his accusations levelled against Izetbegovic's government in Sarajevo that "it is pushing the people into the terrorist embrace of Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and primitivism."

Abdic is the only Muslim leader in Bosnia who has not waged war against either Serbs or Croats, and in the eyes of the world this makes him—unlike Izetbegovic—a man truly committed to peace, Croatian analysts and commentators unanimously affirm.

Gligorov Loses Use of Right Eye; Condition 'Stable'

AU0610123095 Paris AFP in English
1148 GMT 6 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Oct 6 (AFP)—Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] President Kiro Gligorov was reported stable in hospital Friday, three days after an assassination attempt, according to an official medical bulletin.

An informed source in Skopje said the president had lost the use of his right eye, but denied claims he had had an arm amputated. His health was not causing concern, the source added.

The hospital bulletin said Gligorov, 78, remained under "intensive care" but doctors were not planning "any diagnostic check other than the usual tests" for Friday.

A previous medical report late Thursday said the president had undergone a brain scan which had shown "satisfactory" results.

Earlier Thursday, BTA news agency in Sofia reported that Bulgarian Interior Minister Lubomir Nachev had said Gligorov was blind in both eyes and his right arm had been amputated.

The informed source in Skopje dismissed the claims as "pure speculation" but admitted Gligorov had lost the use of his right eye.

The president was injured when a car bomb exploded as his cortege was going through central Skopje early Tuesday. His driver was killed and several other people wounded.

Police Confirm Security Measures Not 'Respected'

AU0510175395 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 5 Oct 95 p 1

[Unattributed text: "Complex Surgery Performed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The condition of Kiro Gligorov, president of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is stable, as are his vital functions, though he remains in intensive care. This was said in a medical bulletin issued last night at 6:00 PM by the medical team of the Surgical Clinic in Skopje, which is monitoring the condition of the president of the state after the assassination attempt carried out with a car bomb on Tuesday [3 October] on "Makedonija St." in central Skopje. Because of the serious injuries to the head and the locomotive system, President Gligorov has undergone complex surgery. The medical bulletin also says that specialized control diagnostics were also carried out, as well as consultative examinations by our doctors and outstanding foreign experts. The medical team concluded that modern techniques are being applied in the intensive care.

Since President Gligorov is temporarily prevented from carrying out his duties as head of state, in conformity with Article 82, Paragraph 3 of the Macedonian Constitution, he will be replaced by Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov, the president's office announced yesterday.

Amonal was the explosive that was used in the car bomb during the assassination attempt on President Gligorov, according to police investigations revealed at a news conference yesterday at the Interior Ministry. The conclusion was that, in addition to what is known about this brutal terrorist act, the Interior Ministry does not have precise data on who carried out the assassination attempt. The police confirmed that, after the explosion of the amonal, which had been placed in the rear left seat of the Citroen Ami 8, a lump of metal weighing almost one kilogram killed Aleksandar Spirovski, the driver of the president's official Mercedes. Journalists who asked whether the president's vehicle was armored were told that it was not and it was also confirmed that security procedures were not thoroughly respected, first of all, as the Mercedes was not preceded by another security vehicle, and as President Gligorov was sitting in the front seat next to the driver.

Throughout yesterday reactions from the domestic and the world public continued to arrive in which this terrorist act was unanimously condemned and evaluated as a blow to the democracy, stability, peace, and independence of the Republic of Macedonia. In addition, a number of renowned world newspapers said that the "maintenance of peace in Macedonia was mostly due to President Gligorov, who knew how to protect his country from all those neighbors that were not very friendly to it."

Envoy to FRG Rules Out Setback After Attack

AU0510123395 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0500 GMT 5 Oct 95

[Interview with Srgan Kerim, ambassador to the FRG, by an unidentified reporter on 5 October; place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Reporter] Are you absolutely certain that extreme nationalists might be behind the attack [on Macedonian President Gligorov]?

[Kerim] No, at the moment one really cannot say that because the police and the secret service are, of course, working on this case. As it is usual today, some investigations have to be carried out first. Of course, only then will one be able to assess it.

However, in a wider political sense one can, of course, proceed on the assumption that this possibility exists, because, in this case, only ultranationalists can have a political motive to have it out with the president or the political institutions of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

[Reporter] What does ultranationalist specifically mean in this case?

[Kerim] It means that this can be people who have political motives and political views that are first of all connected with terrorism, who do not want Macedonia to be stable, and who want to cause developments in Macedonia that might result in conflicts between various ethnic groups. Accordingly, it is clear that there are still forces in the Balkans that want to turn back the wheel of history.

[Reporter] Does the president, on whose life the attempt was made, stand alone for this stability in Macedonia?

[Kerim] I would not say so. He is certainly the leading political personality and a statesman who is recognized as such, not only in Macedonia, but all over the world. However, without any exception, all the Macedonian institutions, the Macedonian Assembly, and the Macedonian parties, have rejected this deed, this attempted assassination, and this method. This is certainly also encouraging because the statements by all parties, both in and outside the Assembly, and the opposition made it quite plain that they sharply condemned it.

[Reporter] President Gligorov is regarded as some kind of hopeful for conciliation with the neighboring countries, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania, too. Does this attack automatically mean a setback for all conciliation efforts?

[Kerim] No, of course, it cannot mean a setback because Macedonia will continue this policy. It is one of the basic principles of Macedonia's foreign policy to cultivate good relations with all neighbors. Accordingly, of course, such cowardly and really very extraordinary methods cannot cause any damage. This process is irreversible.

[Reporter] This Thursday [5 October], your parliament wanted to vote on the change of the state flag and the symbols to pave the way for the planned settlement of the conflict with the neighboring country, Greece. Will this have to be postponed now? Is the agreement with Greece now endangered in general?

[Kerim] No. On the contrary, I would say that the atmosphere has become even more positive—unfortunately because of such an incident, the terrible attack on our president—because the parties, the political movements planned protests today and tomorrow, but they have refrained from it.

Our parliament will, of course, continue its activities as planned. By the way, the Assembly president has taken over the official duties for some time. This is the practice according to our Constitution.

[Reporter] This also means that diplomatic relations with Serbia will be established in November as agreed?

[Kerim] Yes, if both sides will agree on it. In our opinion, this is of interest for both sides. It is an idea, a proposal. If it is to be implemented in concrete terms, we expect positive developments in this direction in November.

[Reporter] There are already commentators who write that, as a consequence of this assassination attempt, Macedonia will be the next powder keg in the Balkans. Can I deduce from what you have said that you do not share this view?

[Kerim] No, of course, I cannot share this view because both the domestic political forces in Macedonia, the parties, the Assembly, and the outside factors, that is, the international community, have unanimously condemned it and know how to defend themselves against such methods. That is, it will certainly not be Macedonia's turn now and it will not be a factor of new riots and armed conflicts in the Balkans.

Crvenkovski Sees No Change in Government Policy

AU0510181695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 5 Oct 95 p 6

[Report by Z. Andonovski: "The Course Will Not Be Deterred"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New York, 5 Oct—Stevo Crvenkovski, the foreign minister of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], delivered a speech in New York, at the UN General Assembly, last night. There was great interest in the minister's speech, particularly because of the terrorist act in Skopje and the assassination attempt against President Kiro Gligorov. The Macedonian foreign minister dedicated a long part in his speech to the latest event in Skopje and among other things he emphasized that "the attempted murder had a clear political goal—to destabilize my country. It took place—and this is of no little importance—just at the time when the centuries-long dream of the Macedonian people to create their own state and establish an equal role in the international community came true. This also happened at a particular moment, when the situation in the Balkans was about to be solved and when all our neighbors and the whole world accepted the fact that the Republic of Macedonia is a reality and a factor of peace and stability."

"The assassination attempt against President Gligorov is an attack against Macedonia's independent and peaceful position. It is directed against peaceful life and against the well-being of all our citizens," Crvenkovski said. Crvenkovski pointed out that "this event will by no means force us to change our course toward democracy, reforms, and development of good neighborly relations with all the neighbors, toward the transformation of my country into a modern European state."

Minister Crvenkovski, among other things, spoke from the General Assembly's floor about the main principles of Macedonian foreign policy, and he pointed out as follows: "One of the main principles of our policy is the policy of equidistance in the relations with the neighbors, and we are ready to establish equally good relations with all of them based on mutual respect, inviolability of borders, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and without violence. Recently, in this same building, under the sponsorship of the United States and with the mediation of Cyrus Vance, the special envoy of Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, and Matthew Nemitz, the special envoy of President Clinton, my country, the Republic of Macedonia, reached an accord with the Republic of Greece by which the relations between the two countries have been regulated in many aspects and a base for good-neighborly cooperation has been created. We believe that this accord will greatly contribute to better stability in the Balkans and that it will have a positive effect on the future development of events in the region. We believe that this accord is a good illustration of the positive role of the international community and particularly of the United Nations in the search for peaceful solutions in the relations among states, on the basis of the UN Charter."

The Macedonian foreign minister also spoke about the role of the UN, that is, the peacekeeping forces in Macedonia. Among other things, he stressed that this mission is very successful in Macedonia and that it fully accomplishes its goals. "UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] has greatly contributed to peace and stability in the south of the Balkans and it created a confidence in international organizations among the Macedonian people. This operation proves that the preventive mission is the most effective way of UN peacekeeping. This operation is the best illustration that results can be achieved even by sending small, almost symbolic UN forces, provided that it is done at the right time and with a clearly defined mandate. The whole support of the people of the Republic of Macedonia that is extended to this operation shows that the Security Council made the right decision when it approved this peacekeeping mission. This is a very successful operation and I hope that it will continue to be a model for many future UN activities in which, I hope, the same results will be achieved," Macedonian Foreign Ministry Stevo Crvenkovski said in his speech at the UN General Assembly.

Assembly Condemns Assassination Attempt

AU0610091895 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Upon the proposal of Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov and coordinators of parliament groups Tito Petkovski, Ismet Ramadani, and Blagoja Filipovski at the beginning of the session, the Assembly adopted a declaration in which it condemns the assassination attempt against the president of the Republic. This act was assessed as an act against reason and peaceful processes in the region, as well as against all forces that are committed to these processes as the only alternative for the Balkans as a region of peace, democracy, and mutual good neighborly cooperation and confidence. In the declaration that was read by Assembly Chairman Andov, among other things the following is emphasized:

[Begin Andov recording] The Macedonian Assembly points out that there are no forces that will prevent the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] from accomplishing the road for which it opts with its Constitution and other acts, as an expression of the will of the citizens and as an indispensable orientation for the development of the republic in conformity with the needs that are imposed by the modern development of democracy and humanity. So, the Republic of Macedonia will firmly persist in its European orientation, on its willingness to cooperate with all democratic countries in the world, and particularly on its option for development of good neighborly relations, for initiatives for strengthening peace in the region and for strengthening confidence among the states in the region.

The Republic of Macedonia will persist in its basic determination for its internal order, for interethnic and religious tolerance, for common life, for mutual confidence, and for respect. The Macedonian Assembly expects from the competent bodies of the Republic of Macedonia to implement the investigation in a fast and efficient way and to discover the organizers and perpetrators of this outrageous act. The efficiency of these assignments will affect the lasting stability and security of the Republic of Macedonia and it will be proof of the firm determination of the state to prevent any attempts at terrorism. [end recording]

Daily Assesses European Stance on Macedonia

MS0510103895 London THE GUARDIAN in English 5 Oct 95 p 18

[Editorial: "The Squeeze on Macedonia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia's charmed life has been badly shaken by the attempted assassination of President Gligorov. The "oasis of peace" which he proclaimed is under threat just as things seem to be improving. Is this by chance or design?

Since independence Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has been squeezed between Serbian hostility to the north and Greek anger to the south. Yet it sits at the crossroads of the Southern Balkans and its future depends upon open frontiers. Recently the sense of movement elsewhere has created new opportunities. Parliament is about to approve last month's agreement with Greece over the disputed "flag" issue: Mr Gligorov had just returned from talks with President Milosevic in Belgrade. Macedonian ministers have shown enterprise in persuading Greece to accept a face saving solution—U.S. pressure also helped. Internally a start at least has been made in meeting ethnic Albanian demands for better access to education and jobs.

There is no shortage of theories about responsibility. Macedonians fear above all it may prove to be close to home. The early independence struggle a century ago was disfigured by feuding and terrorism. Speculation so far has focused on ultra-nationalist elements in the VMRO [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization] party who have made wild threats against Mr Gligorov. Others suggest a wider dimension. Observers have long warned that the Bosnia war unless checked could have a knock-on effect to the south. The argument could be reversed: those who stand to lose by a Bosnian peace may seek a more general destabilisation.

Whatever the cause this incident should not be shrugged aside as a typical "Balkan" event. The Skopje government has worked hard for stability and needs all the support it can get. And history reminds us that Europe cannot afford another Macedonian question.

VMRO-DPMNE: Decision on Flag 'Illegitimate'

AU0610091795 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Because of the terrorist act against Mr. Gligorov, to whom the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] wishes a speedy recovery in spite of political differences, this party communicated today that it will postpone its planned peaceful protests. At the same time, as is pointed out in the communication, the VMRO-DPMNE is disgusted by the indifference of the authorities, particularly by the schedule in which negotiations with Greece are conducted, without the smallest interruption, even at a moment when the institution of the presidency of the state is endangered. According to this party, this would be a common activity in every democratic and civilized state.

It is also stressed in the communication that evidence for this is also the ease with which the Assembly of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] decided to change the symbol of the national flag at its session today. The VMRO-DPMNE condemns and rejects today's Assembly session and points out in the communication that the illegitimate decisions of the illegitimate assembly are not valid.

Poll Reflects Strong Opposition to Changing Name

AU0510174695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 4 Oct 95 p 8

[Unattributed report: "'The New Sun' Is Acceptable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Changing the name of our state is not acceptable to 79.33 percent of the citizens, while only 15 percent do not object to it. At the same time, every second citizen (56.33 percent) does not mind changing the flag, 26 percent do not accept it, while the rest of the people are indifferent.

According to the opinion of 53.67 percent, the accord on the normalization of relations between Greece and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], with a duration of seven years, will promote the position of our state, and they believe that the constitutional name Republic of Macedonia will be safeguarded. Only 18.67 percent see this accord as an "advantage" for Greece, while the percentage of those who believe that the accord will promote the position of the state, but the constitutional name will not be safeguarded, is insignificant—5.5 percent. There are similar indications in relation to the following question: "Do you believe that these achievements are positive for the Macedonian policy or that the accord will be at the expense of the Macedonian state?" Sixty-two percent answered "yes—these are positive achievements," and 15.67 percent said "no."

The citizens surveyed by the poll consider that the biggest achievement with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the United States is the possibility of getting economic assistance—34.67 percent. Only 16.67 percent believe that these relations can guarantee stable relations with

Greece. Every tenth citizen believes that "the United States will protect Macedonia." The question "In case you accept a change in the name, which alternative do you find the most appropriate" was again answered with a categorical opposition by 78.83 percent, while 4.33 percent "supported" the name "Nova Makedonija." The same percentage accepts the name "FYROM," while only 0.17 percent are in favor of "Slav Macedonia" or "Northern Macedonia." It was characteristic that almost the same percentage is "against" the change in the name, whether among members or supporters of the opposition or the government political parties.

Compared to last year's poll organized by the same agency, the result is that last year 74.33 percent of the citizens "did not agree with the change in the name of the country with the wording 'Nova,' 'Northern,' 'Upper,' or 'FYROM.'" Last year, 48.67 percent believed that "there must not be discussions on the change of the name or on corrections in the Constitution."

[Box, p 8]

Structure

The greatest opposition to the change of the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia came from males (81.5 percent), followed by those between the ages of 30 and 49, with secondary education, employed in the public sector and Macedonians in nationality.

Those who expressed the least opposition were men over 50, those with university education, and the unemployed. This option was mostly supported in Bitola.

West Charged With 'Leniency' Toward Russia

WS0610103595 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 3 Oct 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Maksymilian Berezowski: "The Lenient West; Caressing Russia to Death?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Pressure exerted by Russia on the West is intensifying instead of subsiding as the NATO countries continue their efforts to calm and appease Moscow. The latter, however, showers its Western partners with uninhibited threats in exchange for the decision to expand NATO.*

The long list of concessions made by the West is met with constant and stubborn demands, criticism, anger, and threats voiced by Russia through the lips of its leaders, politicians, generals, and incited media. Who believes it can be caressed to death?

First, the West backed out of its own reservations, expressed recently by President Clinton, and everything seems to indicate that it will consent to certain amendments of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. As a consequence, the quotas for Russia may be increased: in the south, in the Caucasus region, and in the north, in the vicinity of Saint Petersburg (what are the dangers lurking there?).

As if in exchange, Moscow announced that, once East European states are admitted to NATO, Russia will establish a military bloc within CIS, a Warsaw Pact in miniature of sorts (this does not seem practical, primarily due to Ukraine's reluctance).

Later, in reply to Russia's criticism, the alliance stated in the document on NATO expansion issued in Brussels that, until circumstances require otherwise, NATO will give up deploying nuclear arms as well as the troops of other member states on the territories of the newly admitted countries.

Moscow retorted by quoting local military sources as saying that the Russian General Staff is developing a project of deploying nuclear missiles on its Baltic fleet and rocket launchers in the Kaliningrad oblast and in Belarus. We do know, however, that the deployment of ballistic rockets from Belarus to Russia has been suspended without waiting for NATO to expand, even though their removal is provided for by international agreements signed by both states.

It is no secret that high-ranking U.S. officials stated on numerous occasions that cooperation with Russia would be strengthened together with the expansion of NATO and that the organization would establish "special relations" with Moscow. It was even said that the expansion of NATO would be preceded by an agreement with Russia. Is that not enough?

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher recently assured Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that NATO will not rush to accept new members. General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having said that the expansion of NATO is a top priority of U.S. foreign policy, went on to add that the process will never be carried out in haste. Many similar conciliatory statements were issued. THE NEW YORK TIMES had due reason to point out that Russian pressure is effective.

What is the reasoning of the highest Russian officials behind escalating this pressure? What are they counting on?

—Russian maximalists expect that the West, forced to choose between Russia and NATO expansion, will burst out crying and choose Russia.

—A new group of advocates of Russian superpower chooses to believe that it will succeed in delaying the decision to expand NATO so that, once the circumstances change, the project will either be forsaken or will be blocked by Moscow as it regains its power.

—Further Russian politicians estimate that, by protesting NATO's East Europe policy, they will be able to at least bargain concessions in other fields, thus enabling Russia to accelerate the pace of regaining imperial power.

One way or another, the organized uproar that has been publicized on a global scale is to serve the revival of the Russian empire and clearly confirms such intentions and such preparations. The leniency—not to say naivete—of the West will not halt the tendency. On the contrary, it might help it gain momentum.

Walesa Comments on Polish-Vatican Concordat

LD0510191995 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1534 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 5 Oct—On Thursday, Polish President Lech Walesa issued the following statement:

"The Sejm majority is still deferring a decision on the Concordat. In Poland, no significant international agreement has lain in parliament for over two years. No agreement has waited for executive provisions to be adopted. Hitherto, the order has been different. The decision on ratification came first. If it was positive, parliament went on to adopt the necessary laws.

"Previously, when work has been in progress on the constitution, the Polish parliament has never deferred the ratification of agreements. For two years now, the Sejm majority is breaking away from this healthy rule.

"Never before in the history of Polish parliamentarianism has a negative stance been adopted in relation to a loyal and friendly partner. The ruling coalition and the Sejm majority are demonstrating their scorn for the Holy See.

"We thus have a demonstration in the Sejm of bad will toward the Concordat. A significant distortion in the administration of power by the Sejm has ensued. The Sejm majority is causing the Sejm to abstain from the implementation of its functions in relation to a significant affair of state.

"The opponents of the Concordat are not thinking in the categories of state. The Concordat belongs to the series of great legal acts ordering the position of the state and relations within the state, and at the juncture of domestic and international affairs as well. This is an issue of state priorities. There are various problems between the state and the church. The Holy See is a sovereign entity in international law. That is why we regulate the affairs of the Roman Catholic Church on the basis of an international agreement. Here we keep to a centuries-long Polish tradition.

"The lack of ratification is creating a gap in the system of principle legal regulations in the state. This lack has brought about a collision between the state and the church and society, the decisive majority of which belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. This collision is socially harmful. It is not a struggle that is required but, rather, cooperation.

"The opponents of the Concordat cite the constitutional principle of separation of church and state. It is here appropriate to leave aside the well-known emptiness and falsehood of this principle as it was practicised by the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and the Polish People's Republic [PRL]. What is important is that in the Concordat there is not anything in contradiction to the present constitutional law dating from 1992. According to the Concordat, the state and the church are "each in their own sphere, independent and autonomous" (Article 1 of the Concordat).

"The cooperation of both institutions 'for the development of man and the common good' (Article 1) is subject to this principle. Why do the opponents of the Concordat not want such cooperation?

"The present day, the approaching 21st century, is bringing difficult moral, civilizational, and social challenges. These challenges require the cooperation of the state with different organizations. They also require cooperation with the Roman Catholic Church and other faiths. Such is the interest of the state."

Kwasniewski Meets Unionists; Mikke on Anti-Semitism

WS0610103495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by "DW," "LUZ," SAR" and "ROD": "The Candidates' Success"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] "Let us not panic," Aleksander Kwasniewski soothed a member of the All-Poland Trade Union Agreement [OPZZ] who expressed his fears that once the postcommunist candidate wins the presidential elections the opposition will take to the streets. "In a democracy, whoever gathers more votes wins, and not whoever can organize a larger demonstration. Even if it did come to that, I hope we would all defend that principle, Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Lepper, even [Chief of General Staff] General Wilecki," added the chairman of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

Although all of the unionists did not dispute his candidacy and a previously prepared appeal calling on other unionists to vote for Kwasniewski was unanimously approved, the candidate went on to advertise himself anyway: "I have shown my talents in forming the SLD, naturally with the help of others. Currently, the right is trying to follow our path. There are no copyrights, so I wish them the best of luck! This further proves my achievements because it turns out that I am the only one the right is capable of uniting against."

He gave assurances that his constituency is not becoming extinct. "Many young people and women come to my rallies," he said.

"Well, he finally did lose a little weight," noted an OPZZ activist.

Janusz Korwin-Mikke said in Poznan that anti-Semitism is the effect of practical or legal privileges of Jews.

"If, for example, genocide is considered to be the murdering of Jews alone, while the murder of 2 million Armenians was not qualified by the UN as genocide, then people begin wondering who really rules here. If Jews are to be a better category and the Jewish nation is indeed chosen, people's reactions are negative," said the candidate of the Union for Real Politics.

He added that the hysteria raised by GAZETA WYBORCZA that anti-Semitism exists in Poland is largely exaggerated. "Besides, several other dailies are doing the same, but GAZETA WYBORCZA is in the lead because of the nationality of its editorial board and readers," said Korwin.

Presidential Candidate Publishes Jewish Joke Book

WS0610110595 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5 Oct 95 p 2

[Report by Katarzyna Surmiak, ""MM" and "TH": "Candidate Bubel's Jokes: What Do Jews Do in a Crematorium?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "What do Jews do in a crematorium? Play two fires." [reference to Polish children's game] "Inscription on crematorium chimney: Up with Jews!" "Is it true that Jews like red? Jews like any color that wins." Such "jokes" can be found in a booklet circulated in 500,000 copies to kiosks all over the country two weeks ago. It is also full of attacks on communism and politicians from the Democratic Left Alliance. "They are simply jokes," presidential candidate Leszek Bubel told GAZETA WYBORCZA. He refers to himself as the "editor" (a note on the cover says the editor is the Forum for Combating Crime, which fielded Bubel as a presidential candidate). "We rewrote the jokes from books, dailies, and gazettes. Many of them were sent by our readers. Some I made up myself," Bubel told us.

The Warsaw Prosecutor's Office has already been notified that a crime was committed. Spokesman Ryszard Kucinski confirmed that Article 274 of the Penal Code may be applied, providing for up to three years in prison for people who insult, deride, or humiliate others because of their nationality or race. The spokesman does say, however, that the jokes published in the booklet are neither better nor worse than popular jokes about the Scottish, Russians, or policemen.

Sejm Deputies View Options for Arms Industry

WS0610110695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Oct 95 p 16

[Report by Artur Morka: "Arms Industry; Options for Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Will Polish arms factories manufacture state-of-the-art helicopters and tanks or only excavators and cranes? The Ministry of Industry has prepared a plan of restructuring our arms industry.*

The ministry treats this document as "classified." The program is only at the stage of preparation, Deputy Industry Minister Roman Czerwinski said yesterday before the deputies of the Economic Systems and Defense Commissions had a chance to express any doubts.

It is known, however, that until the year 2010 most arms industry plants would become part of the so-called Investment Funds of the National Defense Industry. These companies would remain state-owned, but they would develop closer cooperation with foreign arms industry concerns. The plan envisions three options of restructuring the defense industry:

- The pessimistic option—that is, gradual adjustment of defense industry plants to production for the civilian market; capital spending on new technologies would be confined to the minimum. The budget would have to spend the equivalent of 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product [GDP] a year (now it spends 2.2 percent of the GDP).
- The "moderate" option, which envisions, among other things, establishment of special funds that would also include arms-industry companies. Aside from that, at least three or four so-called Strategic Governmental Projects would be implemented. These projects are as follows: "Huzar"—construction of a helicopter; "Loara"—preparation of a modern antiaircraft system; "Grom"—construction of a new antitank weapon; and "Goryl"—construction of a new tank, successor of "Twardy."
- The optimistic option also envisions establishment of funds and implementation of up to 15 Strategic Governmental Projects, as well as a "steady increase in the output of our arms industry."

According to Minister Czerwinski, implementation of any of the three options will double the amount of taxes paid by the arms-industry plants and will ensure maintenance of 80,000 workplaces. The ministry assumes that 70 percent of the weapons manufactured in Poland will be purchased by our Armed Forces and the rest will be sold abroad.

Most of the deputies are not certain, however, whether implementation of these plans will increase the value of our arms exports to $150 million or $200 million a year. The deputies also asked how the government wants to force the National Defense Ministry [MON] to order 70 percent of its arms from Polish companies. A representative of MON was against "submitting such rigid conditions for supplies": "After all, it does not pay to conduct the necessary research and then start production of aircraft if all we need is 70 planes," he explained.

India, Poland Set To Cooperate in Antarctic Fishing

MM0610111895 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 28 Sep 95 p 2

[Report signed "les:" "Outcome of Indian Visit: Polish-Indian Krill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is a chance that a visit paid to the Tri-City [Gdansk, Sopot, Gdynia] by an Indian Government delegation could pay a dividend in the form of the launch of a joint krill-harvesting program.

The Indian Government delegation, with Prasad Rao, deputy minister for marine economy, paid a visit to Gdynia City Office and also spent several hours visiting the Gdynia-based Dalmor [deep-sea fishing] company.

"The visit was prepared by the Marine Fishing Institute in Gdynia, and the Indian delegation included, among others, representatives of the marine economy and agricultural sectors as well as scientific research establishments. India is interested in harvesting krill in the waters surrounding the Antarctic. And, because it does not have its own deep-sea fishing fleet, it is interested in the possibility of partnership with Dalmor, which has been fishing for those crustaceans for years," Tadeusz Kaminski, director of the Dalmor Fishing Department, told GLOS WYBRZEZA.

As a result of the talks, it was decided that one of the captains of Dalmor's ships would take part—in a consulting capacity—in an Indian scientific research ship's exploratory voyage to the seas of the southern hemisphere. India is also interested in buying specialized krill-fishing nets.

"If the findings of the voyage, which should take place before the end of this year, are encouraging, India's food-industry sector will turn its attention to krill. If that happens, there is a good chance that India will charter Dalmor's deep-sea trawler fleet to harvest that particular crustacean," Director Kaminski said.

Dutch Businessmen Seek To Invest in Ports

MM0510145195 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 28 Sep 95 p 1

[Report signed "les": "Rotterdam Shows Interest—Gdansk and Gdynia To Act as Ports of Delivery?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "It was a regular working visit by Dutch businessmen and experts from Rotterdam Maritime Group who are interested in investing in Polish ports. The media have focused unnecessary and disproportionate attention on the whole matter," Ryszard Zdeb, commercial director of Gdansk Port S.A. Administration, commented, adding that no precise sums were mentioned in connection with the proposed investment projects and that the media were blowing things out of proportion, as usual.

Nevertheless, the Dutch are certainly interested in our ports, which they see as commercial gateways for their eastward expansion. The most important thing is that they offer guarantees of secure goods turnover, own sites on which new business premises could be built, and are situated 1,000 km closer than the unreliable Russian ports.

Cooperation with certain electrical engineering companies in our coastal regions is, for example, being sought by a Netherlands firm and also by other companies that hope to find commercial partners in Poland. These firms see our ports as partners with whom it would be worthwhile to cooperate. The Dutch who visited Gdansk Port showed a lot of interest in the proposal that a so-called wide channel be opened between Gdansk and Kaliningrad. Once this project—which is a perfectly feasible proposition—is completed and the wide channel commissioned, the expectations of our potential partners would be satisfied.

"The Dutch are not likely to treat our ports exclusively as secondary facilities overshadowed by Rotterdam. In any case, they lie outside the main freight routes. On the other hand, if they are treated as ports of delivery, associated with the eastward directed commercial expansion, that should not be in any way detrimental to our interests. Either way, cargoes from the West will be carried through these ports," Director Zdeb concluded.

Between 7 and 11 November of this year, Amsterdam will host a show and fair entitled " Polish Days," at which the Gdansk region will be represented in a wide and comprehensive manner.

Daily Criticizes Iliescu for Stance on Allies

AU0510182395 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 2 Oct 95 p 1

[Editorial by Dumitru Tinu: "Devil's Sworn Brother?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Outrage was caused among the members of the presidential team by the fact that, a few days ago, the MEDIAFAX press agency dispatched a report from Washington mentioning the fact that, during his talks with U.S. congressmen here, Ion Iliescu had termed Gheorghe Funar [president of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR] and Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party—PRM] "Romania's Zhirinovskiys." In a reply to this, during a press briefing, the PRM leader stated that, together with his colleague from the PUNR, they will sue the president in court. In turn, he termed Iliescu "the Russians' Pacala" [Romanian folk tale character famous for tricking other people] who will go down in Romania's history being mentioned in the errata section.

A plotting presidential counselor is trying to turn this story upside down, whispering in the presidential ear that the daily ADEVARUL is to be blamed for the scandal. Whereas actually the sole thing that has to be cleared up is whether Mr. Iliescu is angry with himself and regrets the statement he made, or rather feels offended by his allies. We would prefer to believe that the president—who, at the National Press Club in Washington, talked so beautifully about the "natural interaction" between the power and the press—does not mind the fact that the statement he made during his talks with the congressmen was aired and that he does consider the journalists culpable just because they considered it their duty to inform the readers about what he said. (As a matter of fact, the MEDIAFAX press agency, the source of this piece of information, is the property of Mr. Adrian Sarbu, who was also present in the United States as a special guest of President Iliescu).

The fact is that Mr. President has been increasingly jumpy and intolerant with respect to opinions that are contrary to his own. This is the stance he displayed on the night that preceded my departure from Washington, after his talks with Clinton, when I was wakened from sleep and asked to go downstairs to the lobby of the hotel. Mr. Iliescu had come to us, the people in the press group, to make statements about his talks. Following a half-hour session of answers to "tricky" questions, such as how did it feel like to be in the White House Oval Office, I told him that we would like him to also tell us about the less-pleasant things he was told during his talks with the group of U.S. congressmen—about the measures limiting the freedom of the press and the intimidation campaign against journalists, as well as the reproaches for his cooperation with the nationalist-extremist forces. Regarding the former issue, the president admitted that the measures recently adopted by parliament are aberrant ones, and he hinted at the fact that he would reject them when the Penal Code is sent to him for promulgation. However, he admonished us for not creating a united front against those who circulate false information and indulge in calumny, but forgot to instruct us on how such a "united front" and, especially, a court martial of the journalists should look.

His irritation increased as the president began to comment on the accusations due to his cooperation with extremist forces. One has to admit that the president has gathered serious grounds since 1990, namely, the lack of will to cooperate on behalf of the opposition, which did not accept his proposal to participate in the government of the country, an accord of the Spanish Mancloa-type, or the pact of national conciliation. And therefore.... Therefore, there was no other way but to strike a pact with the devil. We had no choice, the president explained, adding, in an increasingly nervous tone, that what one needs in politics is realism, and consequently "one is compelled to become a brother of the Devil himself." Although this might be true, the sole problem is that the quoted Romanian proverb, in its complete form says: "One has to become a brother of the Devil himself until one crosses the bridge," whereas Mr. Iliescu and the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] crossed the bridge long ago and they have even anchored themselves strongly to the shores of power. Our traditional wisdom could not possibly suggest that one should become a sworn brother of Satan for good, but rather to strike a short-term alliance with him to overcome a difficult moment.

The presidential irritation climaxed when I reminded him that the western political circles actually blame him for not distancing himself from the extremist stances displayed by some of the PDSR's allies. That is not true!—replied the president, emphasizing that, as far as he is concerned, he has always distanced himself. Being still under the influence of his earlier talks with David Funderburk, former U.S. ambassador to Bucharest and currently a very influential personality among the Republican majority in Congress, the president of our country gave full expression to his resentment (which personally I consider genuine) regarding the nationalist-extremist statements made by some of the allies. But in that case, why does he not cancel his pact with the Devil? The answer is simple. Mr. President does not accept any other formula except for the one he likes best, namely, that of the PDSR running the country. With whom should we set up a cabinet? he asked me despairingly. I had no chance to reply—because he was no longer listening to anyone but himself—to tell him that, according to the rules of the democratic game, if he genuinely wishes to distance himself, they could set up a minority cabinet (such situations are quite frequent in western countries), or a government of technocrats. This would be nothing new. However, I am afraid that the president cannot even conceive any other variant except perpetuating the rule of the current nomenklatura. This is why he resorts to a two-faced discourse: one in which he distances himself from extremism, which he uses whenever he is talking to foreigners, and a different one, tailored for domestic use, intended to cover up bad-smelling issues.

I would add that the president's irritated tone is not auspicious, and it would be a great mistake if the success of his visit in the United States—an incontestable success, owing to which we, from ADEVARUL, termed the visit as this year's biggest political event for Romania—would prevent him from examining lucidly and sincerely the facts he is never told about on how things really are in the country.

Antiopposition Plot To Foil Electorate Presumed

AU0410115095 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 29 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Eugen Serbanescu: "A Week of Strange Coincidences"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At long last, Ion Iliescu has left for the United States. Not on an official visit, with honors due to presidents, but nevertheless, people can still see him on television shaking hands with Bill Clinton and smiling at each other while chattering about good Romanian-U.S. relations. At about the same historic moment, Vadim Tudor [senator and president of the Greater Romania Party—PRM], returns home from vacation, puts on his white-color jacket and announces that he will run for the presidency. That is, he attacks Ion Iliescu. When did Vadim attack him with similar violence? First when Iliescu visited Tel Aviv and again when he attended the inauguration of the Holocaust Museum in Washington. Why does Vadim do such things? To show that there is not even a trace of friendship or cooperation between Iliescu and himself. Vadim is an extremist, while Iliescu is a balanced man. What would become of us if by some accident Vadim were to replace Iliescu at Cotroceni [presidential headquarters]. That would be a serious matter, they would say in various languages in various government offices across the world. It is known that Romania's president is always criticized because of the political alliance between the ruling party and the three extremist parties together with which it forms the ruling group. Vadim's latest appearance in the limelight is intended to demonstrate to people in faraway countries that such criticism is groundless because he and the president will engage in a bitter fighting during next year's election campaign.

The string of coincidences does not end here. At the very moment Iliescu is visiting Washington and Vadim Tudor becomes "would-be president," in Bucharest Iliescu's only serious contender for Cotroceni, Professor Emil Constantinescu, president of the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], is attacked by some students. Six months ago a group from the Students' League, meager scraps of the organization that staged the [1990] protest rally in University Square, launched an anti-Constantinescu campaign. On 10 May, despite the fact that the University rector [Constantinescu] had ordered the famous balcony to be open for speakers, except for political personalities, some of the league leaders chided him. On 14 June, during the rallies pegged to the commemoration of the miners' incursion, the same people provoked incidents very close to the rostrum, while now they are blaming Constantinescu for the lack of places in the student hostels. Of course, all university graduates would find such accusations comical. Normally, university rectors deal with completely different issues than that of ensuring housing for the students. However, the community targeted by the slanderers was not that of the university graduates, but rather the millions of television viewers who saw Constantinescu being booed by the "students." The videotape broadcast on national television failed to show that there were only 50 people protesting in front of the university rector's office. But the target of this attack is even more precise than this: During the years he has been running the university, Emil Constantinescu has displayed a genuine talent for management. Their ostentatiously hoisted placard, saying "We want a competent rector!" had only a single purpose. And that was to darken the exceptionally necessary abilities of a person who wishes to become president of the country.

And to make the string of coincidences complete, one should note the dispute going on between Deputy Mayor Cretu and Bucharest General Mayor Halaicu. That is, between a PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] member and, respectively, the secretary general of the PNL [National Liberal Party]. After [the CDR meetings with the electorate in] Timisoara, Alba Iulia, and Slobozia demonstrated the CDR's strength increasingly clearly, after unpublished public opinion polls confirmed that the CDR's popularity is increasing, and after the very complicated unity of the parties belonging to the alliance seemed strong at long last, during a PNTCD press conference Deputy

Mayor Cretu launches a violent attack against Crin Halaicu. The issues the attack referred to are irrelevant. What is interesting is its genuine reasons. What is the expected outcome of such an attack? Above all, the conclusion that there is no unity whatever within the CDR. Second, that the disputes between the PNL and PNTCD cannot be kept under control any longer. And third, which is the most serious thing, that the CDR might disintegrate at any time.

None of the aforementioned three ideas are true. But who would have an interest in making people believe them? The rulers, above all, but also those who deserted the CDR. As a matter of fact, a journalist of the independent press, a lady who is very close to one of the factions within the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], announced recently that Iulian Cretu is the CDR-nominated candidate for the post of Bucharest general mayor, following the "sacrificing" of Crin Halaicu by the CDR. A PNTCD Press Bureau communique asserted that the statements made by Iulian Cretu merely reflect his personal views, while sources within the CDR confirmed that the idea of nominating the deputy mayor as a candidate for the post of general mayor did not even crop up.

What is one to conclude regarding this uninterrupted series of coincidences linking Washington and the Dambovita River, as well as Butimanu [Tudor's birthplace] and London with its great fortunes?... Perhaps one can conclude only one thing. No one among the current leaders of the country is prepared to take a single step back. They would do absolutely anything to hold on to the comfortable armchairs they are sitting in. The comedy of seeming facts was but a small sample.

A bon entendeur, salut! [Sentence in French: Until the next time I greet you!]

Tokes: Hungary Fosters 'Nationalistic Power'

AU0310134995 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 25 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Lia Bejan: "Scared That He Might Lose the Object of His Work, Bishop Laszlo Tokes Is Striving To Undermine the Romanian-Hungarian Reconciliation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The entire Budapest Government, from Prime Minister Gyula Horn to National Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti, has fallen out of favor with Laszlo Tokes, the honorary president of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]. In a letter sent to the UDMR Council of Representatives, the Oradea bishop voiced his dissatisfaction over the stance displayed by the Hungarian cabinet with respect to the Bucharest leadership. The meeting of the aforementioned UDMR body took place on 23-24 September in the town of Gheorgheni. They discussed issues related to the Council executive statute, the budget, the criteria for elaborating the lists of candidates in view of the local elections, and they also examined the activity of the crisis committee set up to alter the Education Bill. On the agenda they also had a proposal to elaborate three official documents expressing the UDMR stance with respect to President Iliescu's proposal to achieve Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation, their stance with respect to the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina following the flood of Serb refugees, and their stance with respect to the Hungarian Government. All the aforementioned documents had been suggested in Bishop Tokes's letter as well, but they could not be sanctioned due to lack of quorum.

Laszlo Tokes requested that the Council of Representatives should display a clear-cut stance with respect to the Hungarian Government, considering the position of the Gyula Horn cabinet regarding the Education Bill of Romania. In Tokes's opinion it was a mistake on behalf of the Hungarian executive to have proposed to set up, together with the Romanian executive, a joint Romanian-Hungarian commission to monitor the way in which the Education Bill is implemented. "In connection with this issue, a much firmer attitude is needed, and the way it is now, I consider that they actually encourage the current nationalistic power in Romania." Neither does Laszlo Tokes agree with the statements made by Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, according to whom "in Romania one cannot make use of very firm diplomatic means, such as rejecting dialogue or exerting political pressure. (...)" "The too conciliatory and permissive stance of the Hungarian Government comes to support the policy promoted by President Iliescu and the nationalistic power, while Iliescu throws dust in their eyes with his historic reconciliation," asserts Tokes, who does not forget to chide Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti either: "The assertion is exaggerated and irrelevant, according to which the relations between the Hungarian and Romanian Armies are better than the political or diplomatic relations, because there is a tendency to militarize the Szekler region forcibly, to place various garrisons here without any reasons, by which they actually intend to alter the ethnic composition of that region. While Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca claims that the Romanian population needs to be protected by the military, Keleti says that it is an internal affair of every state to decide where to place its troops. There is but a tiny difference between such an assertion and Ceausescu statements on the noninterference in domestic affairs."

UDMR Chairman Bela Marko rang the alarm bell in connection with the isolated position in which the UDMR currently finds itself; this situation was not caused by the radicalization of the policy promoted by the UDMR, because ever since 1990 the political discourse of the party representing the ethnic Hungarian community has not changed whatsoever. In the opinion of the party chairman, all this is due to a greater presence of extremist elements in the Romanian political life. More precisely, the electoral campaign was started prematurely based on the national issue. Marko emphasized the need to find solutions to overcome the crisis situation, but no concrete suggestion was formulated on how to achieve this.

Parliament Condemns Attempt on Gligorov's Life

AU0410160495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputies of the State Chamber conclude with indignation that violence and instability are spreading from behind the scenes in the sovereign Republic of Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

We adamantly condemn the treacherous attempt on the life of Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and voice our sincere solidarity with him and the friendly Macedonian people.

We wish President Gligorov the speediest possible recovery.

Drnovsek Wants Budget To Stay Within Guidelines

AU0610080695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite expectations, the government has not passed the state budget for 1996 today. Namely, the coalition partners have not agreed to the proposed division of 570 billion Slovene tolars, which is what the budget should amount to. Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek initially wanted to pass the budget with a majority vote at today's government session. However, following talks with coalition partners Lojze Peterle [Slovene Christian Democrats] and Janez Kocjancic [the United List of Social Democrats] at noon, they agreed to continue harmonization within the departments and among the parties until Tuesday [10 October]. The government is expected to pass the budget on Tuesday and forward it for parliamentary discussion.

After the agreement with the coalition partners, Prime Minister Drnovsek said that the budget expenditure was additionally burdened by the costs of succession, the universal child benefits, and the assistance to the treasuries of the pensions and health insurance funds. There was also the question of priorities, the prime minister said:

[Begin Drnovsek recording] What ensued, of course, was a big debate about what the priorities were, how much money should go on highways, education, science, and so forth. In short, our views on priorities differ greatly and harmonization is very strenuous indeed. However, I have judged that we need a couple of days of additional work. Initially, I intended to close the matter this evening, with a majority vote within the government, if need be. However, there are still chances to achieve a greater degree of harmonization within the coalition and for that reason we will continue working together ultimately perhaps to reach a coordinated coalition proposal. This proposal will have to be within the upper limit of 570 billion tolars, or even slightly less.

We would like to keep the entire law on subsidies for exporters in the game, which would mean 10 billion tolars next year as an additional burden on the budget. Five billion tolars were spent on this this year. There have been opinions and proposals that we might reduce the joint contributions of companies instead of this law. We are examining possibilities of keeping this law and of improving it a little, that is, of directing and channelling funds in the best possible way to where they will truly have the greatest effect. On the basis of the debate so far, I believe that this law will remain, but we will incorporate into it various funds scattered among the ministries for various subventions that may not have been very well spent hitherto. Despite everything, we will strive for at least a minimal reduction in contributions. It seems important to me that this becomes one of our guidelines, namely, not to raise the total contributions but try to reduce them, at least a little. The law, probably somewhat amended and hopefully better, will remain. The joint contributions should be at least a little lower than this year's. [end recording]

Bavaria's Stoiber Discusses EU Integration

AU0510134495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] As a part of Bavarian Week, Bavarian Minister President Dr. Edmund Stoiber arrived in Ljubljana today. The guest spoke with President Milan Kucan, Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, and Minister of Economic Relations Janko Dezelak. Together with Health Minister Dr. Bozidar Voljc, Stoiber will hand over a remote medical station [telemedicinska postaja] to the eye clinic this afternoon.

The Bavarian minister president, Minister Dezelak, and Dr. Peter Vencej, the head of the Bavarian-Slovene commission, held a news conference. Here is a report by Igor Juric:

[Begin recording] [Juric] Minister Dezelak assessed the talks with the Bavarian guest as follows:

[Dezelak] We can judge them to be very successful because we see that the state of Bavaria, the free state of Bavaria, is not merely a very important trade and economic partner of the Republic of Slovenia, but also that the Republic of Slovenia enjoys its support in a wide spectrum of issues that link both partners.

[Juric] Slovenia realizes more than a third of the entire exchange with Germany, which is our most important trade partner, is with Bavaria. In the talks, they analyzed ways of increasing trade further. One of the fields would also be the exploitation of atomic energy. Namely, there is a possibility that, at sometime in the future, Siemens would be invited to furnish the Krsko nuclear power plant.

Dr. Stoiber explained the purpose of his visit with the words:

[Stoiber, in German with superimposed translation into Slovene] My visit to Slovenia is a part of our efforts to intensify the links with Slovenia and the Visegrad group, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, in as many fields as possible. We already have extremely good relations with them. The Slovene representatives also discussed the present situation in the European Union and the conjecture about the future with Dr. Edmund Stoiber. They did not avoid the issue of a multispeed Europe. According to Stoiber, the expansion should take place as quickly as possible for security and cultural reasons. Dr. Stoiber believes that Slovenia is definitely one of the first countries that should be admitted into the European Union, as it is on a higher level of economic development than the countries of the Visegrad Group. For that reason, they always speak about the five states and not merely the Visegrad four. Bonn and Munich support us in this. They are also of the opinion that our conflict with Italy could be resolved easily. In any case, this would have to happen before our accession to the European Union is completely blocked as a result of it. According to Stoiber, Slovenia could also become a stepping stone for German enterprises in their cooperation with other republics of the former Yugoslavia. Of course, once peace is restored.

[Juric] Dr. Vencelj assessed the work of the mixed Slovene-Bavarian commission as being very successful, to which the more than 100 projects that are currently underway testify. The result of the commission's functioning is also the Bavarian Week that is underway in Ljubljana at the moment.

Development Fund Companies Undergoing State Audit

AU0510154395 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 28 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Silva Ceh: "Dispute Over Audit Ironed Out"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 27 September—Following a decision by the managerial board of the Development Fund, the inspectors of the Agency for Payment Operations will be able to carry out audits in the fund's companies. This ended a dispute in which the Development Fund, banking on the logic that the capital of the companies transferred to the fund was capital with a known owner, had fended off the agency's auditors. With this, some 25 of the fund's companies can expect a more detailed audit. In 18 companies, which were only transferred to the fund this year due to "the audit disobedience," they are already feeling the tighter reign of the fund.

"Even so far, we have been of the opinion that the agency is, pursuant to the prevailing legislation, also authorized to audit the fund's companies and, for that reason, the decision of the fund's managerial board only confirmed the correctness of our stance," Bogomir Spiletic, deputy director general of the Agency for Payment Operation, Supervision, and Information (APNI), says. This authority of the APNI was, according to Spiletic, confirmed by the rulings of the higher courts, even though the fund disputed them. The State Chamber passing a law on changes to the law on the privatization of the fund's companies in a summary procedure also contributed somewhat to the fact that the agency's auditors will audit the fund's enterprises from now on. The director of the fund, Spiletic says, when deciding on such audits, will also have to keep in mind whether the agency will exist at all from 1 January 1996 onward or whether it will be divided into two agencies, and also whether these audits will be carried out by the Accounting Court: "There are still many open questions. Obviously it sounds very nice to say before the elections that everything will be audited from now on."

Half of Audits Already Completed

So how does the fund assess the decision of the its managerial board? Fund's director Uros Korze says: "The changes to the law on the privatization of the fund's companies, which also expand audits to the companies owned by the fund, were passed. The agency can begin with audits. We will inform the agency, as well as the companies, about it this week already." Korze said that audits have already been completed in about half of the fund's companies. In his assessment, there are still 25 companies owned by the fund in which audits will be carried out. These are, of course, the companies that have been owned by the fund since 1992, therefore, the companies from the so-called rehabilitation package. Did a decision of the managerial board confirm the correctness of the Agency for Payment Operations insisting that it was authorized to audit the fund's enterprises? The fund, Korze said, did not prevent these audits, however, it was of the opinion that "the legal bases" for it were lacking. That is why the law that creates these bases was changed. Korze says: "The matter was not of essential importance and was far too politicized. Unnecessarily so, too." [passage omitted]

Commission To Investigate Illegal Privatization

95BA0366A Maribor VECER in Slovene 8 Sep 95 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Group To Investigate Embezzlements"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Slovene Government's reaction to the suspicions and accusations regarding irregularities at enterprises; Tone Rop emphasized that the group for preventing the embezzlement of social capital could not have been established earlier, because there was no legal basis.*

At yesterday's press conference after the first postvacation meeting of the Slovene Government, Tone Rop, state secretary in the Ministry of Economic Relations and Development, said that a special government group for preventing the embezzlement of the capital of socially owned enterprises would consist of representatives of institutions that were involved with privatization and the monitoring of privatization (representatives of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Finance, Economic Relations and Development, the state secretaries, Justice, and the Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering). The basic purpose of the establishment of that group will be to speed up sanctions against irregularities at enterprises that have been or will be privatized.

According to Tone Rop, the group's activity will contribute to the fact that in the event of suspected embezzlements, people will no longer just wait for audit reports from the Agency for Payment Transactions, and instead, appropriate measures will be taken immediately. In response to a question about why the government had not already decided on something like that, Rop answered that there had been no legal basis, but now it was permitted by the Law on the Privatization of Fund Enterprises and the Law on the Agency for Restructuring and Privatization. In connection with this, the state secretary promised that all the accusations and criticisms would be studied, and that wherever there were grounds to suspect irregularities and embezzlements, measures would be taken immediately; further privatization would be stopped, the Fund for Development would take matters into its own hands, and the culprits responsible for the situation that had arisen would be turned over for criminal proceedings.

In this regard, the government has ordered the ministries to check over once again "all the additional legislation" in preparation, and furthermore, the public legal defender is supposed to receive the authority for more rapid and more effective measures (especially in connection with so-called bypass enterprises). Within this framework, the council of the Privatization Agency, according to Rop, started as early as yesterday to study the transactions concluded at Planika, Paloma, and elsewhere. The special government group will be involved primarily in eliminating embezzlements in regular operations at the enterprises that are undergoing privatization (the Privatization Agency has already taken steps in connection with irregularities at the Economic Exhibition, and the Ona On enterprise, and several directors have also been replaced); several indictments have already been issued against some managers, and several finalized contracts have been annulled.

Federal

NATO, Sarajevo Seen as Threat to Peace

LD0510222195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2133 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct 5 (TANJUG)—A leader of a Serbian ruling coalition party said on Thursday that NATO's latest bombings of the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic] and the uncooperative attitude of the Sarajevo government in the Bosnia peace process were the biggest threat to peace at present.

'We demand from NATO officials to put a stop to armed actions, because they run contrary to the peace process,' said Radivoje Lazarevic, chairman of the executive board of the New Democracy Party, the coalition partner of Serbia's ruling socialists.

Lazarevic added that the convention of a top-level peace conference demanded a speedy end of all armed operations and delimitation of the territories of the Muslim-Croat federation and the Republika Srpska.

Oliver Potezica of the Socialist Party of Serbia said at a rally in Belgrade on Thursday that 'the world is becoming increasingly aware that the Muslim side is trying to block the peace process or to delay as much as possible a positive outcome of the talks.'

Potezica, a member of the party's main board, said that 'the agreements of Geneva and New York have affirmed and consolidated the constructive and consistent peace policy of Yugoslavia.'

He stressed that the international community appreciated and highlighted the positive role played by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic who had made 'a decisive contribution to the continuity of the peace process.'

Kontic Views 'Major Progress' in Peace Process

AU0510174595 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Oct 95

[Report by Miodrag Vukovic from Budva—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vukovic] Opening this year's Conference of Yugoslav Managers, devoted to ecological policy in Yugoslavia and the ecological [ekoloski] state of Montenegro in Budva today, FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic assessed it as very useful that the sphere of relations between ecology and economy is being widened and clarified just as, in that context, the relations between the state and economy are.

In his speech today, Prime Minister Kontic also touched upon the current political and economic trends. In the last 30 days, major progress has been achieved in the negotiating process on solving the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is in conformity with strategic orientations of the Federal Government and Yugoslavia's stands that a peaceful solution can be attained exclusively through equal treatment of all three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Kontic] The basic principles that were coordinated in Geneva finally made official the existence of two state entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the first time that an international document mentions the Serbian Republic [RS] along with the Muslim-Croat Federation. One could say this is a historic moment.

The New York agreement guarantees full equality of the RS with the other Bosnia-Herzegovina entity. This not only ensures independent handling of affairs to the state entities, but also makes it possible that there cannot be any outvoting or majority rule [majorizacija] of one side over the other in the joint bodies of power, above all assembly and presidency. In fact, the right of veto has been introduced which ensures protection to the Serb people and its fundamental interests.

The Federal Government is of the opinion that basic conditions for a political solution to the crisis have been ensured with the Geneva and New York agreements. In this context, it is necessary to ensure that the peace efforts continue. The most urgent step now is to reach an immediate agreement on a permanent cease-fire, after which negotiations on maps—that is, the territorial borders between the two entities—should be started.

[Vukovic] Results of the Geneva and New York meetings have once again confirmed the correctness of Yugoslav foreign policy, Prime Minister Kontic said. Belgrade has become the capital city of peace and Yugoslavia's international position has been considerably strengthened. In this situation, the peace process cannot be successfully brought to an end unless the sanctions against our country are lifted. Disturbances in the economy, particularly in the financial sphere, cannot be avoided under the conditions of the blockade and the atmosphere of war, Prime Minister Kontic said, and added the following:

[Kontic] Although the space for the current economic measures has been narrowed down, their scope has nevertheless not been [word indistinct]. This above all refers to the sector of grey economy, financial discipline, that is, generally speaking, the respect for laws and other regulations. On this basis, the main tasks of the current economic policy in the coming months remain to be stopping the further price increase and activating natural dynamism. This implies an increased responsibility of all factors in the economic policy so that—with joint forces and a coordinated way—one could stop negative processes that threaten to take full swing. All state organs have been working on this now.

On this occasion as well, I would like to point out that the Federal Government will firmly maintain its market orientation. On the other hand, one must immediately begin more intensive structural changes, restructuring economy, including privatization, buildup of a new economic system, and the strengthening of the rule of law.

While waiting for the sanctions to be lifted, it is necessary to define a new strategy of economic policy and [word indistinct] economic relations with foreign countries, normalizing relations with neighbors, renewing trade and economic relations with old partners, normalizing financial cooperation with international organizations and other factors, and preparing to join European and world integration processes. These are only some elements of the urgently needed concept of the open economy.

[Vukovic] However, one should also be removing the threatening possibility of experiencing a new, ecological blockade after this one, Prime Minister Kontic pointed out. [end recording]

Belgrade: Peace Deal 'Inseparable' From Sanctions

LD0510173695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1642 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Oct (TANJUG)—The federal government today concluded that the international community and all relevant factors should invest fresh and maximum efforts to establish a definitive and lasting peace in Bosnia, stressing that the peace package must deal with the issue of the sanctions.

A statement from the government session reads:

At a session today, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, the federal government concluded that the international community and all forces involved in the peace process should invest maximum efforts to find a definitive political solution and establish a lasting peace in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, the federal Secretariat for Information has announced.

It was concluded that the peace package is inseparable from the issue of the sanctions and that the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be completely lifted as a matter of urgency. [passage omitted]

Minister Notes 'Albanian Attempts at Separating'

LD0510213695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1931 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Oct 5 (TANJUG)—Minister in the Government of Serbia Vjekoslav Sosevic said Thursday that 'Albanian secessionists will not succeed in their attempts at separating the province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosmet) from the F.R. of Yugoslavia' and merging it with Albania.

'Kosmet is, was and will be part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, its integral and inseparable part,' Sosevic said at Gora at a ceremony marking the liberation of the area in WWII.

Gora covers parts of the Sara Mountain Massif, in the south of Kosmet, near the border with Albania, and is inhabited by a particular national entity of Islamic confession.

Gora Mayor Mesim Delifi said that the Gora area was the first territory in Kosmet which was liberated in World War Two.

Every time that the territorial integrity of the country was endangered, the population in this area expressed loyalty to Serbia and strongly opposed its undermining, Delifi said.

Delifi said that the establishment of the municipality brought the end of pressure and injustice by the Kosovo ethnic Albanian political top which was 'pursuing a sectarian policy towards this area.'

Deputy Prime Minister, Delegation Leave for China

LD0410150395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1242 GMT 4 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Oct. 4 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Minister Uros Klikovac left for China on Wednesday at the head of a Yugoslav delegation to the 7th international anti-corruption conference, which will be held in Beijing from October 6 to 10.

The Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement that the conference would be attended by 700 delegates from 80 countries, including several deputy prime ministers, about 40 ministers and more than 70 deputy ministers.

The organisers are the Supreme Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Inspection of China.

During its visit to Beijing, the Yugoslav delegation plans to hold a series of bilateral meetings with Chinese government officials and members of the delegations attending the conference, the statement said.

Cease-Fire Credited to Milosevic, Holbrooke

AU0510204195 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The cease-fire agreement is a result of the assent reached between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. peace negotiator Richard Holbrooke. Negotiations were held last night when the Serbian president was the first one as a guarantor to sign this historic document. Holbrooke then left for Bosnia, where the Bosnian Serbs signed. The last one was Alija Izetbegovic, who signed the document today on behalf of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

This was a sign for U.S. President Clinton to tell correspondents at the White House the news about the agreement reached on a cease-fire in Bosnia.

During the negotiations, the peaceful role played by Belgrade and President Milosevic, in particular, was of crucial significance.

Following four years of conflict, this has been the most serious chance to date for a just peace to be reached in the earlier Yugoslavia. Let us recall: Belgrade has so far accepted all constructive peace initiatives, warned the warring sides of the fateful consequences of continuing the conflict, and demanded that the solution for the Yugoslav crisis be sought not on the battlefield but at the negotiating table. In the final stage of accepting the cease-fire agreement, FRY has once again confirmed its firm orientation toward peace.

Serbia

Zhirinovskiy To Take Part in Belgrade Protest

LD0510180795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1544 GMT 5 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Oct (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], stated today that the ruling regime in Belgrade, in coalition with the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], "is using all its power to conceal from its own people the betrayal of Serb national interests."

"The secrecy of the federal assembly session was designed to prevent the people from clearly seeing how the affairs of state are conducted and is an attempt to vote through, without a debate, support for the policy of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic," Seselj believes.

The SRS chairman also analysed the statement by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry who openly announced that the U.S. Army would remain in the former Yugoslavia until the Muslim forces are trained. "This means that the course of the war hitherto is only one phase in the Muslim conquest of the whole territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina," Seselj concluded.

He announced that protest meetings of Serb Radicals would be held in Belgrade and Novi Sad on 20 and 21 October in which, he said, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, would take part.

Commentary Analyzes Serbia's Military Assets

AU0510145095 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 30 Sep 95 pp 16-17

[Commentary by Dario Barbalic: "What Serbia Threatens With"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recent statement from the new Serbian Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, in which he, in fact, threatens that Serbia will enter the war, has drawn the full attention of the domestic public. First, because it was the first bellicose statement from official Serbia after a long period in a "peacemaking" role in the territories of former Yugoslavia, and was obviously addressed to Zagreb, which is the main military opponent to Serbian expansionism. However, what is it that Serbia, as the largest remaining military power of "the totality of Serbianship," can threaten with?

Imported Weapons Are Unknown Quantity

The basic characteristic of the war conducted so far in the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (except the NATO air strikes) is that it has been a conflict of a low technological level, with the application of archaic tactics, also including putting cities under siege. In this conflict, largely weapons manufactured in former Yugoslavia under Russian license have been used, that is, the weapons directly procured from the former USSR. A smaller amount of weapons comes from the U.S. aid provision from the fifties, and one part of it was imported during the course of the war itself. That part is the largest unknown for foreign analysts, too, because certain weapons can be registered here and there in the battlefield, but it is very hard to establish the exact number of pieces.

All military observers agree that during the course of the war so far, what has been most important has been heavy artillery, and in this the Serbs have until recently had a big advantage in relation to all other sides in the conflict. However, their advantage during 1991 was not so much the result of the number of artillery pieces (compared to Croatian artillery), as it was the result of the fact that they had had sufficient quantities and kinds of ammunition for all artillery caliber. And in the first months of the war in 1991 that was the main weakness in the Croatian side. Therefore, in the past years, perhaps the greatest efforts in the Croatian Army have been invested in strengthening its own medium and heavy artillery, and ammunition manufacturing. Croatia has started manufacturing D-30 howitzer 122 mm, the ammunition for it, as well as for 155 mm howitzer, with a 24,000-meter range, and there have also been Argentine 155 mm howitzers on display. The results were seen as early as in 1993 in artillery combat in the Kordun and Banija regions, and particularly in Operations Winter 94, Summer 95, and Storm.

Out of Range

Then it was proved that Croatian artillery not only had fire power, but that its accuracy was far better than that achieved by the opposing units of the former army of Krajina, and Karadzic's Serbs. Both those formations had been formed by the officers and gunners of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] with personnel of roughly equal level of training. However, the artillery has, particularly by the Serbs, also been used as a means of terrorizing the civilian population within its range (today it is up to 27 kilometers for the longest range weapons). Former sectors North, South, and West being liberated, and the front line being moved deeper into the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, many Croatian towns are now beyond the reach of the artillery terror. The towns within reach of the enemy artillery, apart from Dubrovnik, are primarily those in eastern Slavonia: Osijek, Vinkovci, Zupanja, but also the regions along the river Sava beside the occupied areas on the Bosnian side, like, for example, Slavonski Brod, where there is, for the time being, a lull. One of more important reasons for the lull is certainly the capability of Croatian artillery to respond in like manner.

Everything Is Different After Storm

Both Serb military units of the former army of the so-called Republic of Serb Krajina and of the Serb Republic so far, have used two long-range rocket systems. One of these is the well-known Orkan multibarrel rocket launcher system (12 barrels), with a range of 50 kilometers at most. Until Operation Storm, with this system, the Serbs could have attacked Zagreb, as well as the suburbs of Split, that is, the two largest Croatian towns, with enough space to hide the launchers after shooting. The military effect of such attacks was insignificant, but the psychological effect on the population was immense. Today, these systems, shooting from the region of northern Bosnia (Mt. Kozara, Mt. Motajica), or from the surroundings of Brcko, can hit certain Croatian towns, like Pozega, Novska, Kutina, Djakovo. The basic precondition for their activity is the existence of the road network, which enables them to change position quickly. For example, the HRZ [Croatian Air Force], after the rocket attack on Zagreb, found the firing position, but the launcher had already been moved from that position.

"Luna" Armed With Chemical Weapons?

American pilots had the same problem finding Iraqi surface-to-surface missile launchers in the desert, despite all the help of satellites and the most contemporary equipment. However, with the loss of the strategically most interesting territory of the former "krajina," the majority of highly valuable targets in Croatia remained out of this system's reach. Simultaneously, Croatia has recently carried out the first test-firing from its own system "Orkan," two of which were presented at the military review of the armed forces. The other missile system used by the Serbs is the "Luna" system, or codified FROG-7 by NATO, with a 65-kilometer range. This system is much more destructive, because its warhead houses 550 kilograms of explosive, but it is also less precise, its aberration from the target is about 700 meters. Technically, it is possible to modify the warhead of this missile to carry chemical or biological weapons, if a country possesses them, of course, but then the missile can carry about 400 kilograms of useful load.

On the Model of Saddam?

Before the war, Yugoslavia was a manufacturer of chemical weapons, so theoretically there is a possibility of their application. However, in that case, the point in question is the usage of the weapons of mass killing. So far, nobody has ever dared to use them, except that, allegedly, Saddam Hussein tried to do so during the course of the war in the Gulf, but, according to one news story, the officers who handled the missile systems refused. Theoretically, there is a possibility that the so-called Yugoslavia has purchased some of the medium-range missile systems, like the Russian-made SS-1 SCUD, with a 300-kilometer range, that is, some of its versions. That is not very likely, because particularly the Americans observe such transfers closely and try to limit them. There is also an international agreement on the non-proliferation of medium-range missiles, and simultaneously on the number of countries that can develop them on their own. Before the war in the Gulf, Iraq had had the best results in this, having developed several derivatives of the SCUD missile with an extended range (up to 600 kilometers).

General Panic's Threats

It is interesting that during the eighties there was very intensive cooperation between former Yugoslavia and Iraq, precisely in the field of the development of the Orkan missile system (the Iraqi version was named Ababel). Two years ago, Yugo-General Zivota Panic announced that Yugoslavia would develop the missile systems with a range of between 300 and 1,000 kilometers, but, obviously the purpose of that was to scare the West with Serbian strength. The only result were panic-stricken articles in the Italian press directed more at the creation of feeling against the use of Italian air bases for NATO air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs. In the recent attack on Kutina, for the first time the Serbs used a modified Russian made SS-N-2 ship-to-ship missile. In the arsenal of the former JRM [Yugoslav Navy] there were two kinds of such missiles, which differed in the navigation system, either radar or infrared. The missile in question is an old-fashioned model, the basic characteristic of which is a large 500-kilogram warhead (range 60-70 kilometers). One of these missiles was once shown in a military review of Martic's army in Slunj.

Serbian Invention

There is one more Serbian invention. That is an air bomb propelled by four rocket engines of a 28 mm multiple rocket launcher by means of which the Sarajevo TV Bosnia-Herzegovina Station was recently hit. The third group is represented by Russian made anti-aircraft missile systems SA, SA-3, and SA-6, all of which have limited capability of hitting targets on the ground (there is a switch indicating "Surface," which automatically turns a surface-to-air missile into a surface-to-surface missile with a 50-kilometer range). All of these weapons are relatively imprecise, but one can fire them onto a residential area, and consequently use them in order to terrorize the civilian population.

The actions of the Yugoslav Air Force may represent the biggest threat, but, because of the growing strength of the Croatian Air Defense, that threat is much smaller than it was only a year ago. According to foreign sources, Yugoslavia has 13 MiG-29A aircraft and two training MiG-29UB aircraft. The latter version cannot use the new generation of Russian laser guided bombs, which limits them to traditional nonguided bombs and essentially reduces their efficiency. In specialized publications there was conjecture that 32 more aircraft of this type had been delivered to Yugoslavia after 1991, but it has never been confirmed.

Maverick Missile for Sljeme

It is definitely known that Yugoslavia possesses, of major aircraft, 60 MiG-21 (MF and "bis" version), 45 G-4 Super Galebs [Seagulls], and 65 Orao [Eagle] aircraft, in all versions. A certain number of Orao aircraft had the facility to use American TV guided Maverick rockets (one of such hit the TV tower on Sljeme [peak on Mt. Medvednica overlooking Zagreb] in 1991). In addition, the former Yugoslav Air Force has had British-made cluster bombs, and Durandal missiles for destroying runways.

Possible targets of large-scale air force action would primarily be the more important infrastructure and industry, like petrochemical complexes, refineries, thermoelectric plants, the important factories, bridges. Less likely targets would be military units on the battleground, because they act under the protection of their own anti-aircraft defense, which is based upon 20, 30, and 40 mm anti-aircraft guns, and portable anti-aircraft systems SA-7 Strela [Arrow] and SA-16 Igla [Needle], which cover altitudes up to 2,500 meters, and domestic modifications of the system SA-13, which covers altitudes up to 3,000 meters. The pillar of the anti-aircraft defense territory is the frequently mentioned S-300 system with a range of 90 kilometers, which covers all altitudes above several hundred meters. Depending upon the number of the batteries in the system, the Croatian territory has also been covered, that is, the majority of the most important targets.

Excellent Pilots To Face Air Strikes

However, one also has to say that there is no completely impenetrable anti-aircraft defense, particularly in the case of a mass air strike. Today Croatia has got fighter-bombers, too, which have been estimated by foreign sources to number some 30 to 40 MiG-21 bis fighter-bombers. It is interesting that so far they have been used primarily in the role of bomber, where excellent results have been achieved, almost unbelievable for such a type of aircraft. The credit here goes exclusively to the pilots and the crew who rendered those old aircraft usable (during the course of training only one aircraft was lost, and it was only because the tactics of usage demands flying close to the ground at very high speed).

Apparently, in the future Croatia will have to strengthen its air force, since this is still weaker than that of its main opponent, so that then this third possibility of an air strike on its territory will gradually disappear. Unless there is an extended peace settlement in the area caught in the conflict, it is possible that some kind of arms race between so-called Yugoslavia and Croatia will continue, and their neighbors will have to follow automatically. On the example of already existing local crisis centers, and knowing the development of military technology (like India and Pakistan, Israel and Syria, etc.), it is possible to predict its course.

In the first case, the point in question is primarily the race in developing rocket systems that for the time being carry conventional warheads, but can also carry weapons for mass killing (primarily of the civilian population). Along with that, both countries are developing more or less secret programs for the development of nuclear weapons (one CIA report states that by the year 2015 at least 10 new states, mostly in the third world, will have the capability to launch a ballistic missile that will be able to carry nuclear warheads).

Smart Rockets

Translated to the local level, it is possible to expect the attempts of both Yugoslavia and Croatia to introduce surface-to-surface missiles with a 400-kilometer range, armed with conventional warheads, with the capability of carrying chemical weapons, into their arsenals. Then there is a probable purchase of more contemporary aircraft with "smart" bombs and rockets. That is, an aircraft can carry a load several times more effective than a surface-to-surface missile and, unless shot down, can repeat that strike. Particularly because this is a small battleground, where jet planes can very quickly reach a target and have numerous sorties a day. If we get back to the beginning of the story, there is "the queen of battle," that is, artillery, which is also advancing technologically, and where today 39 to 45 kilometer ranges are being achieved, with the addition of a gas generator on a shell, also with the use of "smart ammunition"...So, it cannot be all the same to us what the shape of the future will be, and what area of Bosnia-Herzegovina is taken by the Serb entity, as a possible military training ground for some new threat to Croatia. If for a moment we ignore those areas of western Bosnia presently in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs and whose destiny is uncertain, one can easily see that the endangered areas of Croatia will still be Vinkovci, Djakovo, Osijek, Zupanja, and the region of Dubrovnik in the south.

Project for Which They Have No Strength

After Milutinovic's threat, many probably thought that Serbia had managed to get nuclear weapons. The idea of possessing nuclear weapons is not new in the army of former Yugoslavia, and even in the days of Rankovic, who was the initiator of the whole idea, in the fifties, this idea was being elaborated. It was mostly for this reason that the Institute for Nuclear Physics in Vinca was founded, and one of the most passionate opponents of this project was Dr. Ivan Supek, who had warned about its financial and technological unfeasibility. Especially today, Serbia has not got enough strength to realize this project on its own, although there is always a theoretical possibility that any country in the world that is willing to pay will manage to get hold of nuclear weapons from the area of the former USSR. However, at the same time, the main activity of the U.S. intelligence services all over the world today is concentrated on preventing such a development of events. If we take a look at the situation in the world today, we will see that, apart from the big powers, so far only the Israelis have obtained their own nuclear weapons, and they have most likely been indirectly enabled to do so by their ally and protector, the United States of America. And Serbia does not have such an ally and protector today.

Kosovo

Albanians Amass Capital Despite 'Plunder'

AU0310213195 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 30 Sep 95 p 1

[Commentary by A. Maliqi: "The Gold and the Sword"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since ancient times, one of the motives inspiring any soldier to occupy another country has been greed for the booty to be seized after the defeat of the opposing army. Commanders even used to stand in front of the gates of cities to be conquered and to speak about the valuable loot and lovely women that the soldiers would have in their hands if they overcame their enemies, who just as today were to be cruelly slaughtered in the name of lofty ideals constructed out of ambition and mass envy.

The Republic of Kosova is an occupied state and, like every country in the world without freedom, is subjected to continual violence and plunder. Serbian police forces often blockade markets and loot small-scale Albanian traders, who are battling against the bitterness of their destitute lives with whatever means they possess. Daily reports come of fines levied on Albanian private firms by the Financial Police and of different sorts of inspections, while small-scale looting takes place at almost every turn and excites nobody's attention. In a word, such things have become commonplace, as have violence and even death.

In spite of this, as a result more of the tactics of the Serbian occupation apparatus, a stratum of Kosovar Albanians have succeeded in creating a solid basis of capital. One often finds those among them who have acquired this capital fast and easily, but also those who have invested great effort in it. However, Serbian soldiers are present in every corner of Kosova. It does not matter what they look like, whether in military or police uniforms, or in plain clothes in police stations, army barracks, or various administrative offices. As long as they are here, according to the harsh laws of war, anything they do is justified. Efforts have been made at different international levels to tame the demon of war, and agreements have even been signed, but this demon remains ruthless, calculating, and horribly cruel.

At such a time, simple logic suggests that those with a firm capital base, like all those with a powerful urge toward freedom, should be to the fore in the movement to create a state that will secure the lives and property of its own citizens. It does not need to be said that the capital at present in the hands of Albanian businessmen has not been used as far as possible in efforts to establish this state. A considerable number of Albanian businessmen have been hoodwinked by the attractions of transitory material comfort and have begun not to worry much and to live as if the situation were normal, enjoying the sweets of their prosperous lives. They have forgotten the fable of the gold that buys everything and the sword that seizes everything that gold buys. If the gold is in the hands of the Albanians of Kosova, the sword is in the hands of the Serbian Army. Thus, one can understand to whom these goods belong, even though the Albanians may flatter themselves with their stockpiles in warehouses or the sums in their current accounts. Objectively, nothing that they possess belongs to them, as long as the sword is in the hands of someone else. This is a lesson that emerges out of every chapter of world history, in which every page shows that everything belongs to the victor, including even his slaves' history, let alone their capital.

In order to obtain a passing grade in history and not to remain victims of the illusion of their wealth, Albanian businessmen, more than anyone else, must do much more to establish Kosova's statehood. Doing so means creating a mechanism to safeguard lives and capital, which are endangered at every moment under the conditions of slavery. This is elementary logic that even the ignorant must understand.

Article Deplores Dependence on Serbian Wheat

AU0510200095 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian
2 Oct 95 p 2

[Article by A. Podrimcaku: "Bread as a Test of (In)dependence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The agriculture of Kosova does not possess every condition for normal production, but opportunities nevertheless exist, alongside the need, to produce more wheat, at least enough to supply the population of Kosova with cereals and to eliminate once and for all the dependency on wheat and flour produced in the fields and mills of Vojvodina or elsewhere, however cheaply it may be offered on the Kosovar market. There is room for much more cultivation of wheat, and higher yields must be obtained on such fertile land as the Plain of Kosova, the Plain of Dukagjin, and the fields round villages throughout Kosova.

Opportunities exist, which must be exploited despite the many difficulties for grain producers. This is evident from the warehouses full of flour mainly produced in Vojvodina or by flour mills in Serbia, which, it seems, are the sole suppliers of flour and therefore bread to Kosova. We might say that this is a purely commercial issue and not to be treated as a question of dependency, but the fact remains that Kosova, which claims to be an independent state, depends on the occupier for its staple foodstuff, bread, which it could produce itself!

Cereal production in Kosova, at least according to past statistics, was not enough to meet the needs of the population, let alone others. Wheat production sometimes almost achieved the quantities necessary to cover the entire needs of the Kosovar market, but, in recent years, wheat production appears to have marked time. The data is not precise, but it is calculated that the wheat fields of Kosova produced 320,000 to 520,000 metric tons last year if the 100,000 hectares thought or hoped to be devoted to wheat were harvested. However, we say thought or hoped, because it is suspected that not even 90,000 hectares were sown and there are reports that many peasants put their sickles to the wheat before it was ripe! Perhaps the peasants had their own reasons for this. Nevertheless, there is no reason for the half-empty or totally empty barns. Last year, there was a shortfall in wheat production of 50,000 to 80,000 metric tons or perhaps even 100,000 metric tons below the real needs of Kosova. This is a large quantity, and a heavy burden of dependency, although in this area, at least, we should stand entirely on our own feet.

The failure of Kosovar agriculture to produce adequate quantities of cereal should at least cause concern. There may be many excuses for this, but little real reason. There is nothing to justify the failure to produce the necessary wheat, or to excuse reliance on the wheat fields and barns of Vojvodina and elsewhere, however cheaply the wheat and flour may be offered to us. Kosova and its people are not rich enough to buy wheat and to leave their own land to lie fallow and have nothing to sell in order to buy what it is worth their while producing themselves. In the final analysis, they are not sufficiently free and independent to indulge themselves in dependency, especially where bread is concerned! On the contrary, Kosova is aiming at independence and the practical creation of its own state.

It was 2,500 years ago that Plato identified guaranteed food supplies as the first and foremost condition for creating a state. Plato was then just creating a state "in the mind," while we are aiming at a real state, and apparently have still not grasped that securing food is the foundation of independence and statehood. Or perhaps we are dreaming of a state while hoping to buy bread from other people.

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